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Summary of Chapters
Chapter 1
Over the last decade we have witnessed an improvement in the literature on how to measure
and compare the well-being of individuals. While the standard approach in the analysis of
individual well-being is based almost exclusively on a material dimension of income, there is a
robust evidence that individuals care about non-income dimensions of life which accordingly
should be included in such a measure. Nevertheless, even when the non-income dimensions of
life are included in the analysis of individual well-being, a majority of studies are predominantly
neglecting the notion of individual preferences in order to escape the problem of interpersonal
comparisons of well-being.
In this chapter we have employed an alternative welfare measure which takes into account
income and non-income dimensions of life while at the same time the following measure is
sensitive to the individual preferences. This is known as the equivalent income measure. We
have compared the equivalent income and income measures over 25 countries of the European
Union. The following analysis is done for 2007 and 2011, since these were the only available
years that we could use. Our contribution to the literature is reflected in the fact, that to the
best of our knowledge, there are no such studies in the literature that compares the well-being
with the following two measures for such a large set of countries.
Although we found that the welfare rankings across countries change to some extent
between the average income and average equivalent income, in spite of that when we ranked
countries according to the growth rates of income and equivalent income we observed a
substantial change in the country rankings. The following evidence implies that the choice of
the welfare metrics is empirically important. The previous results have been broadened by
computing the welfare rankings across countries once we raise the concern about the egalitarian
principle of justice. We observed that the welfare rankings across countries changed remarkably
when we take into account distributional inequalities. The evidence we have found suggest
that correlations of disadvantages between life dimensions matter since some countries have
sufficiently larger inequalities of equivalent income than inequalities of incomes.
The results we have found show that individuals across countries care about material
dimension (income) but they also care much about the non-income dimensions. Relatively the
most important non-income dimension for almost all countries is health while the least impor-
tant non-income dimension concerns the (un)employment status. We have identified the worst
off individuals according to each welfare measure and we have compared the socio-demographic
characteristics of the worst off individuals. We have seen that different well-being measures will
identify the worst off individuals with different socio-demographic characteristics. We have also
observed that the worst off individuals considerably differ over countries with respect to their
average income and non-income dimensions and average socio-demographic characteristics.
Finally, we have illustrated the degree of re-ranking between income and equivalent
income measures taking into account all individuals of a given country. While we found a
similar pattern of re-ranking between income and equivalent income across countries, the
degree of re-ranking differs across countries. The pattern that we have observed across all
countries indicated that individuals who are income rich can end up as equivalent income poor
while the opposite has not been found.
Chapter 2
An important role of social and public policies, among others, is to provide employment
opportunities and to maintain the initiative of people to work. Yet, the role of these policies
should not exclusively be concerned with the improvement of job quantity, such as ensuring
the optimal employment rate but likewise these policies should be designed to improve the
well-being of workers by enhancing job quality. Although, the precise definition of job quality
is lacking in the literature, one can reasonably argue that job quality is a multi-dimensional
concept which includes the wage dimension but also non-wage job dimensions such as job
autonomy, job security, whether a job is interesting, challenging, whether it offers a good career
opportunities, etc.
Accepting the idea that a job quality is a multi-dimensional concept leads to the important
question of aggregating various job dimensions into an overall index of job quality which can
be used as a measure of well-being on the job. Moreover, if we agree on the notion that
the preferences of workers over job dimensions should be respected, then we have to find a
proper way to weight these various job characteristics such that the construction of weights
is consistent with the preference orderings over different jobs. A measure that satisfies the
previous two requirements is known in the literature as the equivalent wage measure.
In this study we have applied the concept of equivalent wage to a specific sub-population
of recent graduates (bachelor, master and doctoral students) who are currently participating
in the labour market. In addition to the equivalent wage measure, we have used four other
well-being measures which are wage, average preferences objective measure, equal weights
objective measure and subjective job satisfaction measure. We have compared the job quality
using a large scale survey which includes nineteen countries.
We have found that individuals with various personal characteristics have different
preferences over wage and non-wage job dimensions. This result underlines the importance
of considering the heterogeneity of individual preferences seriously. We have shown that
different measures of job quality will result in substantially different ranking of countries. In
other words, the evidence we have found points out to the fact that the choice of well-being
measure is utterly important for measuring job quality. Since, we have observed a considerable
re-ranking of countries between different measures, we were encouraged to provide the evidence
on the strength and direction of relationship between the ranking for all pairs of measures.
We have found that the rank correlation is positive and statistically significant for almost all
pairwise correlations. The lowest correlation has been found between pairs of wage and equal
weights objective measure while the highest correlation has been found between subjective job
satisfaction and average preferences objective measure.
As one important issue in creating a reasonable public policies is to identify those individ-
uals who are not faring well or those who are faring very well, we have decided to identify the
individuals at the bottom and top end of the distribution according to different measures of job
quality. The results have shown that the overlap of the worst off when we use two measures is
lowest for wage and equivalent wage measures while the largest overlap occurs when we use two
objective measures. These results should not be surprising since the informational requirements
between two objective measures are more alike than the informational requirements between
wage and equivalent wage. On the other hand, the largest overlap of the best off individuals
for a pair of measures occurs between average preferences and equal weights measures while
the overlap is lowest between wage and subjective job satisfaction.
We have evaluated the gender differential in job quality across countries by using wage
and equivalent wage measures. The evidence we have found indicate that in majority of
countries, the average quality of jobs is higher for men than for women if we use the wage
measure. While even if we use the equivalent wage measure, the quality of jobs are higher
among men in most countries, still we have observed that women are either holding jobs of the
same quality or they are even faring better than men in some countries. In addition, we have
computed the willingness-to-pay for each non-wage job characteristic and we have compared
the gender differences in the willingness-to-pay across and within countries. We have found that
across almost all countries, the willingness-to-pay is higher among men, which indicates that
they are suffering more not reaching the best possible values of non-wage job characteristics.
Finally, we have presented the decomposition the total willingness-to-pay on the contributions
attributed to each non-wage job characteristic. We have found that across countries for both
men and women, having a good career prospect is relatively the most important non-wage
job characteristic while job security is relatively the least important non-wage job characteristic.
Chapter 3
In recent decades there has been a growing number of studies that investigated the effects of
personal and job characteristics on the subjective well-being on the job. Besides, the empirical
findings reveal that workers who are paid on the piece rates exert more effort and earn more
than those workers paid an hourly salary. Nevertheless, it is ambiguous what will be the effect
of performance paying schemes, since the well-being on the job can increase in wage but it can
decrease with higher level of excreted effort. Since the possible effect of performance paying
jobs on the well-being of workers stay hidden, we have tackled the following issue in this chapter
and we have provided the empirical evidence on these effects.
This chapter contributes to the literature on the subjective well-being by providing the
casual effects that the performance pay job schemes have on job satisfaction. We approximate
the well-being on the job by the subjective job satisfaction reported by individuals. We have
used the Korean Labour and Income Panel Survey which allowed us to distinguish between
the workers who are paid by performance and those who are paid by fixed rate. In addition,
we could exploit the information about the particular type of performance paying scheme that
applies to the workers who are paid by performance. Since the personality traits are possibly
correlated with the observed and unobserved explanatory variables, we have decided to estimate
the job satisfaction regression using the fixed effects estimator.
We have shown that workers in the performance pay job schemes have a higher subjective
well-being on the job than workers who are using the non-performance pay job schemes. The
following result holds true even after we have controlled for the level of earnings, attitudes
toward risk and other personal and job related characteristics. This evidence is also confirmed
for both men and women. When it comes down to the effect of wage on job satisfaction, we
observe that the effect is not apparent as someone might expect. We have found that among
all explanatory variables, health has the strongest effect on the well-being on the job.
Finally, we have exploited the information on the type of performance pay schemes in
order to analyse how different performance pay schemes affect job satisfaction. The results
have shown that workers who are employed on the individual, group and company performance
pay job schemes are more satisfied on their job than workers who are paid by the fixed amount.
The later result remains even after we have controlled for the difference in earnings, personal
and job characteristics.

Chapter 1
Social Well-Being, Life Aspects and
Individual Preferences
1.1 Introduction
The attractiveness of the concept of happiness in economics has gone historically through dif-
ferent phases. In the early 20th century, the predominant position of economists who were to
a large extent under the influence of Arthur Pigou, was that happiness plays no important role
in economics since the individual and social welfare can only be measured through the scope
of money. However, the economists renewed their interest for the concept of happiness and life
satisfaction in the 1970s. This has restored the important debate about whether it is possible to
make interpersonal comparisons of utilities. While, economists have been reluctant to indulge in
making interpersonal comparisons of utilities, they have mostly used income as a measure which
approximates the individual well-being. Nevertheless, an alternative approaches for measuring
well-being have been developed as well and the main purpose of these approaches is to provide
a more reasonable comparisons of the individual well-being.
In recent decades, the literature on welfare economics has been preoccupied with the stud-
ies which have used the data on happiness or life satisfaction (see Oswald (1997), Frey and
Stutzer (2002a), Frey and Stutzer (2002b), van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) and La-
yard (2005)). In this developing field of literature, we can find two fundamental but opposing
approaches which split on the question whether or not the data on happiness or life satisfaction
1
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can be used for making interpersonal comparisons of utility1. While the first group of scholars
who belong to the welfarist doctrine proclaim that the interpersonal comparisons of utility are
plausible and therefore, we can indulge in the process of measuring social welfare, on the other
hand the second group of scholars which belongs to the non-welfarist doctrine takes a position
that interpersonal comparisons of utility are not achievable.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasise that both of these two approaches are subject to
criticism. Sen (1985) draws attention to various uncompromising weaknesses that are contained
in the welfarist approach. The first weak point concerns the notion of physical condition neglect
which means that the subjective utility does not appropriately takes into account the physical
condition of individuals but it only cares about the mental states of individuals according to
which the well-being of individuals is being compared. A second weakness pointed out by Sen
has to do with the notion of valuational neglect which implies that the welfarist approach which
is only concerned with the psychological states of individuals undermines the reflective valua-
tions that individuals can have on their lives.
On the other hand, the non-welfarist approach suffers from the problem of paternalism,
or in other words this approach does not respect the various viewpoints that individuals have
for the important life dimensions (functionings). Although, the later problem is indeed the
fundamental one, fortunately it can be resolved since the recent findings in the literature on
welfare economics show that we can use the data on life satisfaction for measuring individual
well-being while at the same time we can respect the individual preferences over important life
dimensions. That is to say, there is a reconciliation between the welfarist and non-welfarist
approaches and the resulting concept that emerges is known as the equivalent income (see
Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) and Decancq et al. (2015)).
In this chapter, we use the individual data on life satisfaction which allows us to recover the
information on individual preferences for income and non-income dimensions of life. We have
found that besides income, individuals do care about non-income dimensions as well. These
non-income dimensions include health, quality of accommodation, quality of neighbourhood and
1Through history the concept of utility has taken various considerations. The well known classical utilitarian,
Jeremy Bentham perceived utility as a predominant stream of pleasure and pain that individuals experience
over time. Kahneman et al. (1997) distinguish between the two concepts of utility which they denote as the
experienced utility and decison utility. The experienced utility refers to Bentham’s concept of utility as a hedonic
experience of an outcome and this was a predominant concept among economists in the 19th century. At the
beginning of 20th century the concept of experienced utility was abandoned and a new concept of decision utility
which denotes the impact of an outcome in decision process became the predominant concept (like today).
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employment status. Once we have estimated preferences, we were able to compute the equiva-
lent income measure. If we agree on the notion that welfare is a multi-dimensional concept then
the following measure allows us to make well-being comparison which goes beyond a standard
income approach where income is used as the only criterion for measuring individual well-being.
We contribute to the welfare economics literature by providing the empirical evidence on the
well-being for 25 European Union countries in 2007 and 2011. Our empirical analysis is based
on the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). We compare the well-being across countries
with the equivalent income and income measures.
The results we have found indicate that the choice of well-being being measure is impor-
tant since different measures can lead to different well-being ranking of countries. We show
that the correlation of disadvantages between life dimensions matter since we have found that
across all countries the inequality of equivalent income is significantly larger than the inequality
of income. Since we want to raise a concern for the inequality in the distribution of well-being,
we have computed a social welfare functions for income and equivalent income, where a larger
weight has been given to those individuals who are on a lower position in the distribution.
Although we have found a moderate re-ranking of countries between the levels of social welfare
of income and equivalent income measures, yet we have found a substantial re-ranking between
the growth rates of social welfare of income and eqiuvalent income.
We address an important point which concerns the identification of the worst off individu-
als according to each of these two well-being measures. All individuals which have been found
below the threshold of the 20th percentile for a given well-being measure, were classified among
the worst off. We also compare the socio-demographic characteristics of the worst off individuals
for income and equivalent income measures. We have found that different well-being measure
identifies different worst off individuals with respect to the income and non-income dimensions
and socio-demographic characteristics. We also complement the later findings by illustrating
the percentage of individuals who are belonging to the worst off according to both income and
equivalent income measures.
We illustrate the total willingness-to-pay that individuals would pay for reaching the best
possible value for all non-income dimensions. We show that the average share of willingness-to-
pay in income differs across various socio-demographic groups and across countries. After we
have obtained the total willingness-to-pay, we have applied the Shapley value decomposition in
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order to decompose total willingness-to-pay to relative contributions of each non-income dimen-
sion. We have found that health is relatively the most important non-income dimension across
all countries and the relative importance of health dimension is more conspicuous for older
than for younger population. It is quite surprising that the unemployment status is relatively
the least important dimension across all countries. Nevertheless, the relative contributions to
unemployment status have gained importance for some countries that have been suffered quite
substantially during the recent economic crisis in 2007 and 2008.
Finally, we illustrate the size of re-ranking between income and equivalent income measures
that happens for all individuals within a country. The size of this re-ranking over countries is
quantified with the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Although we have found that the
rank for both welfare measures overlaps for a large number of individuals within countries, yet
there is a considerable fraction of individuals who experience a noticeable re-ranking between
income and equivalent income.
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents an overview of the
literature on the multi-dimensional well-being measures. In the same section we illustrate the
conceptional framework that we follow in this study and we also present the underling principles
which are providing a normative justification for using a particular well-being measure. In sec-
tion 1.3 we present the methodology for estimating equivalent income from the satisfaction data
and we illustrate the empirical specification for our satisfaction regression. Section 1.4 describes
the econometric model for the satisfaction equation. In section 1.5 we illustrate the concept of
Shapley value and Shapley value decomposition. Section 1.6 describes the data. In section 1.7
we describe our empirical strategy for constructing income and non-income dimensions of life.
Section 1.8 presents the results. In section 1.9 we conclude.
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1.2 Inequality, Satisfaction and Preferences
In this section we present the conceptual framework and we provide an overview of the three
approaches for measuring the multi-dimensional well-being. The approaches that have been
singled out in the literature are the capabilities approach, subjective well-being approach and
equivalent income approach. In addition, we present a set of principles which are providing
a normative justification for each approach. Hence, different principles would imply different
approachs for measuring well-being. The illustration of these principles is mainly based on
Decancq et al. (2014).
Let us start with illustrating the conceptual framework. We assume that each in-
dividual i has the m-dimensional vector of aspects of life, ψi = (ψ1i, ψ2i, . . . , ψmi) where
i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , N), m ∈ (1, 2, . . . ,M) and ψi is defined on Rm+ . A vector of aspects of life
characterizes the life situation of each individual and it can consist of various dimensions like
income (or consumption), leisure, health, social status, employment status, acquired level of
education, etc. We assume that each individual i has a well-defined preferences2 over aspects
of life which can be represented as ψiRiψ
′
i if individual weakly prefers ψi over ψ
′
i, ψiPiψ
′
i if
individual strictly prefers ψi over ψ
′
i, and ψiIiψ
′
i if individual is indifferent between ψi and ψ
′
i.
The observed level of satisfaction of an individual i, evaluated at her vector of life dimensions
ψi will be represented with the satisfaction function which we denote with Si.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Fleurbaey et al. (2009), Decancq et al. (2014) and Decancq
et al. (2015) it may not be correct to assume that we will observe the true level of satisfaction,
since it can happen that some individuals do not report their level of satisfaction truthfully.
For instance, one can find situations where individuals are distracted by various factors while
answering the satisfaction question or their answers can be influenced by a certain mental states
they are going through at the time of the interview. That is to say, the data on satisfaction
can be manipulated by the feelings of individuals, the order in which the questions on various
2We assume the preference relation to be complete, transitive, continuous and weakly monotonic. Com-
pleteness of preferences implies that for all consumption goods x1, x2 ∈ X we have either x1  x2 or x2  x1
or both. Transitivity of preferences implies that for any consumption good x1, x2, x3 ∈ X, if x1  x2 and
x2  x3, then x1  x3. Preferences are said to be continuous if for any sequence of pairs of consumption goods{
(xn1 , x
n
2 )
}∞
n=1
with xn1  xn2 ∀n, x1 = limn→∞ xn1 and x2 = limn→∞ xn2 , we have x1  x2. Preferences are said
to be weakly monotonic if for any bundle of goods the agent always prefers the consumption bundle that have
more of every good in it relative to other feasible bundles or the agent is at least as good with the bundle that
have more of at least one good and not less in any other good. Formally if X is the consumption set, where
X = RL+ = {x, y ∈ RL, x` ≥ 0, y` ≥ 0 for ` = 1, . . . , L} then for any x, y ∈ X such that y  x implies y  x or
such that y > x and y ≮ x implies y  x.
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dimensions of life have been asked in a survey (see Schwarz and Strack (1988)) and with the
process in which individuals compare their own life satisfaction with the life satisfaction of other
people (see Clark (2003)). Since we assume that the true level of satisfaction is not truthfully
observable, we will introduce the error term, ηi, that represents the amount by which the ob-
served level of satisfaction of individual, Si, differs from the true (unobserved to statisticians)
level of satisfaction of individual. We denote the true level of satisfaction with ωi. The observed
level of satisfaction for each individual can be represented as follows
Si = S(ωi, ηi) (1.1)
where S denotes the general functional form of life satisfaction. We assume that ωi represented
with a function ω, that is ωi = ω(ψi, Ai, Ri), where (Ai) denotes the level of aspirations and (Ri)
denotes the preference orderings (Ri). The complete life characterization for each individual is
represented with the triple (ψi, Ri, Si) which we use for evaluating the well-being of individuals.
Although, we have not yet specified a vector of personal characteristics, nevertheless they will
be included in the triple, through Ri or Si.
After we have introduced the notation, we can now define a well-being measure,
WB(ψi, Ri, Si), which represents the well-being of each individual evaluated at her vector of
life aspects (ψi), given her preference orderings (Ri) and given her satisfaction function (Si).
However, we are still facing a few difficulties. The important question that is certainly difficult
to answer is concerned with the choice of life dimensions which one needs to consider when
constructing a measure of well-being. If we agree on the notion that individual preferences
should be respected then it seems reasonable to claim that our vector of life dimensions needs
to include all life dimensions which are important for individuals. It is immediately obvious
from the following proposition that it will be difficult to figure out from the pragmatic point of
view what is the right method for elicitation of individual preferences but also how specific one
should be with respect to the choice of life dimensions which individuals consider important.
In the literature, we could find the opposing views about what makes these important life
dimensions. One group of researchers that belongs to the capability approach discard the idea
that the important life dimensions should be selected on the basis of revealed preferences since
the preferences of individuals might not be truthfully disclosed. A different viewpoint is taken
by Nussbaum (2006, 2011) who suggests a list of functionings (capabilities) that are objectively
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needed for a prosperous life. On the other hand, Sen (2004) argues that the list of relevant
functionings should remain undefined unless there is a public consensus about what is the right
choice for these dimensions3. Nevertheless, we will abstract from these issues since the purpose
of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive discussion about the normative justifications
behind the choice of important life dimensions.
Once an agreement is reached on the list of important life dimensions which will be in-
cluded in a measure of well-being, we are immediately confronted with another dilemma on how
to aggregate these various dimensions of life over individuals in a synthetic indicator of well-
being. If we are interested in making interpersonal evaluations of multi-dimensional well-being
then we need to find a proper social aggregation procedure which will represent the aggregation
of social orderings over these vectors of life dimensions. However, before one could proceed
with the aggregation, one still needs to construct an individual well-being measure which al-
lows for such weighting procedure that ultimately respects individual preferences over these
dimensions of life. Before we illustrate the first principle, we have to assume consistency be-
tween the valuation function and ordinal preferences. It can be shown that any binary relation
that is complete, transitive and continuous over vector of functionings can be represented by a
continuous function νi or more formally this can be stated as
For all ψi, ψ
′
i ∈ Rm+ , νi(ψi) ≥ νi(ψ′i)⇐⇒ ψi  ψ′i (or equivalently ψiRiψ′i) (1.2)
where νi : Rm+ → R. One should note that each individual can have his own evaluation function,
νi, which represents his preference relations over the vector of functionings. Every increasing
monotonic transformation of νi will guarantee that a preference relation, Ri of individual i over
these vectors of functionings, will be satisfied. Nevertheless, it is certainly not a trivial task
to define this valuation function and we find a great deal of contention about this issue in the
literature. Sen (1985) suggested an “intersection approach” which is based on the Dominance
Principle. The Dominance Principle can be formally represented as follows
Principle 1 (Dominance Principle). Suppose that two individuals, i and j have different
rankings over the dimensions of life, Ri 6= Rj. Then we have (i) (ψi, Ri, Si)  (ψj , Rj , Sj) if
ψiRψj ∀R, and (ii) (ψi, Ri, Si)  (ψj , Rj , Sj) if ψiPψj ∀R.
3The list of relevant dimensions has been suggested by Stiglitz et al. (2009a), the OECD (2011) and the
European Statistical System (2011) where the following list consisted of consumption of commodities, health,
housing quality, employment status, leisure, social interactions and environment.
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According to this principle, the comparison of well-being of two individuals, i and j, will
not depend either on their preferences over the vector of functionings, nor on their satisfaction
functions but will only depend on the preference orderings which belong to a feasible binary
representation of preferences. An obvious weakness of this principle is that it implies only
the ordinal preference orderings and the well-being comparisons based on this principle could
regularly lead us to ambiguous conclusions. Unfortunately, this is not the fundamental problem
with the Dominance Principle. If we accept the idea that individual sovereignty should be
respected by acknowledging individual preference rankings over important life dimensions, then
it can be easily shown that this idea will be in contrast with the logic that is implied by the
Dominance Principle (see Brun and Tungodden (2004) and Fleurbaey (2007)). The Personal
Preference Principle according to which the individual preferences are respected can be formally
stated as follows
Principle 2 (Personal Preference Principle). Suppose that for each individual i we com-
pare two individual life situations where each life situation differ in the vector of function-
ings. Then we have (i) (ψi, Ri, Si)  (ψ′i, Ri, Si) if and only if ψiRiψ′i, and (ii) (ψi, Ri, Si) 
(ψ′i, Ri, Si) if and only if ψiPiψ
′
i.
The Personal Preference Principle implies that if the individual i (strictly) prefers a vector
of functionings ψi over a vector of functionings ψ
′
i, then this individual is (strictly) better off
when ψiRiψ
′
i (ψiPiψ
′
i) holds true. Unfortunately, we will not be able to develop a synthetic
well-being measure that is based on the Dominance Principle and Personal Preference Princi-
ple because these two principles are conflicting each other. More precisely the assumption of
transitivity of preferences would be violated in such a case (see Fleurbaey et al. (2009)).
1.2.1 The Capability Approach
A prominent concept of multi-dimensional well-being that has been established by Amartya
Sen in the 1980s is known as the capability approach (see Sen (1985, 1997)). Sen rejects the
subjective welfarism since it leads to physical condition neglect and valuation neglect but he
also rejects all other approaches to well-being which are based on income or assets (material
resources) exclusively. Sen proposes a well-being concept that is based on the functionings or
achievements that individuals are able to accomplish (i.e. being well-nourished, being well-
dressed). It is important to recognize that the functionings are not the same as the inputs
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(resources) which we transform in the process of reaching our life achievements because whether
we have succeeded to accomplish what we wanted or not will by large depended on our individual
characteristics and opportunities in life that we had. A concept of well-being, suggested by Sen
is represented with the well-being measure which is based on functionings. We denote this
measure with WBfi . Formally, the following measure can be represented as follows
WBfi (ψi, Ri, Si) = νi(ψi) (1.3)
where νi represents the valuation function. It is important to emphasise that two individuals
can have exactly the same vector of functionings but with a quite different implications which
have brought each of these individuals to have such a vector of functionings. Realizing this
situation, Sen suggests that besides the vector of functionings, one needs to take into account
the capabilities, that is a set of feasible functionings which are attainable to individuals.
Nevertheless, it turns out that the capability approach suffers from several serious problems.
The first problem is that we cannot find a general solution on how to compare the opportunity
sets between individuals when we allow for heterogeneity of individual preferences. The second
problem is that the evaluation of opportunity sets violates the Compensation Principle (see
Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013)) which represents a fundamental point in the theory of equality
of opportunity. Based on these critiques, it seems that measuring well-being with the capabilities
approach suffers from some serious weaknesses which are presently not possible to resolve.
1.2.2 The Subjective Well-Being Approach
The literature on happiness and life satisfaction have been growing rapidly in the last couple
of decades. Economists have utilized a lot of effort to make their contribution in this field.
The popularity of economic studies on happiness and life satisfaction can be attributed by and
large to the data which has recently become available. A prominent approach for measuring
well-being that economists have taken concerns either the usage of the question on the life
satisfaction or the question on happiness and both of these questions are appearing nowadays in
many representative surveys. A large group of economists believes that both of these questions
can be used to represent the standard concept of utility which we call the subjective well-
being. However, another group of economists together with psychologists have realized that the
concept of life satisfaction and the concept of happiness is not the same. For the time being
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we will not discuss the conceptual differences between happiness and life satisfaction but in the
upcoming sections we will provide the argumentation why these two concepts are not supposed
to designate the same thing. Notwithstanding, we have witnessed a growing number of robust
empirical studies that have dealt with the notion of subjective well-being. The empirical evidence
points out that the subjective well-being is affected by income but interestingly it is affected by
a larger extend by non-income dimensions like health conditions, labour market status, social
interactions, political freedom, etc. Another robust finding in the literature on the subjective
well-being states that people compare their own well-being with some reference group that they
find appropriate to be compared with. The mechanism of adaptation where people change their
aspirations depending on their current life situation has been found in the literature as well (see
Loewenstein and Ubel (2008)).
The approach that uses the data on life satisfaction and happiness in order to measure the
well-being is known under the name of subjective welfarism. The proponents of this approach
assume that the scores obtained from the data on life satisfaction and happiness can be used as a
measure of well-being that is entirely comparable between individuals. The subjective well-being
measure, WBsi , can be represented as
WBsi (ψi, Ri, Si) = Si(ψi) (1.4)
The underling idea behind the subjective well-being measure is that this measure combines
the information on different life dimensions which are then aggregated into a single measure of
individual well-being. Although this approach seems as a very elegant solution to the problem
of finding a proper well-being measure which can be used for making interpersonal comparisons,
yet we will see that this concept of subjective welfarism is not immune to some fundamental
problems.
Although the predominant standpoint among the economists is that both the notion of
happiness and life satisfaction resemble the same concept of utility, nevertheless the psycholo-
gists greatly oppose this view. In the psychological literature, there exists a distinction between
these two concepts where the concept of happiness refers to affects or feelings while the concept
of life satisfaction refers to the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understand-
ing through thought, experience which we call cognition (see Kahneman and Krueger (2006)).
A similar distinction exists in welfare economics which differentiates between hedonic welfarism
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and “preference welfarism”. While the hedonic welfarism is primarily concerned on acquiring
individual happiness (Kahneman et al. (2004), Layard (2005), the preference welfarism relies on
the individual preferences which then serve as a proper measure for deciding on important life
aspects. Accepting the view propagated by the hedonic welfarism, one neglects the notion that
individual preferences are important in measuring individual well-being which does not seem
to stand as a reasonable argument to make. Although, it does not seem plausible to dismiss
the feelings of happiness as something which individuals do not find important in life. Another
weakness of the hedonic welfarism approach comes from the fact that it leaves individuals ir-
responsible for their feelings of happiness or sadness although the following approach uses this
information for measuring individual well-being.
A different approach for measuring subjective well-being which contrasts the one based on
the individual feelings of happiness, uses the cognitive ideas of individuals about their life. The
individual assessment of various life dimensions can be obtained from the individual satisfaction
function. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the preference welfarism would make sense
only if individuals have a complete preference ordering defined over important dimensions of
life. Unfortunately, we must stress out that understanding of preference ordering has not been
perceived unanimously in the literature.
Kahneman et al. (1997) distinguish between the two concepts of utilities, which they refer
to as the experienced utility and decision utility. The concept of experienced utility refers to
a well known Bentham’s concept of utility which can be understood as a hedonic experience
of an outcome. This was a predominating concept among economists in the 19th century. At
the beginning of the 20th century the concept of experienced utility was abandoned and a new
concept of decision utility emerged as a leading one. The following two concepts are quite
distinctive and moreover one should not confuse the preference ordering Ri with the notion of
revealed preferences. The individual satisfaction function Si would be a proper characterization
of individual preferences if the preference ranking, Ri over life dimensions is achieved. This is
called the consistency assumption and it can be represented as follows
For all ψi, ψ
′
i ∈ Rm+ , Si(ψi) ≥ Si(ψ′i)⇐⇒ ψiRiψ′i (1.5)
An important point that needs to be made concerning the interpretation of satisfaction
function Si. The characterization of individual preferences with the satisfaction function would
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be valid as long as one assumes an ordinal concept of preferences. On the contrary, a cardinal
representation of the individual satisfaction function, Si presupposes a particular scaling factors
which are attributed to a process of individual adaptation (or habit formation) and forming a
frame of reference (peer comparison effects). That is to say, a cardinal representation of Si
would not be consistent with the individual revealed preferences and if we want to find the
identity between Si and Ri then the scaling factors needs to be purged out from the satisfaction
function, Si which would then result having an ordinal representation of preferences. Thus,
the subjective well-being which is implied by the consistency assumption would respect the
intrapersonal evaluation of life aspects, or in other it would respect the Personal Preference
Principle. Unfortunately, this would not suffice if we want to make the interpersonal evaluation
of life aspects between two individuals who have the same preference rankings but their scaling
factors differ or when the preference ranking changes between two points of time for the same
individual. However, the later requirement could be achieved by the Same Preference Principle
which can be represented as:
Principle 3 (Same Preference Principle). Suppose that two individuals, i and j have the
identical preferences, Ri = Rj ≡ R. Then we have (i) (ψi, Ri, Si)  (ψj , Rj , Sj) if and only if
ψiRiψj (or equivalently ψiRjψj), and (ii) (ψi, Ri, Si)  (ψj , Rj , Sj) if and only if ψiPiψj (or
equivalently ψiPjψj).
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that the subjective well-being measure is incom-
patible with the Same Preference Principle. Thus, we cannot directly relate the information on
life satisfaction to subjective well-being measure if we want to respeact individual preferences.
1.2.3 The Equivalent Income Approach
We are now turning to illustrate the concept of equivalent income. Unlike the previous concepts
of well-being, the concept of equivalent income complies with the Same Preference Principle. In
order to formalize the concept of equivalent income we have to introduce a vector of life dimen-
sions ψi(yi, xi) which consists of income, yi and non-income dimensions, xi = (x1i, x2i, . . . , xmi)
for each individual i. In addition, we have to know the preference orderings4 of individuals.
4Contemporary economic literature has suggested three approaches for the identification of individual prefer-
ences. These approaches include the revealed preferences, stated preferences and preference identification utilizing
the data on the life satisfaction (happiness). The revealed preferences approach is based on observing choices
made by individuals which then allows to identify the preferences. The requirement needed for the identification
is that individual rationally decided over their choices. Nevertheless, whether this condition is indeed satisfied is
very much debatable. The stated preferences approach is based on the hypothetical evaluations where individuals
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We also have to specify the reference value for the vector of non-income dimensions which we
denote with x˜. We can now define the equivalent income, y∗i , as the amount (monetary value)
which makes any individual indifferent between (yi, xi) and (y
∗
i , x˜), or equivalently using the
preference relation we have (yi, xi)Ii(y
∗
i , x˜). The equivalent income represents the amount of
income which makes any individual indifferent between her current life position (i.e. achieved
life aspect) and some hypothetical situation where all of her non-income dimensions are set at
the reference values. We represent the equivalent income measure, WBei as follows
WBei (ψi, Ri, Si) = y
∗
i (1.6)
An important feature of the equivalent income is that it is given in monetary terms and
since the equivalent income has cardinal properties it can be used for interpersonal comparison
of well-being. Moreover, the equivalent income unlike the life satisfaction approach satisfies
the Same Preference Principle or in other words it respects the preference rankings (assuming
monotonicity in income) of individuals over the important dimensions of life. The equivalent
income is insensitive to any scaling factors (aspirations and expectations) so that the interper-
sonal comparisons are made on the basis of ordinal representation of utilities. Alternatively, we
can represent the equivalent income as follows
y∗i = yi −WTPi(xi → x˜;ψi) (1.7)
where WTPi(xi → x˜;ψi) represents the amount of willingness to pay of individual i if the current
level of all her non-income dimensions were to be set at the reference value. We can easily see
from the equation above that the equivalent income corresponds to income if all non-income
dimensions are already at the reference values. The underlying logic of this approach is that
once we have set the reference values for all non-income dimensions then the only important
information that we need for making the interpersonal comparisons of well-being concerns the
income level of individuals. The fundamental question is still how to define these reference
values for non-income dimensions. A plausible solution is to set the reference values for each
non-income dimension at the level to which all individuals would aspire. Although it would
are asked to reveal their willingness to pay for commodities that are not supplied by the market. Whether this
method is a plausible one or not is still genuinely debatable in the literature. The third approach for measuring
preferences uses the data on life satisfaction (happiness). The individual satisfaction function, Si which obeys
the consistency assumption represents the ordinal rankings of individuals over important life dimensions.
Chapter 1 14
be easier to come up with such reference values for some non-income dimensions (i.e. health)
while for other non-dimensions (i.e. working time or leisure) the reference values are very much
debatable, still it seems quite reasonable to try to find a solution where these reference values
represent a level which all individuals wish to achieve.
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1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Estimating Equivalent Income
In this section we show how to estimate the equivalent income using the data on life satisfaction.
The starting point for estimating the equivalent income is to have the information on the live
satisfaction at the individual level (Si). Currently a significant number of representative surveys
contain the question on the self-reported satisfaction with life. Basically, the following question
can be found in surveys: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you currently with your life in general?
The responders are usually offered a discrete or categorical (or combination of both) scale of
possible answers. The empirical relationship between the life satisfaction as the dependent
variable and the right hand side variables can be written as follows
Si = α+ (β + ΛZi) ln yi + (φ+ ΩZi)
′Fi + Ziθ + i (1.8)
where Fi is a vector of non-income dimensions of life, ln yi denotes the logarithm of income, Zi
is a vector of personal characteristics, β, φ, θ, Λ, Ω and α are coefficients to be estimated and
i represents the error term. We have introduced the logarithmic transformation of income in
order to allow for a non-linear relationship between the life satisfaction and income. This seems
as a plausible assumption to make since it has been shown that the effect of income on the life
satisfaction is not necessarily constant across the income distribution (see Clark and Oswald
(1996) and Layard et al. (2008)).
We would like to emphasise that different individuals would probably consider different
life dimensions to be important in their lives. A list of non-income dimensions which are com-
monly used in the literature include the employment status, health, housing, environment, social
protection and the like. Although, the purpose of this section is only to illustrate the method-
ological framework for the estimation of the equivalent income, in the subsequent sections we
will put forward the arguments concerning the choice of relevant life dimensions. It is important
to note that even though the variables contained in Zi produce a direct effect on the level of
satisfaction, the main role of these variables is to capture the aspiration levels and norms that
might differ across the individuals. The variables contained in Zi produce a direct effects on Si
through the coefficient θ. These effects should be interpreted only as a shift in the level of life
satisfaction.
Chapter 1 16
Another important point concerns the issue of heterogeneity of individual preferences. One
approach that allows us to model heterogeneity of preferences is to include the interactions of
individual characteristics (Zi) with income (ln yi) and non-income dimensions (Fi). The follow-
ing argument is supported by the claim that individuals with different personal characteristics
have a heterogeneous opinion on the list of important life dimensions. The indirect effect that
the individual characteristics have on the life satisfaction, through their interaction with life
dimensions, change the marginal rate of substitutions between life dimensions. In other words,
these effects change the slope of the satisfaction function. The marginal rate of substitution
between the income and non-income dimension d can be written as follows
MRSy,Fidi ≡
∂Si/∂Fid
∂Si/∂yi
=
(φ+ ΩZi)
′yi
β + ΛZi
(1.9)
where MRSy,Fidi denotes the marginal rate of substitution for individual i between the income
and non-income dimension d. One should notice that although the interaction terms between
Zi and yi and between Zi and Fi are necessary if one wants to introduce the heterogeneity of
individual preferences, still we would observe identical preferences for those individuals with
the same values of regressors in Zi. As it was already mentioned, we keep the marginal rates
of substitution between income and non-income dimensions constant. Although one can argue
that the following assumption is undoubtedly questionable, we could not do better than that
with the data we have at our disposal.
We illustrate the necessary steps for computing the equivalent income. In the first step,
we set up the reference values for all non-income dimensions which we denote F i. In the second
step we calculate the equivalent income, y∗i , such that the individual i is indifferent between
the vector (y∗i , F i) and his actual life situation (yi, Fi). In other words, one has to solve for the
system of these two equations for y∗i
Si = α+ (β + ΛZi) ln yi + (φ+ ΩZi)
′Fi + Ziθ + i (1.10)
Si = α+ (β + ΛZi) ln y
∗
i + (φ+ ΩZi)
′F + Ziθ + i (1.11)
After we solve this system of equations we arrive at the equivalent income equation
y∗i = yi exp
[(
φ+ ΩZi
β + ΛZi
)′ (
Fi − F
)]
(1.12)
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One can immediately see that the equivalent income y∗i would collapse to income yi if the
values of all non-income dimensions were exactly on the reference values. Moreover, if the values
of non-income dimensions, Fi is below the chosen reference value, F i, then for every increase
in non-income dimensions (relative to income) the equivalent income will increase. We observe
that the direct effect of individual characteristics Zi on the life satisfaction, Si, that is captured
by the coefficient θ drops out from the equivalent income equation. One can also notice that
the equivalent income equation has no error term i because it has been cancelled out once we
have solved the system of equations given in 1.10 and 1.11. This implies that the idiosyncratic
differences over individuals linked to aspirations and adaptations play no role in computing the
equivalent income. Whether someone finds this acceptable or not is an ethical question which
determines the justification for our choice of the well-being measure. One can also notice that
the equivalent income does not depend on the subjective life satisfaction since the following
term has been cancelled out once we have solved the system of equations.
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1.3.2 Life Satisfaction Regression
In this section we illustrate our empirical strategy for estimating the life satisfaction regression.
We have specified five different life satisfaction regression models. We start with the model that
includes only a parsimonious specification and then in each subsequent model we hve broad-
ened our specification by including the additional set of regressors. Each specification uses a
set of regressors which comprises of logarithm of income (ln yi), the quality of accommodation
(ai), health (hi), the quality of neighbourhood (ni) and unemployment (ui). The logarithm of
income represents the income dimension while the last four variables represent the non-income
dimensions. Other control variables that we have included in a vector of personal characteristics
(Zi) consist of age, gender, marital status, the level of education an individual has obtained, a
dummy variable if an individual has at least one child, a dummy variable if living in the urban
areas, country dummies and a dummy variable for 2011.
In order to account for individual heterogeneity we have also included a set of variables
which represents the individual personality (Pi). These variables measure the extent to which
an individual is optimistic, cheerful, calm, active and has a interest in life. As we do not have
a panel data we cannot use the fixed effects in the satisfaction regression to control for the
unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity. However, we can control for the unobserved hetero-
geneity that comes from the difference in individual personality by including these personality
traits variables.
It is important to stress out form the outset that our aim is to estimate a latent variable
model which assumes that the subjective life satisfaction is an ordered categorical response
variable. Although we would ideally like to obtain the causal estimates of the regressors on
the life satisfaction, unfortunately we could still be sceptical about whether our estimates are
influenced by the unobservables we have not managed to control for in the estimation. Actually,
most of the literature on life satisfaction and happiness has the same problem of providing the
causal inference of the variables included in the life satisfaction regression.
Yet, we should bear in mind that we are not after finding the behavioural effects on the
life satisfaction but our purpose is to find the relationships between the life satisfaction and a
vector of variables which represent income and non-income dimensions of life. For that purpose
we will use the ordered logit model where the probability of observing a particular category of
the dependent variable corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function which
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includes the error term lies within the limits of the thresholds estimated for the dependent
variable. The specification of the life satisfaction regression that we have used can be written
as
Si = α+ β ln yi + Fiγ + Ziθ + Piϑ+ i (1.13)
where Fi = (ai, hi, ni, ui) is a vector of non-income dimensions of life, α, β, γ, θ and ϑ are
parameters to be estimated while i denotes the error term.
At this stage there are two important points to be emphasised. We are primarily interested
in estimating the marginal rate of substitution between the income and non-income dimensions.
For that matter we need the coefficients β and γ. The remaining coefficients, α, θ and ϑ are not
of any particular interest concerning the estimation of individual preferences. In other words,
the coefficients on the income and non-income life dimensions are necessary for obtaining the
information on the indifference curves, while the coefficients on the personal characteristics and
personality traits are considered just as the scaling factors of indifference curves. Assuming the
linear coefficients in the life satisfaction regression, we put forward the arguments which tells us
that the indifference curves are parallel lines since the marginal rates of substitution between
income and non-income dimensions are constant.
Once we have introduced the interaction terms into our life satisfaction regression, we
have immediately changed the coefficients on income and non-income dimensions. We have
interacted income and non-income dimensions with a vector of socio-demographic characteristics
of individuals (Πi). This vector comprises of a dummy variable that equals 1 if an individual
is male (malei), if an individual belongs to the non-middle age group which is defined for age
below 45 and age above 65 year (nonmiddlei), if an individual is married (marriedi), if an
individual lives in urban area (urbani), if an individual has acquired a lower level of education
(lowereduci) and if an individual has any children (childi). Finally, the specification of the
satisfaction regression which includes an interaction terms can be written as
Si = α+ (β + ΛΠi) ln yi + (γ + ΩΠi)
′Fi + Ziθ + Piϑ+ i (1.14)
where α, β, γ, θ and ϑ represents direct effects while Λ and Ω are matrices of the interaction
terms to be estimated. Respecting the natural ordering of the self reported level of satisfaction,
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Si, we have estimated the equation 1.14 with the ordered logit model where all parameters of
the model are estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
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1.4 The Econometric Model
1.4.1 An Ordered Logit Regression
This section illustrates the ordered logit model which we have employed for estimating the
life satisfaction regression (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Train (2009)). Two popular
estimation strategies known for the qualitative dependent variable model are the multinomial
logistic or probit regressions and ordered outcomes models (i.e. ordered logit model or ordered
probit model). A weak point of the multinomial logit model or probit model is that these
models are throwing away orderedness of categories of dependent variable which is clearly not
applicable in our setting. Hence, we have reasonably opted for the ordered outcome model as our
estimation strategy. The regression model for a latent variable Y ∗ (unobserved to statisticians)
can be represented as follows
Y ∗i = X
′
iβ + i (1.15)
where Xi is a vector of independent explanatory variables and i is the error term. Since we
do not observe the latent variable Y ∗i , we relate it to the observed ordered categorical variable,
Yi, which then depends on a series of increasing thresholds as we move from the lowest value of
Y ∗i to the highest value of Y
∗
i . We define the ordered model for an kth possible alternatives as
follows
Yi =

0 if Y ∗ ≤ α0
1 if α0 < Y
∗ ≤ α1
...
k if Y ∗ > αk
(1.16)
where j = 1, ..., k and where the threshold parameters αj are assumed to be strictly increasing in
the category j, ∀j, αj < αj+1 and by definition we have α0 = −∞ and αj−1 = +∞. Assuming
that the dependent variable Yi takes the value j if the jth alternative is preferred over other
alternatives, we can then define the response probability of observing the outcome j for each
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individual i in the following way
Pr[Yi = j] = Pr[αj−1 < Y ∗i ≤ αj ]
= Pr[αj−1 < X ′iβ + i ≤ αj ]
= Pr[αj−1 −X ′i < i ≤ αj −X ′iβ]
= F (αj −X ′iβ)− F (αj−1 −X ′iβ) (1.17)
where F (·) is the cumulative density function (cdf) of an error term i. In the ordered logit
model the functional form for the conditional probability that individual i select the alternative
jth is specified as follows
pij = Λ(αj −X ′iβ)− Λ(αj−1 −X ′iβ) (1.18)
where Λ(·) is the logistic cdf with the following property Λ(z) = ez/(1 + ez) while a random
variable z ∼ Logistic (0, pi2/3). The density function of the dependent variable yi, can be simply
written as the product of the probabilities when the outcome variable takes a particular value
from the set of available categories. The probability density function (pdf) of the dependent
variable, Yi, for an individual i is defined as follows
f(Yi) = p
Yi1
i1 × · · · × pYijij =
n∏
i=1
k∏
j=1
p
Yij
ij (1.19)
Using the probability model from the equation 1.18 and assuming the independence over i, the
log-likelihood function can be written as
LN (α, β) =
N∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
Ij(Yij) ln
{
Λ(αj −X ′iβ)− λ(αj−1 −X ′iβ)
}
=
N∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
Ij(Yij) ln
{
exp(αj −X ′iβ)
1 + exp(αj −X ′iβ)
− exp(αj−1 −X
′
iβ)
1 + exp(αj−1 −X ′iβ)
}
=
N∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
Ij(Yij) ln pij (1.20)
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where Ij(Yij) is an indicator function defined as follows
Ij(Yij) =

1 if Yij = j
0 otherwise
(1.21)
Differentiating the log-likelihood function with respect to β and (k − 1) threshold parameters,
α1, · · · , αk−1, and setting the first order conditions to zero, we can find the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE) for β̂ and α̂1, · · · , α̂k−1 that solve the maximization problem. Assuming that
we have M regressors (excluding the intercept) in the equation 1.15 and assuming that the
ordered logit model has k alternatives, the total number of parameters to be estimated is given
by M + k − 1.
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1.5 The Shapley Value and Shapley Value Decomposition
This section provides an overview of the Shapley value and Shapley value decomposition which
decomposes the distributional statistic of interest by the factors components (see Shapley (1988)
and Shorrocks (2013)). A popular application of the Shapley value decomposition can be found
in the literature on inequality and poverty (see Sastre and Trannoy (2002) and Kolenikov and
Shorrocks (2005)).
One can either decompose the aggregate inequality indices into the population subgroups
that are defined by some demographic characteristics of interest or one can decompose a partic-
ular welfare measure (i.e. disposable income) on its components. In the later case, the Shapley
value method is often used for decomposing the poverty index into the growth effect that rep-
resents the difference in mean incomes and into the redistribution effect that represents the
difference in relative income shares. We will illustrate the Shapley value decomposition in a
particular setting that has been of interest in our work. This concerns decomposition of the
willingness-to-pay on the contributions of non-income dimensions.
1.5.1 The Shapley Value
The Shapley value is a concept that originates from the cooperative game theory which offers
a solution on how to divide the surplus between the players of the game. Let us assume that
the game consists of n agents where each agent is denoted by i and the total number of agents
is denoted by N where N ∈ {1, ..., i, ..., n}. In addition, there is a subset of agents denoted
by S ⊂ N who are contemplating about the procedure which can divide the gains from the
cooperation in a fair way. The payoff that can be achieved by any coalition that is formed by
the players, S ∈ 2S , can be represented with the function υ(S) where υ : {S | S ⊂ N}→ R and
υ(∅) = 0. We can define the marginal contribution that a player i makes to the coalition S as
follows
ΠS(S, υ) = υ(S)− υ(S \ {i}) (1.22)
where υ(S \ {i}) denotes the payoff formed by the coalition S that excludes the contribution
made by player i. Because the players form their coalitions at random there is an equal chance
that any order of players that form that coalition will be accomplished. Due to the fact that
the contribution of each player i is dependent on the order in which that player forms the
coalition, the Shapley value method will attach the weights to each possible coalition according
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to its probability and then it will ascribe to every player the average value of the marginal
contributions that the following player brought up to all possible coalitions. The reason why we
need to compute the average value of all marginal contributions across all possible combinations
for making the coalition comes from the fact that we do not have a natural order of elimination
for the coalitions that could be formed.
We will denote the number of possible permutations of n players by n! while the number
of individuals that form a coalition S we denote by s. We are interested to know the expected
marginal contribution made by player i over the whole randomization of coalitions that can be
formed in the game. For every permutation in a given coalition S ∈ N with i ∈ S, we have
(n−s−1)! permutations for the players that complement the coalition S. The Shapley value of
player i, Γi(N, υ), shows the expected marginal value that the player i contributes after joining
the coalition S in any possible way s. Formally this can be represented as follows
Γi(N, υ) =
∑
S⊂N
i∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(
υ(S \ {i})
)
(1.23)
It is important to note that the Shapley value decomposition satisfies two important prop-
erties. First, the Shapley value decomposition satisfies the symmetry condition which means
that the order in which we introduce factors is not important for evaluating the contribution
of each factor. Second, the Shapley value decomposition satisfies the additivity property which
means that the sum of all factors taken together adds up to the total amount (payoff). Applica-
tions of the Shapley value decomposition are convenient in decomposing inequality and poverty
indices where the marginal contribution of each factor to an index is computed by eliminating
the role of that factor in a series of sequences and computing the index for each possible combi-
nation. The total contribution of each factor is computed as the mean value of marginal effects
for that factor and for all series of sequences.
1.5.2 Shapley Value Decomposition of the Willingness-to-pay
Let us illustrate the procedure for the Shapley value decomposition of the total WTP by factor
components which in our setting are represented by non-income dimensions. Assume that each
individual i has a willingness-to-pay for each non-income dimension of life. A set that includes
all non-income life dimensions is represented by D = {1, ..., d∗, ..., d}. We will denote a subset
of non-income components by C. We can express a distribution of WTP for each subset of
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non-income components as follows
WTP (D) =
N∑
i=1
D∑
d=1
WTPid (1.24)
where by the definition the following relationships hold WTP :
{
D | D ⊂ C} → R and
WTP (∅) = 0. Based on the Shapley value model that we have described in the previous
section, we will denote the marginal contribution of each non-income component (dimension)
d∗ to WTP with Γd∗ . Formally, the marginal contribution of each non-income component can
be written as follows
Γd∗(D,WTP ) =
∑
D⊂C
d∗∈D
d!(c− d− 1)!
c!
(
WTP
(
D \ {d∗})) (1.25)
The procedure for decomposing the total WTP by non-income components (dimensions)
can be summarized in two steps. In the first step we compute the marginal effects of all non-
income components by removing each non-income component at the time but retaining all
other non-income components. In the second step we repeat the computation of the marginal
effects for all possible combinations of non-income components and we estimate the average
value of these marginal effects for each non-income component. The sum of all non-income
contributions to WTP that we obtain should add up to the total value of WTP . In other words,
the Shapley value decomposition enabled us to decompose the total WTP into the contribution
for accommodation (WTP a), health (WTP h), neighbourhood (WTPn) and unemployment
(WTP u).
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1.6 Data
In this section we illustrate the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) which we employed in
our analysis. The EQLS is a cross sectional data set which examines the objective and subjec-
tive life conditions of European citizens, their social-demographic and personal characteristics.
The EQLS contains information on a various topics such as income, employment status, at-
tained level of education, housing conditions, family characteristics, self-assessed health status,
neighbourhood quality and etc. The information on these topics are necessary for computing
the important dimensions of life. The EQLS contains several variables on the subjective life
conditions like happiness, life satisfaction in general and life satisfaction with a certain sub-
domains of life. Knowing all this information offered us a unique opportunity to relate the life
satisfaction with the income and non-income dimensions of life.
Concerning the geographical coverage of the data, the EQLS has increased the number of
covered countries from 28 countries in 2003 to 34 countries in 2011. Although, the EQLS is
collected every fourth year starting from 2003, we have been forced to constrain our analysis
only on the data for 2007 and 2011 because the data for 2003 was less reliable and the data was
lacking some variables which were decisive for the purpose of our estimation. We also had to
exclude from the estimation three countries (Ireland, Switzerland, Norway) because in the data
for 2007 these countries were lacking a few important variables. In total, we have worked with
17,601 individuals in 2007 and with 22,342 individuals in 2011.
The distribution of overall life satisfaction across countries and years is described in fig-
ure 1.1. The question on the overall life satisfaction that we have used for our analysis is
formulated as follows: All things considered, how satisfied would you say you are with your
life these days? The responders were offered a discrete scale of possible answers which ranged
from 1 (“very dissatisfied”) to 10 (“very satisfied”). Each sub-figure represents the estimated
proportions of the overall life satisfaction within each country for 2007 and 2011. The capped
spike lines at each vertical bar represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
The first thing that can be noticed form the figure 1.1 is that a high degree of heterogeneity
of the self-reported life satisfaction is present over countries but not over time within a coun-
try. Moreover, the distribution of overall satisfaction with life is either skewed to the left with
long left tails or countries have almost symmetric distribution of self-reported life satisfaction.
Nevertheless, most countries fall in the former case. The heterogeneity of life satisfaction across
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countries can be easily demonstrated by comparing distributions of life satisfaction between
countries. For instance, in Denmark, the estimated cumulative proportion of life satisfaction
for the highest three categories (i.e. categories 8, 9 and 10) in 2007 was 0.85 while in Bulgaria the
estimated cumulative proportion of life satisfaction for the highest three categories in 2007 was
only 0.1. On the other hand, we can see that in Bulgaria the estimated cumulative proportion
of life satisfaction for the lowest three categories (i.e. categories 1, 2 and 3) in 2007 was 0.23.
Other countries like the Czech republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal
and Slovakia have the largest proportion of the population in the middle part of distribution,
which means that most of people in those countries have the life satisfaction that ranges from 5
to 7. One can also notice that the distributions of life satisfaction within countries are almost
identical between 2007 and 2011 which implies that the distribution of life satisfaction did not
changed much over time.
We are now turning to another set of results which illustrates how the life satisfaction is
distributed across gender. The distribution of overall life satisfaction within each country for
men and women is shown in figure 1.2. One can observe that the distribution of life satisfaction
for both men and women is quite heterogeneous over countries. Nevertheless, the distribution
of life satisfaction within countries does not seem to differ much between men and women.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables (tabulated in rows) that we have used in our
study are represented in table 1.1 and table 1.2 for 2007 and 2011, respectively. Because we
have a relatively large number of countries that we use in our study we will only present the
means of main variables in the tables of descriptive statistics. In both years, 2007 and 2011, the
average value of life satisfaction has found at the lowest level in Bulgaria and at the highest level
in Denmark. Comparing the average value of life satisfaction between 2007 and 2011 within
countries we noticed that these values remained fairly unchanged. The hedonic treadmill the-
ory suggested by Brickman and Campbell (1971)) tells us that individuals maintain a relatively
stable level of happiness even though they experience all kinds of changes in life. Since it is
possible that the real conditions within countries have remained unchanged between 2007 and
2011, we cannot relate the following theory to our findings.
In the second row of table 1.1 and table 1.2 we can see the average value of the real
equivalized monthly income. In 2007 and 2011, Bulgaria had the lowest average income while
Luxembourg has the highest average income. Comparing the unemployment rates between 2007
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and 2011 we can notice that for most of the countries the unemployment rates have increased in
the later year which is not surprising as we recognized the severe effects of the recent economic
recession which occurred in many countries. One can notice that the mean of self-assessed
health is the lowest in Latvia and Lithuania in 2007 and 2011, while the mean of self-assessed
health is found to be the highest in Cyprus in 2007 and 2011, respectively. The average quality
of accommodation was the lowest in Latvia for both years, it was the highest in Sweden and
Germany in 2007 and in 2011 it was the highest in Austria and Germany. Finland has on av-
erage the fewest problems with the quality of neighbourhood, while the lowest average quality
of neighbourhood was found in Italy and Bulgaria in 2007 and in Greece and Cyprus in 2001.
In the remaining rows we show the average values of socio-demographic and personal
characteristics across countries. There are few interesting points regarding the personality
characteristics that are worth to mention. In 2007, a country with the lowest average level of
optimism was Portugal while in Greece the average value of optimism was at the average level
computed among all countries. What seems particularly interesting is that the average value
of optimism for Greeks felt significantly after the recent economic recession so that Greece was
the most pessimistic country in 2011. Nevertheless, we can observe that in Spain the average
value of optimism has stayed constant between 2007 and 2011, although we know that they
have experienced economic decline during the recent economic crisis.
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1.7 The Choice of Income and Non-Income Dimensions
A crucial issue that arises in the estimation of multi-dimensional well-being concerns the choice
of life dimensions. An important life dimension that determines individual’s well-being in the
sphere of material living standard can be captured by income, consumption and wealth. We
have selected income as a measure that will represent the material living standard. We have
used the total disposable monthly income at the household level with incomes expressed in
euros. Because our income variable is measured at the household level, we have have applied
the OECD-modified equivalence square which assigns a value of 1 to the household head, a
value of 0.5 to each additional adult member of the household and a value of 0.3 to each child
present in the household (see Hagenaars et al. (1994)). In order to construct the real income
variable we have applied a Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The non-income life dimension in the domain of work is represented by the employment
status of individuals. The employment status variable equals 1 for those individuals who are
unemployed and 0 otherwise. Although, we are aware that representing the domain of work with
a binary variable may have many weaknesses, nevertheless we could not propose a better solution
given the data at our disposal. The individual’s self-assessed health is another non-income life
dimension which we have used5. The individuals were asked to assess their health level by using
the following question In general would you say your health is? They were offered a categorical
scale of possible answers which consists of 1 for “very bad health”, 2 for “bad health”, 3 for
“fair health”, 4 for “good health” and 5 for “very good health”. For each category of the
self-assessed health variable we have constructed a binary variable that equals 1 if a particular
category applies to individual and 0 otherwise. As a result, our measure of individual health
consists of the five binary variables with “very good health” as the base category.
The third non-income life dimension that we have used is the quality of accommodation.
For constructing the quality of accommodation variable we have used the question in which the
5Besides the self-assessed health variable, we have been considering the possibility to include a variable that
measures health in a more objective way. Our candidate for the objective health variable comes from the following
question: Are you limited in your daily activities by this physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?
The respondents have been offered a categorical scale where 1 means “severely disabilities present”, 2 means
“disabilities present to some extent” and 3 means “no disabilities present”. We have transformed this categorical
variable into a binary variable that equals 1 if the individual faces either severe disabilities or disabilities to some
extent and 0 if the individual faces no disabilities. However, we opted not to include the objective health variable
in our analysis due to the fact that we have obtained a positive coefficient on this variable in the estimation of
the life satisfaction regression. That is to say, it is difficult to believe that the level of life satisfaction was higher
for those individuals with disabilities than for those individuals without them.
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individuals were asked to assess the quality of their accommodation according to five different
categories. On each question they answered with a binary variable that equals 1 if they had
problems with the accommodation in that particular category and 0 otherwise. The following
questions have been asked Problems with your accommodation? a) shortage of space, b) rot
in windows, doors or floors, c) damps or leaks in walls or roof and d) lack of indoor flushing
toilet, e) lack of bath or shower. We have computed the average score on these five questions
which represents our measure of quality of accommodation. The resulting variable takes values
from 0 to 1 where 0 means the best possible quality of accommodation while 1 means the worst
possible quality of accommodation.
The last non-income dimension we have used is the quality of neighbourhood. In order
to construct this variable, we have used a set of questions in which individuals were asked
to emphasise whether or not their neighbourhoods have any difficulties with air, crime, litter,
noise and water. While these questions slightly differ in their formulation between 2007 and
2011, in essence questions in both years have the same content and they are querying the same
thing. While the original question in 2007 was Reason to complain about the problem in your
neighbourhood?, in 2011 the question was Thinking of your immediate neighbourhood do you
have problems?
The answers on both of these questions provide us with the information on whether or not
individuals experienced any problems in their neighbourhoods. In 2007 the respondents have
been offered a categorical scale of possible answers which included the categories 1 for “very
many reasons”, 2 for “many reasons”, 3 for “few reasons” and 4 for “no reason at all”. In 2011
the respondents were offered a categorical scale of possible answers which included the categories
1 for “major problems”, 2 for “moderate problems” and 3 for “no problems”. In order to have
the categorical scale which is comparable across years, we have recoded the categorical scale in
2007 so that it fit the scale in 2011. As a result we have recoded the categories “very many”
and “many” from 2007 into the category “major problems” which is valid for 2011, the category
“few reasons” from 2007 into the respective category “moderate problems” for 2011 and the
category“no reason at all” from 2007 has been recoded to the category “no problems” for 2011.
In our last step, we have inverted the categorical scale so that lower numbers represent the less
severe problems (higher quality of neighbourhood) while a higher numbers represent the more
severe problems (lower quality of neighbourhood). The categorical scale for the variable that
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measures the quality of neighbourhood takes value 1 when individuals face no problems with
the neighbourhood, 2 when individuals face moderate problems with the neighbourhood and 3
when individuals face major problems with the neighbourhood. Finally, our measure for the
quality of neighbourhood is constructed by computing the average value from the five questions
which designated the quality of neighbourhood with respect air, crime, litter, noise and water.
We have normalized the quality of neighbourhood variable to a scale between 0 and 1 where
the former value denotes the lowest quality of neighbourhood while the later value denotes the
highest quality of neighbourhood.
A vector of life dimensions that we have chosen to play an important role in lives of
individuals, definitely should not be taken for granted or should not be taken as the complete
list of life dimensions that individuals find important in their lives. Nevertheless, we assume
that the list of life dimensions that we have selected are capturing those dimensions of life for
which individuals attach a great deal of importance so that our list of functioning vectors is a
reasonable choice.
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1.8 Results
1.8.1 Life Satisfaction Regression
In this section we present the estimation results obtained from the life satisfaction regres-
sion models. These results illustrate the effect of income and non-income dimensions, socio-
demographic and personal characteristics on the level of life satisfaction in a pooled sample of
25 countries. We have specified five different regression models where each specification of the
model differs depending on the type of regressors that we are controlling for in that specifica-
tion. Each specification of the life satisfaction regression is estimated with the ordered logit
model6. Since the error term in the life satisfaction model could violate the assumption that
observations are independent and identically distributed, we have proceed in the estimation by
assuming that errors are clustered at the country level. That is to say, we have assumed that
the observations are correlated within countries but not between countries. One should bear in
mind that since we are presenting the estimated coefficients from an ordered logistic regression,
we are only able to make inference about the direction and significance of the effects while
we cannot conclude anything about the magnitude of effects by just looking at the estimated
coefficients. The results are given in table 1.3.
In model I we control for income and non-income dimensions of life, set of socio-
demographic variables and a time dummy for year 2011. We can notice that all variables (except
variables urban and lower education) are highly significant. All other things being equal, the
life satisfaction is increasing in income and decreasing if you are unemployed, decreasing if you
are living in the accommodation of bad quality or if you live in problematic neighbourhood.
The effect of health dimension on the life satisfaction should be evaluated relative to the base
category of health dimension which is represented with the “very good” health. We can notice
that relative to the the base category, the effects of health for all other health categories decrease
the life satisfaction. The effect of age on the life satisfaction is found to be convex, or in other
words there exists the U-shaped curve for age. The minimum level of satisfaction is reached
at the age of 44,5. Males tend to have a lower level of life satisfaction than females, all other
things being equal. The life satisfaction is higher for those individuals who are married (or they
6In addition, we have estimated the life satisfaction models using the OLS regression (i.e. a cardinal specifi-
cation of the life satisfaction model) and using a semi-non-parametric estimation of an extended ordered probit
model (SNEOP). The results we have obtained from both of these estimation approaches were quite similar with
the results we have obtained from an ordered logit model.
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cohabitate with their partners) in comparison with individuals who are single. The likelihood
of having a higher level of life satisfaction is decreasing for those individuals who are divorced
or widowed. Having a child or living in urban area increases life satisfaction although the later
effect is not significant.
In addition to previous variables, in model II we introduce a set of country dummies where
Austria represents a base category. The rationale for introducing the country dummies is to
capture the heterogeneities between countries. After we have introduced the country dummies
which serve as the shift parameters of the indifference curves, we can notice that the magnitude
of the coefficient for log income decreased substantially. The remaining coefficients on non-
income dimensions (except for neighbourhood which has decreased in absolute value) have not
changed much in comparison with model I. The coefficients on the socio-demographic variables
did not change significantly between model I and model II, except for lower education whose
coefficient dropped in absolute terms and it has become statistically significant. Individuals who
acquired only a lower level of education (i.e. either no education acquired or having acquired
the primary education) are less satisfied with their life in comparison with those individuals
who acquired either secondary or higher education.
So far, we have assumed that a functional form of the life satisfaction equation is the same
across all individuals which means that the estimated indifference curves are assumed to be
parallel lines with the constant trade-offs between each pair of life dimensions. Since it is hard
to believe that the these trade-offs between life dimensions are constant, so we have decided
to introduce a more flexible functional form in which we allow for the heterogeneity of indi-
vidual preferences. We have assumed that the preferences of individuals belonging to a given
socio-economic group differ across these groups. Thus, we have introduced the interaction terms
between the life dimensions and socio-economic characteristics.
The concept of life dimensions denotes a list of important dimensions of individual well-
being which measures the life achievements of individuals. Needless to say, there is no general
approach which we can follow for defining the list of income and non-income dimensions which
individuals find important in life and therefore the dimensions we have chosen seemed to us as a
reasonable list of life dimensions the individuals care about. Another important point concerns
a distinction between life dimensions and basic needs which individuals have to posses in order
to achieve those life dimensions. For instance, one can think of basic needs as the minimum
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amount of food, water, shelter, and availability of health care.
A reasonable concern can be raised on whether education is a life dimension or it is a
scaling factor. Although we allow for the possibility that some individuals perceive education
as a life dimension, we have opted to treat education as additional variable which only has an
effect on the individual level of aspiration. In other words, we perceive the level of acquired
education as a mean that individuals seek to accomplish in life rather than the outcome7. Un-
fortunately, it turns out that there is no apparent agreement on the level of basic needs that are
sufficient for individuals in order to acquire life dimensions. Even though we can argue that the
question on whether or not individuals have acquired their dimensions of life will depend on the
realization of basic needs, the later will inevitably depend on the socio-economic characteristics
and norms in the society. Nevertheless, accounting for the right specification of basic needs
when the socio-economic characteristics differ across individuals, is definitely not a trivial task
in the well-being analysis.
Additionally, when one chooses over important life dimensions, it is important to pay atten-
tion whether this choice should include the personal dimensions of life (i.e. being single, being
married, being divorced, having children and the like). Despite the fact that we are certainly
not denying that individuals might perceive these personal life characteristics as the important
dimensions of life, nevertheless our interest will be to compare the well-being across countries
and in the following comparison we will concentrate on the dimensions of life which can be
affected by public and social policies. That is to say, in our study we are focusing on the public
domains of life which are important for individuals but on the other hand we want to allow for
the that social and public policies use their instruments for making welfare improvements.
In the third column of table 1.3 we present the results that have been obtained when we
included the interaction terms. Immediately one can notice that the coefficient on log income
have decreased by more than half in comparison with the model II. This is clearly a consequence
of introducing the heterogeneity of preferences which we have illustrated with different socio-
demographic characteristics that a group of individuals belong to. Other things being equal,
the effect of income on life satisfaction is higher for those individuals which live in the urban
areas and for those individuals who have children. Although we have found a larger income
effect for males, for individuals in the middle age, for married (or cohabiting) couples and in-
7As a result, our specification treats the level of schooling which individuals have acquired as a mean for
achieving personal realization in the domain of education (i.e. to achieve literacy).
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dividuals with a lower level of education, however these effects are not statistically significant.
The coefficients on non-income dimensions of life kept the same sign and statistical significance
as in the previous two specifications. Individuals with children have a higher life satisfaction
when their are unemployed and when they are in a “good” health. As it was already mentioned,
a higher income is more important for those individuals with children. Moreover, the results
show that having a higher quality of neighbourhood is more preferred for those individuals who
are married (or cohabiting) and for those individuals with a lower level of education. Having a
“good health” is more important in the urban areas. The evidence shows that individuals who
are not in their middle age, do not prefer to be in a “bad health”.
We are now turning to the model IV which expands the previous model by including the
personality traits, that is a set of variables which underline personality of individuals (i.e. their
behaviour, thoughts and emotions). In the economic literature researchers have paid much at-
tention on finding a proper treatment of unobserved heterogeneity across individuals in order
to reach the validity of statistical inference (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)). An
important part of unobserved heterogeneity is ascribed to individual personality which may af-
fect explanatory variables but also the outcome variable. The personality traits can be seen as
factors which increase the individual material position but on the other hand they also increase
the life satisfaction of individuals. A common approach when thinking about the estimation
strategy is to assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is fixed over time within individuals.
The estimation procedure in which the individual heterogeneity is treated as time invariant
requires from us to work with a panel data but since we are working with a cross-sectional data,
in order to deal with the unobserved individual heterogeneity we include a set of variables that
are capturing the individual personality.
It is important to emphasize that using either a fixed effects (FE) estimation or random
effect (RE) estimation in order to get rid of the individual unobserved heterogeneity can be
misleading because both approaches are grounded on a set of specific assumptions which may
be too restrictive. That is to say, even if we were to be in a possession of panel data, using the
FE estimation will not be an appealing strategy due to (at least) two reasons. The first reason
is that we are interested in obtaining the estimates on many socio-demographic characteristics
(i.e. age, gender, etc.) but these estimates are not attainable when using the FE estimation
because socio-demographic characteristics mostly do not vary within individuals. The second
37 Chapter 1
reason is concerned with better understanding of what is happening in the estimation process.
It is reasonable to opt for the FE if one assumes that the unobserved individual heterogeneity
is correlated with the explanatory variables in the model. However, if we have information on
the personality of individuals, then instead of using the FE estimation, it makes more sense to
include the information on the personal characteristics in our model.
We should also emphasise that there is no common agreement on the definition of unob-
served heterogeneity. The most prominent channels through which the unobserved heterogeneity
has an effect comes from the individual ability (see Di Tella et al. (2010)), health (see Winkel-
mann and Winkelmann (1998)), anchoring or the attitude of individuals (i.e. pessimistic or
optimistic) which is then reflected in providing inaccurate answer to the question about the
well-being of individuals (see Clark et al. (2005)). Nevertheless, we mostly assume that the
individual heterogeneity operates through the channel of individual personality (see Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and Frijters et al. (2004)).
A commonly used model that describes individual personality is the Big Five which in-
cludes openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism
(see John and Srivastava (1999) and Borghans et al. (2008)). It has been shown the Big Five
can robustly categorise individuals and their behaviour into these five groups. In contrast to the
literature in psychology which conceive the personality traits as the most important factors of
well-being, economists are more akin to economic understanding of well-being where dimensions
of personality are mostly neglected. Although we control for the personality traits in our study,
our main focus is on the effects of socio-demographic variables on the individual well-being since
the latter effects are customarily susceptible to social and public interventions.
The EQLS contains five variables on individual personality which we have used in our
study. The individuals were asked the following question Which is closest to how you have been
feeling over the last two weeks? They could answer to what extend they have been optimistic
about the future (Optimistic), feeling cheerful and in the good spirit (Cheerful), feeling calm
and relaxed (Calm), feeling active and vigorous (Active) and whether their life has been filled
with things that interest them (Life Interest). Individuals could express their degree of opti-
mism on a scale from 1 if they “strongly agree” to 5 if they “strongly disagree” while for all
other variables the suggested answers have ranged from 1 if they “agree all of the time” to 6
if they “agree at no time”. Both scales were recoded in the inverse order so that we easy the
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interpretation. Note that we assumed that the personality traits are cardinal variables.
We have found that each personality trait increases the likelihood of having a higher life
satisfaction. It is important to notice that once we have controlled for the personality traits,
the coefficient on each life dimension (except on income) has decreased in the absolute value.
This evidence is perfectly in line with the argument that there is a substantial correlation be-
tween the individual personality and the explanatory variables. That is to say, the individual
heterogeneity that is attributed to individual personality substantially reduces the size of coef-
ficients (in absolute terms) on life dimensions. This evidence points out that some individuals
have a higher level of life satisfaction which is attributed to the personality traits. In addition,
once we have controlled for the personality traits, we can notice that the coefficients on the
socio-demographic variables have decreased in absolute value as well. This also indicates that
there is a correlation between socio-demographic variables and personality traits although the
direction and statistical significance remained unchanged after we have controlled for the indi-
vidual personality.
In model IV we have included the additional control variable which is the level of trust.
This variable was constructed from the responses on the following questions Would you say
that most people can be trusted? and How much you personally trust each of the following
institutions: a) legal system, b) police? For the first question, the individuals were offered a
categorical scale of possible answers where the scale ranged from 1 if you think that “you cannot
be too careful” to 10 if you think that “most people can be trusted”. For the last two questions
a categorical scale of possible answers ranged from 1 if you “do not trust at all” to 10 if you
“trust completely”. Finally, the trust variable have been constructed as the average value of
given responses on these three questions. Other things been equal, we have found that trust
have a positive and statistically significant effect on the life satisfaction. Nevertheless, it may
well be true the causality between trust and life satisfaction is reversed.
Until so far we have not assumed that the life satisfaction is dependent on the life dimen-
sions of the reference groups with whom individuals could possibly compare themselves. The
empirical evidence suggests that the level of happiness or satisfaction of individuals depends
not only on their level of life dimensions but it also depends on the level of life dimensions that
are possessed by others. If individuals have concerns about their relative income position in the
society, then the utility function will be dependent on the income level of the reference group
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with whom individuals are comparing themselves. This is known as a social comparison effect
(i.e. a sociological norm). The relationship between the relative income and well-being has been
found in various studies (see Easterlin (1974, 1995, 2001), Stadt et al. (1985), Clark and Oswald
(1996), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) and Vendrik and Woltjer (2007)). Applying the same line of
reasoning it has been shown that the relative position matters with respect to unemployment
(see Clark (2003)).
The second important mechanism concerns the effect of adaptation (i.e. a psychological
norm) which designates the process of psychological comparison in which an individual compares
her current situation with respect to some dimension of life and then relate it to her previous
experience. The theory suggests that the marginal effect of having the income aspiration lowers
the level of utility and it also suggests that the individual aspiration is increasing in income
(i.e. other things being equal, this implies that individual aspiration is increasing in the level of
income which an individual had acquired in the past). However, it turns out that the effect of
adaptation is marginally decreasing over time. The empirical evidence that points out on the
process of adaptation according to which individual aspiration is increasing in income has been
found in studies by Stutzer (2002) and McBride (2001), among others.
In order to capture the process of social comparisons, we have included in model V a list of
regressors which represents a reference group for income and non-income dimensions. However,
we were unable to test whether there exists an effect of adaptations on the life satisfaction
of individuals. Although, there is no common agreement how to define a reference group for
the life dimensions, yet one approach that has been singled out is to construct the reference
group for a certain life dimension according to the average value of that life dimension. In our
study we have followed this approach so we have constructed the reference-group-variables for
all life dimensions (except health) by computing the conditional mean of each life dimension
with respect to gender, region, country and year.
The results which are illustrated in column five suggest that there exists a negative com-
parison effect for the accommodation and positive comparison effect for income, unemployment
and neighbourhood, although only the effect on neighbourhood is statistically significant. Hav-
ing found a positive comparison effect for income indicates that an increase in income of the
reference group would increase the life satisfaction of an individual. Positive coefficients on the
reference group for unemployment and quality of neighbourhood show that the life satisfac-
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tion of an individual increases as unemployment and quality of neighbourhood of the reference
group decrease. On the contrary, if the quality of accommodation of the reference group would
decrease then the life satisfaction of an individual would decrease as well. Although we are
certainly not neglecting the role of aspirations, we must confess that our final specification did
not find any robust effects of aspirations. Thus, we opted to use our specification in model IV
for the estimation of equivalent incomes.
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1.8.2 Empirical Comparison of Well-being Measures
This section illustrates the results we have obtained from two well-being measures, income (yi)
and equivalent income (y∗i ). At this stage we are not indulging in the examination of inequality
in the distributions of these two measures. Nevertheless, later on we will raise the important
question which concerns the distributional analysis of the well-being. Although, we could have
included the subjective life satisfaction (Si), as our third measure of individual well-being, never-
theless we have decided to concentrate only on the comparisons between income and equivalent
income.
The approach we have taken for comparing well-being across countries consists of calcu-
lating the averages of income and equivalent income at the country level and then we rank
each country according to the averages of each measure. Since we know that adding additional
non-income dimensions will lower the value of equivalent income, it is not very appealing to
compare the absolute values of equivalent income with absolute values of incomes. Thus, we
will concentrate on the ordinal rankings of measures. We present the growth rates of each
well-being measure between 2007 and 2011 and we rank countries accordingly. The results are
presented in table 1.4. For ease of presentation we have plotted the country rankings of income
and equivalent income and its changes over years in figure 1.3 (panel a and panel c).
Ranking countries according to the average income in 2007 indicates that Luxembourg has
the highest income, the Netherlands has the second largest income while Bulgaria and Romania
are two countries with the lowest incomes. We can notice that for all countries the average
value of equivalent income is lower then the average value of income. This evidence indicates
that neither country has reached the best value for all non-income dimension that we have used
for computing the equivalent income. The highest average equivalent income in 2007 was in
Luxembourg while the lowest equivalent income was in Bulgaria. Comparing the relationship
between the income rank in 2007 and equivalent income rank in 2007, we can notice that the
ranking overlaps for several countries (see panel a of figure 1.4). The largest improvement in
equivalent income rank in 2007 occurred in Cyprus, while the largest loss occurred in the United
Kingdom and Belgium.
The results for 2011 show that Luxembourg has the highest income rank [1 ], Sweden has
the second highest income rank [2 ], Romania has the second to last income rank [24 ] while
Bulgaria has the lowest rank [25 ]. Comparing the rankings of equivalent income in 2011, we
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find the highest average equivalent income in Luxembourg which is followed by Sweden and
Denmark while the lowest equivalent incomes are in Latvia and Romania and Bulgaria. The
rank of income and equivalent income in 2011 either remained the same or has changed slightly
for some countries (see panel c of figure 1.4).
We can observe that all countries have had a negative growth rates of income. Luxem-
bourg and Greece had the largest negative growth rates of average income while the smallest
negative growth rates were in Poland and Bulgaria. The growth rates of equivalent income
were negative for all countries except for for Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia which had positive
growth rates of equivalent income. Luxembourg and Estonia had the largest negative growth
rates of equivalent income. While we have seen that the rankings between the average incomes
and equivalent incomes do not change substantially for most of the countries, yet the rankings
between the growth rates of income and equivalent income show a substantial re-ranking that
occurs between countries (see panel e of figure 1.4). We can see that the ranking of the growth
rate of income and equivalent income overlaps only for Luxembourg, Spain and Czech Repub-
lic, while all other countries experience a re-ranking between the growth rates of income and
equivalent income measures. The results we have found indicate that if we measure the relative
position of a country with the growth rate of equivalent income, then we observe a significant
rank improvement of Italy, Slovenia, Portugal, Latvia and Greece, while on the other hand a
significant rank deterioration occurred in Austria, Germany, Cyprus, Sweden, the Netherlands
and Finland.
1.8.2.1 Inequalities and Social Welfare Functions
So far we have only put emphasis on the average level of income and equivalent income but
we have not raised any concerns for inequality in the distribution of these two measures. In
order to express our ethical position that we should give a higher weight to those individuals
who are located at the bottom of distribution, we will introduce a concept of justice. One can
introduce a concern about justice by specifying the social weights which reflect a normative
perspective on the degree of inclination for justice. While the Utilitarian social welfare function
assumes that each individual deserves an equal weight, on the other hand the Rawlsian social
welfare function will attach only a positive weight to the worst off individual in the society. A
common approach for introducing social weights is to compute the mean value of a well-being
measure which is then corrected by a distributional factor reflecting the degree of awareness to
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inequality. We will employ the following approach by correcting both well-being measures with
a single parameter generalized Gini coefficient proposed by Donaldson and Weymark (1980).
The generalized Gini coefficient can be represented in the following way
Gini(X, ρ) = −ρ Cov
(
X
µ(X)
,
(
1− Φ(X)
)ρ−1)
(1.26)
where X is a random variable, µ(X) is the mean of X, Φ(X) is the cumulative distribution
function of X and ρ is a parameter that describes the degree of aversion to inequality. Once we
compute the measure of inequality we can proceed with computing the social welfare function
SW(µ, ρ) = µ(X)
(
1−Gini(X, ρ)
)
(1.27)
where the term (1−Gini(X, ρ)) denotes the correction factor for inequality. We will first illus-
trate the results of the Gini coefficients for income and equivalent income. The generalized Gini
coefficient is computed for ρ equals 2 in which case we obtain the standard Gini coefficient and
for ρ equals 5 which implies a stronger degree of aversion to inequality or in other words it gives
a stronger weight to individuals who are located at the lower tail of the distribution. We use
the Gini coefficients for income and equivalent income to compute the social welfare function of
income and equivalent income which is then corrected for the inequality in distributions. After
we have obtained the social welfare measures which are sensitive to the notion of justice, we
have compared the ranks across countries.
In table 1.5 we present the Gini coefficients for income and equivalent income together with
the ranking which is implied by these two inequality measures (see figure 1.5 and figure 1.6).
Income inequality in 2007 was the lowest in Slovenia, Sweden and Slovakia while the highest
income inequality is found in Latvia, Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom. The evi-
dence on the equivalent income inequalities in 2007 shows that countries which had the highest
income inequality also have the highest inequality of equivalent income while some countries
with the lowest level of income inequalities have become relatively more unequal with respect
to the equivalent income. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom is an exception because it became
relatively less unequal by equivalent income measure. An important point to notice is that the
equivalent income inequalities are significantly higher than the income inequalities across all
countries.
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Analysing income and equivalent income inequalities in 2011 we can immediately notice a
few changes which happened in contrast with 2007. In 2011 the lowest income inequality is found
in Slovenia, Czech Republic and Sweden, while the highest income inequality is found in Greece,
Latvia and Portugal. We can notice that in 2011 some countries like the Netherlands, Belgium,
Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Lithuania have experienced an improvement in the
ranking of income inequality (i.e. they have become less unequal) relative to income inequality
ranking in 2007. On the contrary, countries which had less income inequality in 2007, like for
instance Greece, Spain, Italy and Hungary, have become more unequal by income in 2011. The
lowest equivalent income inequality in 2011 has been found in the Netherlands, Sweden and
Austria while the highest inequality has been found in Greece, Latvia and Romania.
An interesting evidence arises when we compare income and equivalent income inequal-
ities (see figure 1.6). We have found that Slovenia and Slovakia who were having relatively
the lowest income inequalities in 2011, have experienced a noticeable larger equivalent income
inequalities in 2011. The opposite evidence has been found for countries like Greece, Spain and
Portugal whose income inequalities were relatively among the highest yet the equivalent income
inequalities in these countries were much lower. Countries that had the lowest equivalent in-
come inequalities in 2007, like for instance Sweden and the Netherlands remained at the lowest
level of equivalent income inequalities in 2011, while countries which had the highest level of
equivalent income inequalities in 2007 like for instance, Latvia and Romania, have retained the
highest level of equivalent income inequalities in 2011 (see panel b of figure 1.5). We have also
found an interesting reversal in the rankings of equivalent income inequality between 2007 and
2011. While Poland and Portugal have lowered their rankings from 2007 to 2011 (i.e. they have
moved towards those countries who have more equal distributions of the equivalent incomes),
Hungary and Bulgaria experienced an increase in the ranking of equivalent income inequality
(i.e. they have moved towards those countries which have more unequal distribution of equiva-
lent income).
We are now turning to illustrate the social welfare measures of income and equivalent
income. We will concentrate only on the ordinal rankings of social welfare measures. Notice
that both social welfare measures we have previously described are based on the distributional
parameter representing the degree of aversion to inequality ρ which is set to 1. This implies
the utilitarian perspective on well-being according to which the social welfare measure is rep-
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resented with the mean value of the well-being measure. The interpretation we will provide is
based on the social welfare measures which are corrected with the standard Gini coefficient (i.e.
inequality aversion parameter ρ equals 2).
Countries with the highest level of social welfare of income in 2007 are Luxembourg, Swe-
den, the Netherlands and Denmark, while the lowest level is found in Poland, Latvia, Romania
and Bulgaria. An interesting evidence emerges for the United Kingdom whose income rank has
substantially decreased once we have used a distribution sensitive measure in relation to the
income rank obtained from the utilitarian social welfare function (see panel e of figure 1.3).
This points out to the fact that income inequality is having a substantial effect in the United
Kingdom. The largest social welfare of income in 2011 is found in Luxembourg, Sweden, the
Netherlands and Denmark while the smallest social welfare of income is found in Estonia, Latvia,
Romania and Bulgaria (see table 1.6).
Countries with the highest level of social welfare of equivalent income in both years are
Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands while countries with the lowest level of social welfare
of equivalent income are Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. Some countries have experienced a
noticeable re-ranking in the social welfare of equivalent income between 2007 and 2011 (see
panel d of figure 1.3). The rank of social welfare of equivalent income has moderately decreased
(i.e. countries have relatively improved their positions) from 2007 to 2011 in France, Belgium,
Italy and Poland while the rank of social welfare of equivalent income has moderately increased
(i.e. countries have relatively decreased their positions) in Estonia, Latvia, Greece, the United
Kingdom and Cyprus.
Finally, we compare the ranks of the growth rates of social welfare of income and equivalent
income (see panel f of figure 1.4). We observe that the ranks of growth rate of social welfare
of income and equivalent income stay unchanged only for Poland, Belgium and the United
Kingdom, while the respective ranks have changed for all other countries. We can see that the
relative position of Italy, Portugal, France, Slovenia and Lithuania has considerably improved
as we moved from the growth rate of social welfare of income to equivalent income while the
opposite holds true for Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Cyprus, Germany, Romania and
Austria. As we have seen, the rankings of countries have changed moderately as we moved from
the levels of social welfare functions of both measures, yet we can notice that a considerable
re-ranking occurred when we considered the growth rates of social welfare functions.
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1.8.3 Willingness-To-Pay for Non-Income Dimensions
In this section we will present two sets of results. The first set of results concerns the (total)
willingness-to-pay (WTP ) which can be expressed as a difference between income and equiva-
lent income. This amount represents the monetary value that each individual is willing to give
up in order to reach her reference values in all non-income dimensions. The second set of results
illustrates the decomposition of the WTP at the willingness-to-pay contributions for each non-
income dimension. Since the WTP is a function of income we have normalize it with income
in order to neglect the differences in incomes between countries. We have also normalized the
willingness-to-pay contributions with the (total) WTP . Although our main focus is to illustrate
the relative shares of WTP in income (WTP×100y ) and relative shares of WTP contributions
(WTP
d×100
WTP ), we have shown the results for the absolute value of WTP and its contributions
(see table A1, table A2 and table A3).
In figure 1.7 we show the mean of the relative shares of willingness-to-pay in income (here-
after the relative WTP ) over gender and age groups. In panel a we illustrate the relative WTP
for a pooled sample of men and women. We have found that Sweden, the Netherlands and
Denmark have the lowest relative WTP in 2007 while Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia have the
highest relative WTP . In 2011 the lowest relative WTP had Denmark, Austria and Sweden
while the largest relative WTP had Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. As we can see the largest
changes in the relative WTP between 2007 and 2011 occurred in Italy, Poland and Luxembourg.
In panel b we show the relative WTP for men. We observe that Sweden, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Austria and Cyprus have the smallest share of relative WTP in both years, while
the highest share is found in Poland, Hungary and Latvia. In panel c we see that the lowest
share of relative WTP in 2007 for women is found in Sweden, Austria and Denmark while the
largest in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia. The first three countries have the lowest share of
relative WTP in 2011 as well, while the highest share have been found in Estonia, Romania
and Latvia. If we compare panels b and c we can notice that within countries, on average both
men and women are willing to pay similar amount (relatively to income) in order to reach the
reference values of the non-income dimensions.
The lowest share of relative WTP in 2007 for the age group 18-44 is found in Austria,
the Netherlands and Sweden while the largest share is found in Hungary, Italy and Latvia (see
panel d). In 2011, the smallest share of relative WTP for the age group 18-44 has been found
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in Austria, Cyprus and Denmark, while the largest share is found in Lithuania, Estonia and
Latvia. Among the age group 45-65, Hungarians and Latvians are having the largest share of
relative WTP (panel e). It is important to notice that across countries, the share of relative
WTP for the age group 45-64 is smaller than the share for the age group 18-44. On the other
hand, for majority of countries the share of relative WTP for the age group 64 and older is
larger than the shares for the age groups 45-64 and 18-44. We can point out to two reasons why
this evidence occurs. The first reason is that the older population (relative to younger popula-
tion) evaluate to a larger extent the position of being in the best possible state of non-income
dimensions. The second reason is that the income effect for the age group 45-64 and age group
65-over should be lower than the effect for the age group 18-44.
We are now turning to the results of the willingness-to-pay contributions for non-income
dimensions (hereafter relative WTP contributions). Figure 1.8 shows the shares of relative
WTP contributions for the pooled sample of men and women and separately for men and
women. We have found that health is relatively the most important dimension across all coun-
tries except for Greece in 2007 (see panels a and d). Relative WTP contributions to health are
most important in Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovenia.
This evidence comes as the result of suffering from the lower health level of individuals these
countries. The second most important non-dimension for almost all countries in 2007 turns out
to be the quality of neighbourhood. The highest relative WTP contributions to neighbourhood
in 2007 is found in Greece while the lowest in Finland. The quality of accommodation is found
to be on the third place of importance in 2007. The highest relative WTP contributions to
accommodation is found in the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria. It is quite striking that
the importance of unemployment turns out to be at the last place across all countries.
The relative importance of non-income dimensions in 2007 shows a similar pattern between
men and women across countries (see panels b and c). Nevertheless, one can see that the relative
importance of health over countries has marginally higher effect for women than for men. Men
attach a higher weight on the quality of neighbourhood than women do. The importance of the
quality of accommodation and employment are almost equal for both men and women across
countries.
The results for 2011 show many similarities with the results for 2007, although there are
some interesting changes between these two years. We can see that across all countries the
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health dimension plays relatively the most important role (see panel d of figure 1.8). The sec-
ond most important non-income dimension for most countries is the quality of neighbourhood,
on the third place is the quality of accommodation and on the last place is the employment sta-
tus. Although, the employment status has relatively the smallest effect across most countries,
nevertheless we can observe that for some countries like Bulgaria, Greece, Spain and Slovenia
the relative WTP contributions to unemployment have grown substantially from 2007 to 2011.
However, this effect should not be surprising because the following countries have experienced
a significant labour market shock during the recent economic crisis which began in 2007 and
2008.
Figure 1.9 shows the relative WTP contributions of non-income dimensions for the age
groups 18-44, 45-64 and 65-over. Despite the fact that health is the most important dimen-
sion among the age group 18-44 for majority of countries, we can see that for Greece, Cyprus,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Italy and Spain other non-income dimensions are either more im-
portant or somewhat equally important as health. One can notice that the effect of health
becomes more important across countries as we move from the youngest to the oldest age group
so that the effect of health is predominantly the most important across countries for the age
groups 45-64 and 65-over. This should make perfect sense since we observe that older people
have stronger preferences for health but also due the fact that older people are in worse health
than the younger people. We can observe that unemployment plays no role for the age group
65-over since elderly people have already been retired.
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1.8.4 Description of the Well-being of the Worst off
In this section we focus on the worst off individuals with respect to both measures. Focusing
on the worst off individuals is important from the normative perspective of policy makers who
create a dozen of public and social policies which have the aim of improving the well-being of
individuals. Our analysis is going to unveil who are the worst off individuals by providing a
complete characterization of their incomes, non-income dimensions, life satisfaction and socio-
demographic characteristics. We have used the bottom 20th percentile of income and equivalent
income as a threshold for identifying the worst off individuals. All individuals below this thresh-
old are characterized as being the worst off. The threshold is computed at the country level
and for each year. We only present the result for 2011.
We first illustrate the results for the worst off with respect to income. These results are
given in table 1.7. Note that we have multiplied all non-income dimensions except health with
100. The average equivalized household income among the worst off individuals with respect to
income is lowest in Romania and Bulgaria while it is highest in Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands. The average quality of accommodation differs noticeably across countries. For instance,
the highest quality of accommodation among the worst off is in Sweden (6.65) while the low-
est quality of accommodation is in Latvia (35.80) and Romania (33.66). We have not found
any noticeable differences in the self-assessed health across countries. The average quality of
neighbourhood is lowest in Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus while highest in Denmark and Finland.
The highest unemployment rates among the worst off individuals are in Latvia (34.84%) and
Bulgaria (30.15%).
The oldest population among the worst off is to be found in Slovenia and Luxembourg.
Czech Republic has the smallest percentage of men among the worst off individuals (34.39%).
We found that the likelihood of being married among the worst off individuals is highest in
the Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain) while it is lowest in the
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). The highest percentage of divorced
individuals among the worst off is found in Sweden (25.26%) while the smallest percentage is
found in Italy (5.22%). The difference in the number of widowers and widows across countries
are quite noticeable. Among the worst off we have found that on average there is only 3.76% of
widowers and widows in Luxembourg while in Slovenia the percentage of widowers and widows
is 30.02%.
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We will now compare the results for the worst off individuals with respect to income (num-
bers given in rows of table 1.7) with the unconditional averages of the population (numbers given
in columns of table 1.2). We observe that in the United Kingdom the worst off posses 40% of
the average income while in Romania the worst off posses 30% of the average income. Although,
we can see that health is lower among the worst off individuals across all countries, nevertheless
these differences are not well pronounced. Comparing the socio-demographic characteristics
between the worst off and the average individual in the population, show some interesting ev-
idence. We can see that in Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, France, Hungary,
Luxembourg, Latvia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the average age among the
worst off is lower than the average age among the population. In every country except Bel-
gium, Estonia, Hungary and the United Kingdom the percentage of men among the worst off
is lower then the average percentage of men in the population. In the Scandinavian countries,
the probability of finding an individual who is married among the worst off with respect to
income is around 30 percentage points lower than on average finding the same individual in the
population.
In table 1.8 we illustrate the portraits of the worst off measured with the equivalent in-
come. We can see that the lowest average equivalized household income among the worst off is
found in Romania while the highest average income among the worst off individuals is found in
Luxembourg. It is striking to see that the average income among the worst off individuals is 7
times higher in Luxembourg than in Romania. We observe that across all countries, the aver-
age income of the worst off individuals with respect to the income (table 1.7) is lower than the
average income for the worst off individuals with respect to the equivalent income (table 1.8).
This evidence points out that some individuals who were not below the income threshold are
nonetheless classified as the worst off with respect to equivalent income. The average life satis-
faction among the worst off individuals with respect to equivalent income is lowest in Bulgaria
(4.53) while it is highest in Denmark (7.87).
Among the worst off individuals with respect to equivalent income, Denmark has the high-
est quality of accommodation (9.01) while Latvia has the lowest quality of accommodation
(41.45). The least healthy individuals among the worst off are in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
while the most healthy individuals are in the Mediterranean countries. The lowest unemploy-
ment rate among the worst off individuals is found in Romania (10.50%) and Finland (11.55%)
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while the highest unemployment rate is in Latvia (45.54%) and Spain (43.78%).
We observe the apparent differences in socio-demographic characteristics across countries.
Among the worst off individuals we have found that the youngest individuals are in Luxembourg
with the average age of 38 while the oldest individuals are found to be in Czech Republic, Por-
tugal and Bulgaria with the average age of 48. A moderate gender differences among the worst
off individuals are present across countries as well. For instance, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia,
France, Romania, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have an equal share of men and women among
the worst off while in Germany, Slovenia, Hungary and the United Kingdom there is 63% of
men among the worst off individuals. The highest rate of divorced or separated among the
worst off is found in Slovakia (28.80%) while the smallest rate is found in Greece (5.60%).
Finally, we compare the average worst off individuals with respect to the equivalent income
(numbers given in rows of table 1.8) with the average individuals in the population (numbers
given in rows of table 1.2). We can notice that the percentage of the average income for the
worst off individuals differs noticeably across countries. For example, in Romania the worst off
individual possess less then 50% of the average income while in Sweden this percentage is 65%.
We observe that the average life satisfaction among the worst off individuals with respect to
equivalent income is lower than the average life satisfaction in the population.
We can also notice a substantial differences across countries between the average value of
non-income dimensions among the worst off individuals and the average value of non-income di-
mensions in the population. The relative likelihood of having a lower quality of accommodation
is higher for the worst off individuals than the average individual across countries. The average
value of health is higher among the average population than among the average value of health
among the worst off with respect to equivalent income. The relative likelihood of having lower
quality of neighbourhood is higher among the worst off individuals across all countries with
some notable exception. The most compelling cross country differences are found for the un-
employment status. Differences in the socio-economic characteristics are also noticeable across
countries. The most prominent age gap between the average worst off individuals with respect
to equivalent income and the average individual in the population is found in Luxembourg with
around 7 years older individuals in the later group.
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1.8.5 Overlap of the Worst off Individuals
In the previous section we have shown that different well-being measure would identify differ-
ent individuals among the group of the worst off. These individuals differ in average incomes,
average equivalent incomes, average values of non-income dimensions and socio-demographic
characteristics. We have also shown that according to each well-being measure, the worst off
individuals would differ over countries. In this section we illustrate the percentage of individu-
als who belong to the worst off according to both income and equivalent income measures. We
show the percentage of individuals among the worst off when they belong to the bottom 10th
percent and bottom 20 percent according to each measure. We will present the results for 2011.
In the first column of table 1.9 we show the results for the entire sample, in the second column
we show the results for men while in the third column we show the results for women. We can
observe that the percentage of individuals who belong to the bottom 10th percent of income
and equivalent income measures varies from 1.4% in Luxembourg to 2.6% in Cyprus. While the
highest percentage of males who belong to the bottom 10th percent of income and equivalent
income measures is found in Lithuania and Greece, the highest percentage of females who belong
to the bottom 10th percent of income and equivalent income measures is found in Cyprus and
Czech Republic. We have found that around two-thirds of the countries have higher percentage
of men among the bottom 10th percent of income and equivalent income, while around one
third of countries have higher percentage of women among the worst off.
Increasing the threshold value for identification of the worst off at the bottom 20th per-
cent, increases the percentage of individuals among the group of the worst off. The overlap of
individuals who belong to the bottom 20th percent of income and equivalent income measures
is highest in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal and Greece while lowest in Slovenia, Luxembourg,
Finland and Hungary. The highest percentage of women among the bottom 20th percent of
income and equivalent income is found in Bulgaria and Cyprus, while the highest percentage of
men among the bottom 20th percent of income and equivalent income is found in Greece and
Portugal. We can see that with the identification threshold set at the bottom 20th percent of
income and equivalent income, the percentage of women among the worst off is larger in around
two-thirds of countries which means that the percentage of men among the worst off is larger
in around one third of countries.
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1.8.6 Re-ranking between Income and Equivalent Income
We have seen that the ranking of countries is dependent on which measure of well-being we
use. In this section we illustrate the size of re-ranking between income and equivalent income
measures that happens for all individuals within a country. The following analysis is important
for constructing the progressive redistribution policy according to which we could redistribute
from some individuals at the top end of distribution to others located at the bottom end of
distribution. In order to do that we have to consider all individuals in a society.
In figure 1.10 we plot the rank of the individuals within each country according to the
percentile of income and equivalent income an individual belongs to in 2011. These plots are
called sunflowers and they are convenient for representing bivariate data whose observations are
having a high density which are difficult to read with the standard scatter plots. A sunflower
plot is divided into a low density bins which plot the individual observation as in the standard
scatter plots, a medium density bins which contain light sunflowers and high density bins which
contain dark sunflowers. While each petal in the light sunflower represents one observation,
petals in dark sunflower represent a particular number of observations. If all points were to be
situated on a diagonal line, there wound be no individuals whose rank of income and rank of
equivalent income differ. Thus, the observations off diagonal are representing the re-rankings
between the two measures.
In order to determine the size of re-ranking, we have computed the Spearman rank cor-
relation coefficient r which is a bivariate non-parametric measure of rank correlation. The
Spearman rank correlation coefficients are presented on each plot. We have also tested the
statistical significance of the Spearman rank correlations and all coefficients have shown to be
significant at the 1%.
One can immediately notice that the scatter plots show similar patterns across all countries
which means that the re-ranking between income and equivalent income is to be similar across
countries. Nevertheless, the size of re-ranking differs across countries. While the highest density
of observations are placed around the diagonal, we observe that a lower density observations are
spread out in the top left hand side of the plot. These findings highlight the fact that while for
most of individuals we would not find a considerable difference in ranks of income and equiv-
alent income, yet for those individuals located in the top left hand side of plot, the re-ranking
between these two measures is pronounced. The later re-ranking indicates that individuals who
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are income rich can end up as equivalent income poor. It should not be surprising to observe
these findings since we know that the equivalent income is a multi-dimensional and preference
sensitive measure. Thus, although individuals care about income, they also give weights to
other non-income dimensions.
On the other hand, we have found no individuals who are equivalent income rich and
income poor. We can see that the highest degree of re-ranking between the income and equiva-
lent income measure happens in Hungary, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (countries with the
lowest value of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient) while the highest degree of overlap
between income and equivalent income ranks are in Greece, Austria, Finland, Denmark and
Bulgaria (countries with the highest value of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient).
An interesting detail that we observe across all countries concerns a high concentration of
observations in the top right corner of the plot. These findings indicate that there is a high
density of individuals who are faring very well with both income and equivalent income measure.
Thus, these individuals belong to the top end of income distribution but they have also achieved
very high values of the non-income dimensions of life. Our findings in this section have shown
that although there is a significant amount of individuals whose ranking between income and
equivalent income measure overlaps, still we have observed a considerable re-ranking for certain
individuals across countries.
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1.9 Conclusion
Over the last decade we have witnessed a growing interest in the empirical welfare analysis which
compares the well-being over and within countries. An important contribution to this surge of
literature comes from Stiglitz et al. (2010) who have emphasized the importance of overcoming
the income approach for measuring the well-being. They have suggested that we should focus
on the multi-dimensional measure of well-being since income is not the only dimension that
matters in life. We should also bear in mind that the choice of well-being measure is grounded
on the normative assumptions which are essential in the process of measurement. Hence, the
creators of social and public policies which are using well-being measures for their policy eval-
uations are indulging in putting forward their ethical and political perspectives resulting from
these measures.
According to our point of view a reasonable measure of the individual well-being should be
sensitive to egalitarian perspective of equality among all people and it should respect individ-
ual preferences over important life dimensions. The literature on happiness and life satisfaction
have demonstrated that interpersonal comparisons of utility are attainable when the preferences
of individuals over life dimensions are respected. However, this literature has questioned the
righteousness of using information on the level of happiness or life satisfaction as a measure
of individual well-being since the subjective utility might be affected with the scaling factors
which make individuals utilities incomparable. Abandoning subjective welfarism as a legitimate
measure of individual well-being have created an obstacle in designing a well-being measure
which respects individual preferences over life dimensions.
Fleurbaey (2011) and Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) have demonstrated that it is possible
to compare the individual well-being defined over various life dimensions when the heterogeneity
of individual preferences is respected. In the literature this is known as the equivalent income
approach. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of individual preferences is occasionally overlooked
in the empirical analysis of individual well-being. This is despite the fact that a great deal of
studies have shown that individual preferences matter. Although, we are aware the fact that
interpersonal welfare analysis is not a trivial task, still this does not justify the position of re-
searchers to neglect the individual preferences when making individual welfare comparisons. An
obvious obstacle which immediately emerges when individual preferences are respected concerns
the question of aggregating various life dimensions into a single index.
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In this study we have compared the well-being across 25 European countries using income
and equivalent income. Accepting the idea of equivalent income implies that we have abandoned
the standard income approach in the evaluation of individual well-being and instead we have
computed the preference sensitive and multi-dimensional well-being measure which consists of
income and non-income dimensions. Our results confirm that the evaluation of well-being across
countries depends on which measure we use. As we have shown, the ordinal rankings resulting
from the equivalent income and income, have given us a quite different picture of the well-being
of countries. The following evidence reassures our previous point that each welfare measure
embodies a certain set of normative assumptions which can have different welfare implications.
For that matter, it is immensely important for the creators of social and public policies to show
interest in the distributional effects of well-being. Certainly, the later only holds if we agree on
the egalitarian doctrine which advocates the idea of equality of people.
Although, it is predominately a normative matter to debate about whether one can use
the individual preferences as a well-founded justification for redistribution, one can reasonably
argue that in some occasions we should hold people responsible for their preferences. We have
shown that besides income, individuals have strong preferences for non-income dimensions. We
have found that the identification of the worst off individuals is sensitive to the notion of equal-
ity and the heterogeneity of individual preferences. The results of this sort can be of crucial
importance to policy makers when they are accomplishing their policy evaluations. Nowadays,
the majority of comparisons of the individual well-being are based only on a single dimension
of income but we could reasonably argue that the following approach is exceptionally narrow
because individuals care about their non-income dimensions as well.
Our results have confirmed that the worst off individuals differ with respect to each wel-
fare measure we have used. We have found that for both measures of income and equivalent
income, the identification of the worst off individuals will be quite different across different
socio-demographic groups. If we accept the position that material resources are not the only
important aspects of life but on the contrary that people care about other non-material dimen-
sions, then the results we have obtained for the worst off individuals with respect to equivalent
income can be of a greater importance for policy makers. The policymakers can use the infor-
mation on the socio-demographic characteristics of the worst off individuals in order to design
a policy which would aim to compensate the individuals who are classified as the worst off.
57 Chapter 1
Finally, we have used the information on equivalent income for each individual in order to
restore their willingness-to-pay for each non-income dimension and in the next step we have used
the Shapley value decomposition in order to obtain the exact contributions of the willingness-to-
pay attributed to each non-income dimension. This decomposition has revealed some interesting
results. We have demonstrated that the average share of willingness-to-pay in income and the
contributions of willingness-to-pay to each non-income dimension differ remarkably across coun-
tries. It is important to note that the ranks of willingness-to-pay across countries are giving
us a quite diverse results depending on whether we use the absolute willingness-to-pay or we
normalize the willingness-to-pay with the average income (i.e. relative willingness-to-pay). In
the former case, we have seen that countries which suffer the most in non-income life dimensions
are those countries with the highest incomes. This evidence makes perfect sense because the
countries with the highest incomes can afford to pay the most in order to reach the reference
value in these non-income dimensions. On the contrary, the results have shown that the highest
relative willingness-to-pay has been found in countries with a lower level of income.
Although, the willingness-to-pay contributions to non-income dimensions are quite hetero-
geneous across countries, we have still found that the contribution of heath is relatively the
most important for most of the countries. A completely striking finding was that the relative
importance of employment status was at the last place for most of the countries. We have also
seen that the relative importance of the willingness-to-pay contributions differ across different
socio-demographic groups. While the relative importance of health is more conspicuous among
women, we have also found that the older population evaluate health to a larger extent than the
younger population. These findings are revealing an important sources of information which
policy makers can use in the process of creation and evaluation of social and public policies.
Although, we are aware the fact that a lot of work has still remained to be done we believe that
our study has made a step further in achieving this goal.
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Table 1.3: Satisfaction Equation
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Life
Dimensions
Log Income 0.566*** (0.085) 0.364*** (0.033) 0.155** (0.054) 0.166*** (0.050) 0.160*** (0.048)
Unemployed -0.672*** (0.090) -0.720*** (0.086) -0.778*** (0.107) -0.529*** (0.098) -0.534*** (0.098)
Health very bad -2.346*** (0.138) -2.503*** (0.092) -3.014*** (0.410) -1.557*** (0.378) -1.563*** (0.377)
Health bad -1.636*** (0.095) -1.789*** (0.069) -1.640*** (0.132) -0.693*** (0.108) -0.696*** (0.107)
Health fair -0.884*** (0.080) -0.990*** (0.046) -0.929*** (0.108) -0.324*** (0.083) -0.328*** (0.083)
Health good -0.450*** (0.064) -0.500*** (0.033) -0.564*** (0.087) -0.269*** (0.072) -0.272*** (0.072)
Accommodation -1.047*** (0.091) -1.144*** (0.106) -1.231*** (0.231) -0.873*** (0.182) -0.868*** (0.180)
Neighbourhood -1.206*** (0.154) -0.786*** (0.057) -0.543*** (0.138) -0.234 (0.128) -0.256* (0.129)
Personal
Characteristics
Age -0.058*** (0.006) -0.057*** (0.006) -0.053*** (0.007) -0.041*** (0.007) -0.041*** (0.007)
Age squared/1000 0.651*** (0.059) 0.648*** (0.054) 0.614*** (0.058) 0.485*** (0.057) 0.485*** (0.057)
Male -0.113*** (0.021) -0.104*** (0.019) -0.348 (0.230) -0.089 (0.211) -0.119 (0.226)
Married 0.246*** (0.055) 0.291*** (0.057) -0.206 (0.351) 0.079 (0.341) 0.082 (0.340)
Divorced -0.260*** (0.065) -0.296*** (0.057) -0.286*** (0.056) -0.184*** (0.054) -0.183*** (0.054)
Widowed -0.217** (0.067) -0.156* (0.073) -0.132 (0.070) -0.036 (0.061) -0.034 (0.060)
Urban 0.007 (0.048) -0.036 (0.029) -1.059** (0.347) -0.618* (0.301) -0.743* (0.300)
Child 0.141*** (0.034) 0.131*** (0.036) -1.076* (0.431) -0.386 (0.466) -0.394 (0.464)
Lower education -0.188 (0.104) -0.135** (0.044) -0.202 (0.493) -0.228 (0.527) -0.191 (0.520)
Personality
Traits
Optimistic 0.368*** (0.025) 0.368*** (0.025)
Cheerful 0.292*** (0.019) 0.292*** (0.019)
Calm 0.084*** (0.015) 0.084*** (0.015)
Active 0.030* (0.015) 0.030* (0.014)
Life interest 0.245*** (0.023) 0.244*** (0.023)
Trust 0.183*** (0.012) 0.184*** (0.012)
Reference
Groups
Ref. Log Inc 0.045 (0.202)
Ref. Unemp 1.020 (0.603)
Ref. Accomm -0.399 (0.731)
Ref. Neigh 0.640* (0.302)
Interactions
Income*Nonmiddle 0.012 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007)
Income*Male 0.029 (0.030) -0.008 (0.026) -0.006 (0.028)
Income*Urban 0.128** (0.045) 0.067 (0.038) 0.076 (0.039)
Income*Married 0.076 (0.044) 0.045 (0.044) 0.045 (0.044)
Income*Lower educ 0.018 (0.067) 0.040 (0.073) 0.036 (0.072)
Income*Child 0.158** (0.056) 0.072 (0.060) 0.073 (0.060)
Unemp*Nonmiddle -0.079 (0.102) -0.103 (0.107) -0.105 (0.107)
Unemp*Male -0.132 (0.100) -0.156 (0.112) -0.159 (0.111)
Unemp*Urban 0.188 (0.157) 0.179 (0.135) 0.178 (0.134)
Unemp*Married 0.011 (0.113) 0.021 (0.094) 0.021 (0.094)
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Table 1.3: Satisfaction Equations (continued)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Interactions
Unemp*Lower educ -0.112 (0.178) -0.032 (0.183) -0.034 (0.183)
Unemp*Child 0.212* (0.092) 0.058 (0.102) 0.057 (0.102)
Hea. vbad*Nonmiddle -0.073 (0.230) -0.018 (0.222) -0.018 (0.221)
Hea. vbad*Male 0.133 (0.199) 0.148 (0.211) 0.145 (0.210)
Hea. vbad*Urban 0.115 (0.176) 0.131 (0.196) 0.136 (0.195)
Hea. vbad*Married 0.246 (0.151) 0.253 (0.180) 0.261 (0.178)
Hea. vbad*Lower educ -0.087 (0.173) -0.163 (0.235) -0.165 (0.234)
Hea. vbad*Child 0.492 (0.300) 0.313 (0.323) 0.316 (0.322)
Hea. bad*Nonmiddle -0.211* (0.098) -0.082 (0.079) -0.083 (0.080)
Hea. bad*Male -0.035 (0.079) -0.007 (0.085) -0.003 (0.086)
Hea. bad*Urban 0.096 (0.103) 0.111 (0.097) 0.115 (0.096)
Hea. bad*Married 0.035 (0.081) -0.056 (0.088) -0.054 (0.088)
Hea. bad*Lower educ 0.015 (0.120) 0.039 (0.137) 0.034 (0.135)
Hea. bad*Child -0.045 (0.088) -0.082 (0.107) -0.082 (0.107)
Hea. fair*Nonmiddle 0.014 (0.076) 0.038 (0.073) 0.040 (0.073)
Hea. fair*Male 0.043 (0.051) 0.005 (0.057) 0.007 (0.058)
Hea. fair*Urban -0.024 (0.062) 0.002 (0.054) 0.007 (0.055)
Hea. fair*Married 0.052 (0.059) 0.020 (0.064) 0.023 (0.064)
Hea. fair*Lower educ 0.059 (0.107) -0.023 (0.087) -0.025 (0.086)
Hea. fair*Child -0.153 (0.091) -0.181* (0.086) -0.182* (0.087)
Hea. good*Nonmiddle -0.064 (0.064) -0.035 (0.060) -0.034 (0.059)
Hea. good*Male 0.071 (0.054) 0.035 (0.056) 0.036 (0.057)
Hea. good*Urban 0.139** (0.050) 0.128* (0.054) 0.131* (0.053)
Hea. good*Married -0.057 (0.057) -0.040 (0.068) -0.039 (0.067)
Hea. good*Lower educ -0.087 (0.095) -0.155 (0.116) -0.155 (0.116)
Hea. good*Child 0.114* (0.050) 0.047 (0.060) 0.045 (0.059)
Accomm*Nonmiddle -0.033 (0.135) -0.015 (0.122) -0.015 (0.123)
Accomm*Male 0.135 (0.141) 0.115 (0.124) 0.116 (0.122)
Accomm*Urban 0.093 (0.158) 0.112 (0.160) 0.123 (0.157)
Accomm*Married -0.111 (0.143) 0.010 (0.134) 0.010 (0.133)
Accomm*Lower educ -0.001 (0.182) -0.158 (0.233) -0.155 (0.230)
Accomm*Child 0.108 (0.154) 0.006 (0.150) 0.008 (0.151)
Neigh*Nonmiddle 0.042 (0.106) 0.014 (0.084) 0.012 (0.084)
Neigh*Male -0.094 (0.076) -0.024 (0.065) -0.002 (0.065)
Neigh*Urban -0.070 (0.154) -0.158 (0.126) -0.204 (0.134)
Neigh*Married -0.199** (0.075) -0.322*** (0.095) -0.332*** (0.096)
Neigh*Lower educ -0.240* (0.119) -0.419** (0.131) -0.440*** (0.131)
Neigh*Child -0.079 (0.122) 0.033 (0.125) 0.037 (0.124)
Year Dummy
2011 0.033 (0.067) 0.054 (0.054) 0.057 (0.054) 0.122** (0.041) 0.172** (0.062)
Country Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0597 0.0676 0.0777 0.1282 0.1283
Log-likelihood -81567.8 -80098.3 -80009.0 -72100.5 -72091.4
Number of Observations 43014 43014 43014 40943 40943
Notes: The estimation procedure includes sample weighting. Clustered standard errors at the country level
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% level, 1% level, and 0.1% level,
respectively.
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Figure 1.1: The overall satisfaction with life across countries: Proportions by years
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Figure 1.1: The overall satisfaction with life across countries: Proportions by years (continuation)
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Figure 1.2: The overall satisfaction with life across countries: Proportions by gender
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Figure 1.2: The overall satisfaction with life across countries: Proportions by gender (continuation)
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Luxembourg
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Latvia
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very s.Very s.
Netherlands
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Poland
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Portugal
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Romania
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Sweden
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Slovenia
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
Slovakia
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Very dis 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very sat
United Kingdom
71
Figure 1.3: Ranking Social Welfare: Changes within Welfare Measure
a) Rank SW (y2007; 1) - Rank SW (y2011; 1)
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Figure 1.3: Ranking Social Welfare: Changes within Welfare Measure (continuation)
g) Rank SW (y∗2007; 1) - Rank SW (y
∗
2007; 2)
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Figure 1.4: Ranking Social Welfare: Changes between Welfare Measure
a) Rank SW (y2007; 1) - Rank SW (y
∗
2007; 1)
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Figure 1.4: Ranking Social Welfare: Changes between Welfare Measure (continuation)
e) Rank dSW (y∗; 1) - Rank dSW (y; 1)
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Figure 1.5: Ranking Gini Coefficients: Changes within Inequality measure
a) Rank Gini(y2007; 2) - Rank Gini(y2011; 2)
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Figure 1.6: Ranking Gini Coefficients: Changes between Inequality measure
a) Rank Gini(y2007; 2) - Rank Gini(y
∗
2007; 2)
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Figure 1.7: Share of WTP in Income: Gender and Age Groups
a) Men and Women
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Figure 1.8: Shapley Decomposition of WTP: Gender
a) Men and Women, 2007
0
20
40
60
80
100
Sh
ar
e 
of
 W
TP
 C
on
tri
bu
tio
ns
 in
 T
ot
al
 W
TP
EL CY BG PL IT HU LT RO FR BE ES UK LV LU EE PT SK NL DK CZ SE AT DE SI FI
Health
Neighbourhood
Accommodation
Unemployment
d) Men and Women, 2011
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c) Women 2007
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Figure 1.9: Shapley Decomposition of WTP: Age Groups
a) Age Group 18-44, 2007
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d) Age Group 18-44, 2011
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b) Age Group 45-64, 2007
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c) Age Group 65-over, 2007
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Figure 1.10: Re-ranking between Income and Equivalent Income
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Figure 1.10: Re-ranking between Income and Equivalent Income (continuation)
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Chapter 2
Multi-dimensional and Preference
Respecting Well-Being on the Job:
Evidence from Recent Graduates
2.1 Introduction
An important part of individual well-being comes from the well-being on the job. Given the
fact that individuals spend much of their time at work, it is not surprising that the quality
of job will be reflected in the evaluation of overall well-being of individuals. The individuals
are not seeking for employment just to be paid but they have other reasons like realizing their
own potentials and enriching their social life. Job quality is not only important for workers but
for firms as well. According to the efficiency wage theory, the effort that workers will exert is
determined by the job quality which is defined as the level of wage paid by the firm. Thus,
higher job quality will induce workers to exert higher effort which will result in higher profits
for firms.
The policy makers are interested in the job quality as well. As a matter of fact, an im-
portant part of the economic literature is concerned with the implementation and evaluation of
public and social policies. Since the job quality provides the information on how well people are
doing on their jobs, this information would allow the policy makers to identify those workers
in low quality jobs. Accordingly, the labour market policies can be designed in such a way to
increase the well-being of those workers who are in low quality jobs. Thus, the aim of these
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policies is to enhance the decisions of economic agents since the actual behaviour of individuals
may not bring them to achieve the best situation in life. Nevertheless, before we could assess
the impact of a particular policy on the well-being of individuals, we would have to define the
theoretical framework (concept) of well-being. For that matter, having a measure of well-being
is quite useful.
An approach that has been used extensively is to construct an objective well-being mea-
sure. However, an immediate weakness of an objective well-being measure comes from the fact
that such a measure will not care for the preferences of individuals. On the contrary, an ob-
jective measure has a paternalistic nature since the governments or policy makers would decide
themselves which job aspects the individuals prefer. Certainly, this attempt would not be em-
braced by the economists who are emphasising the importance of individual preferences. The
relative importance of various job aspects differ over individuals. Some individuals prefer to
work longer hours, some prefer higher paid jobs, some prefer higher security at the job, etc.
Thus, the information on preferences of workers is highly relevant for creating a good social and
public policies.
In the literature we can normally find three approaches on how to obtain information on
preferences (see Decancq et al. (2015)). The first approach is known as the stated preference
approach where the individuals evaluate the importance between material and non-material
dimensions. The disadvantage of the stated preference approach is that we either do not have
the information about these evaluations or these evaluations are flawed due to cognitive diffi-
culties individuals are exposed to while answering the questions in the contingent evaluation
techniques. The second approach assumes that individuals declare their preferences through the
observed behaviour and choices they make. This is know as the revealed preferences approach
(see Bernheim and Rangel (2009)). The revealed preferences approach has a disadvantage that
the individuals decisions contain various errors. Moreover, we rarely observe choices over dif-
ferent dimensions. The third approach consists of using the subjective satisfaction scores of
individuals which allow us to obtain the information on the weights between material and non-
material dimensions (see Schokkaert and Decancq (2013)).
The subjective satisfaction approach overcomes the disadvantages of the previous two ap-
proaches but it cannot be used directly for making interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
However, the subjective satisfaction approach suffers from two problems which are suggested
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by Sen (1985). The first problem concerns the physical condition neglect which means that
the subjective satisfaction may not need to take into account the physical characteristics of the
individuals but only their mental states. The second problem concerns the valuation neglect
since the subjective satisfaction cannot be used to value a reflective activities.
These two problems restrain us to use the subjective satisfaction approach directly when we
want to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In other words, the subjective responses
to job satisfaction question may not contain independent variation to other variables of concern
which we want to use to explain the individual behaviour. The responses to job satisfaction
question reflect the objective situations in life of individuals but also on their psychological
states such as aspirations, expectations and norms. Thus, the analysis of job satisfaction re-
quires more comprehensive approach and our attempt will be to show that we can still use
the subjective variable like job satisfaction in order to obtain useful information about the job
quality of individuals but with certain adjustments.
Although, the well-being on the job is an important part of the overall well-being for many
individuals, nevertheless, it is amazing that in contemporary economic literature, the topic of
job quality remained quite under researched. The researches and policy makers are mainly
concerned with the topic of job quantity (i.e. job creation, job stability and labour market
participation). However, this shows a limited viewpoint of researchers and policy makers since
the well-being of individuals is substantially determined by the quality of their jobs. Yet, we
could noticed that recently, the topic of job quality has become increasingly important for the
international organizations and governments. The European Union has shown a significant ef-
fort to incorporate the job quality in their agenda on the European Employment Strategies. In
Leaken 2001, it was the first time that the job quality indicators have been considered as a
part of employment and social policies. Within this initiative, the quality of employment was
selected as an aspect that will define the quality of job (see European Commission (2001)).
The important incentive for measuring and evaluating multi-dimensional well-being of the
current and future generations has been developed by the Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi Commission
(see Stiglitz et al. (2009b)). The OECD has included the topic of job quality in their analysis
of overall well-being Better Life Initiative but also to the analysis of Inclusive Growth (see
OECD (2015a,b)), ILO constructed the “Manual on Concepts and Definitions of Decent Work
Indicators” (ILO (2012)), the UNECE constructed the “Framework for Measuring Quality of
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Employment” (UNECE (2015)) and the Eurofond constructed the “Job Quality Framework”
(Eurofound (2012)). Even though a substantial effort has been exerted to improve the measure-
ment of job quality and to develop its conceptual framework, it is evident that further effort
is needed for constructing the operational framework for measuring job quality which can be
then easily applied in different settings that respects the fundamental principles a reasonable
job quality measure should incorporate (see Mun˜oz de Bustillo et al. (2011b)). Unfortunately,
until today there is still no agreement on the definition of job quality and what will be the
proper way to measure it.
The researchers and policy makers are confronted with two main impediments when they
are analysing the job quality. The first difficulty bears upon finding a proper definition and how
to find a measure of job quality which will be consistent with comparisons over countries, time
and groups1. The second difficulty concerns the multi-dimensional concept of job quality which
resulted in finding no agreement on the question about which dimensions we should include in
a measure of job quality but also there is no agreement on how to measure these dimensions.
Researches who have tackled the topic of job quality, were predominantly interested in the
job quality from a one-dimensional prospect of wage (see Lucifora et al. (2005) and Grimshaw
(2011)). This is obviously not a very realistic point of view since the job quality is not only
determined with the material dimension (see Clark (2005)) but it is also determined by other
dimensions which are not expressed in material terms.
Thus, a stepping-stone for measuring job quality comes from the fact that job quality is a
multi-dimensional concept and trying to construct a measure of well-being which will aggregate
various job dimensions in a single measure is not a trivial task. If one wants to tackle this issue
then the first step is to create the weights ascribed to each dimension which have normative
justification. In the literature there are two main approaches for creating an index of well-being
on the job.
1Nevertheless, there are several approaches that researches have undertaken to analyse the differences and
trends in job quality across countries. The most elementary approach for analysing job quality is based on the
analysis of job dimensions (see Olsen et al. (2010) and Clark (2005)). Although, this approach is simple to apply,
nevertheless a serious weakness of this approach is that it does not take into account the correlations between
different job dimensions (i.e. low job security and high job autonomy) and also this approach is difficult to apply
if we consider a large number of job dimensions. Second approach is to analyse the job quality on the basis of
taxonomy of job types (see Holman (2013)). Third approach is to analyse the job quality from the macroeconomic
perspective which is based on building a model of job quality at the national level (see Davoine et al. (2008)).
The forth approach is to analyse the job quality by constructing an index of job quality which aggregates various
job dimensions using particular weighting schemes for these dimensions (see Ritter and Anker (2002), Leschke
et al. (2008), Mun˜oz de Bustillo et al. (2011a) and Schokkaert et al. (2011)).
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The first approach is to compute the objective measure of well-being on the job which
ascribes equal weights to all job dimensions. The objective well-being measure is computed
either by using a factor analysis, regression analysis (see Jencks et al. (1988) and Kalleberg and
Vaisey (2005)) or the researcher presupposes some arbitrary weights which are then ascribed to
all job dimensions. Although, this approach is quite simple to implement, nevertheless it suffers
from a serious weakness which is that the chosen weights do not reflect the fact that individuals
have different preferences over various job attributes. As we have argued, different individuals
may have different preferences over job dimensions.
The second approach is to measure job quality with the subjective job satisfaction re-
vealed by individuals (see Freeman (1978), Clark and Oswald (1996), Hamermesh (1977, 2001),
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Ritter and Anker (2002), Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette
(2004) and D’Addio et al. (2007)). The concept of job satisfaction originates from the literature
in sociology, industrial psychology and organizational behaviour (see Herzberg et al. (2011)
and Spector (1997)). The subjective job satisfaction reflects the workers attitude for a various
collection of job characteristics at their job. The proponents of this approach presuppose that
the job satisfaction score reflects the true valuation of the well-being on the job of individuals
(see Clark (1997a, 2001), Frey and Stutzer (2002a,b)).
One of the founders of the concept of job satisfaction, Locke (1976) suggested that the job
satisfaction can be defined as the summation of job outcomes such that each job outcome is
weighted by its importance to the worker. Nevertheless, as it has been argued in the literature,
the subjective job satisfaction is affected by the adaptation and expectations (i.e. scaling fac-
tors) which means that one has to be careful with the direct interpretation of the job satisfaction
measure (see Hamermesh (2001), Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004), Mun˜oz de Bustillo
et al. (2011b) and Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000)). To illustrate this point, one can think
of a worker who objectively holds a job of low quality but her subjective job satisfaction is high
due to her low reference level of adaptations and expectations. We can also think of another
worker who objectively holds a job of high quality but he has low job satisfaction due to his high
level of aspirations and expectations. Thus, the well-being on the job is considered to be a more
comprehensive concept than the concept of job satisfaction (see Danna and Griffin (1999)).
Obviously, these two approaches for measuring job quality are opposing each other. The
objective measures of well-being do not take into account the importance of individual prefer-
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ences but instead the relative importance of each dimension is imposed in a paternalistic way.
The subjective job satisfaction measure is sensitive to individual preferences but these pref-
erences are as well under the influence of scaling factors which can violate the assumption of
having a genuine preferences.
In this study we aim our attention at measuring job quality using a large sample of coun-
tries. We restrict our analysis to a specific sub-population of recent graduates who have just
entered the labour market. Since the literature on job quality for young and educated workers
is quite scarce and moreover given the importance this sub-population have in the society, we
have decided measure job quality among recent graduates in order to fill the following gap in
the literature. The main reason why younger highly educated workers have been left out from
the job quality analysis is based on opinion that this group of people have higher opportunities
on the labour market relative to other groups in the society (see Kalleberg and Vaisey (2005)).
However, these young and educated workers have job characteristics and job values that differ
from the job characteristics and job values of previous generations of workers (see Ng et al.
(2010)). Thus, what a former group of workers think of a god job may be quite different from
the opinion of the later group of workers.
Since measures of job quality are of the utmost importance for constructing valuable labour
market policies we have compared five different measures of well-being on the job. The job qual-
ity measures we have used include the objective measure of equal weights, objective measure of
average preferences, subjective measure of job satisfaction, wage and equivalent wage. We have
found that countries greatly differ according to the measure of job quality we use. This results
imply that one should be extremely careful with selecting a particular measure of job quality
since different measures embody different normative implications. In the upcoming sections
we will explain in detail the implementation and informational requirement for each of these
measures.
We also analyse the determinants of job satisfaction among the recent graduates. From
the perspective of policy makers and governments it is important to know the effects of various
job characteristics on job satisfaction. The literature on job satisfaction suggests that there
are various determinants that have an effect on job satisfaction. The first set of determinants
refers to monetary and non-monetary job characteristics. The effect of wage on job satisfaction
is found to be positive although some researches claim that the relationship between the abso-
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lute wage level and job satisfaction is not substantial (see Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette
(2004)). It has been found that the effect of wage on job satisfaction is reducible since workers
can adapt to higher wages (see Groot and Maassen van den Brink (1999)), that job satisfaction
can be influenced by wage inequality (see Hamermesh (2001)) or it is the wage of some reference
group which matters (see Clark and Oswald (1996)). On the other hand, the important list
of non-monetary job characteristics includes recognition, achievement, responsibility, variety,
task identity, autonomy, skill utilization and security (see Herzberg et al. (2011) and Mun˜oz de
Bustillo et al. (2011b)). We have shown that besides wage, young graduates care much about the
non-wage job characteristics. Both men and women find a good career prospect to be relatively
the most important non-wage job characteristic while they find job security to be relatively the
least important non-wage job characteristic.
Our work connects the measurement of job quality with the literature on gender economic
inequality2. We do so by analysing the gender differences in job quality within and across
counties. Although the economic position of men and women has become more equal from the
1950s until today, we still observe that women are on average less paid and that they work on
the jobs of lower quality (see Ponthieux and Meurns (2015) for an overview). The evidence
that shows persisting gender wage gaps across countries is indeed puzzling since women have
gained comparable level of education relative to men, women have prolonged their decision
about maternity and the family structures have changed such that marriages are not stable as
before and women showed increased economic independence by discarding their male spouse as
a breadwinner. Nevertheless, women are still treated unequal to men on the labour market.
The importance of this evidence has greatly reflected in recent work of policy makers who have
designed policies in order to equate the conditions which led to gender wage inequality (see
OECD (2012)).
The approach we have taken to analyse the gender differences in job quality consists of
comparing the wage and equivalent wage measure. In addition, after comparing the gaps in
the job quality at the mean, we have proceed further into the distributional analysis of the
gender gaps in job quality. We have found that the quality of jobs is higher for men in almost
all countries if we use the wage measure. However, as soon as we use a multi-dimensional and
preference sensitive measure of job quality, we have observed that in some countries women are
2Although the following term is a quite broad we would concentrate on the issue of the gender wage gap and
gender equivalent wage gap.
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either faring equal to men or they are even faring better than men. We have also compared
the gender differences in the willingness-to-pay for reaching the reference values of non-wage
job characteristics. The results have shown that men are having higher total willingness-to-pay
which means that they are suffering more than women for not reaching the reference values in
non-wage job characteristics. Finally, we have illustrated the Shapley value decomposition of
the total willingness-to-pay on the contributions attributed to each non-wage job characteristic.
We have found that for both men and women across all countries, having a good career prospect
is relatively the most important non-wage job characteristic, while job security is found to be
the least important non-wage job characteristic.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we describe the conceptual framework
for each measure of job quality. In section 2.3 we present a set of measures of job quality that
we will use. Section 2.4 illustrates the empirical strategy for estimating job satisfaction model.
In the same section we illustrate the methodology for estimating the equivalent wage from the
job satisfaction data. Section 2.5 describes the data and it shows the distribution of job quality
across countries and across gender. Section 2.6 presents the results. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Satisfaction, Individual Preferences and Job Characteristics
In this section we illustrate the theoretical framework for measuring job quality that will be used
in our empirical analysis. The purpose of constructing a measure of job quality is to provide
an information on the well-being of individuals at their jobs. It is important to note that
before constructing a measure of job quality one should justify the assumptions on which each
measure is based on. We present a set of propositions which serve as a normative underpinnings
for these measures. For the presentation of these propositions we follow Fleurbaey et al. (2009),
Schokkaert et al. (2011).
2.2.1 The Framework
Let us assume that a job of each individual i (where i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N) is defined by a vector
of job characteristics or aspects that we denote with θi. The vector of job characteristics
represents the complete characterisation of the job of individuals such that it includes the
outcomes and achievements of the jobs. We assume that the vector of job characteristics consists
of a material job characteristic which is captured by wage of the individual wi and it consists of
other (non-wage) job characteristics (i.e. security, autonomy, etc.) which are represented with
the m-dimensional vector, Xi = (X
1
i , X
2
i , . . . , X
m
i ), where m ∈ (1, 2, . . . ,M). The vector of job
characteristics can be written as θi = (wi, Xi), where θi ∈ Rm+ .
We assume that individuals are well-informed about what represents a good job. In other
words, each individual i has an ordinal preference ordering over the vectors of job characteristics
which are denoted with Ri for a weak preference ordering, Pi for a strict preference ordering
and Ii for an indifferent preference ordering. In addition, we assume that individual preferences
are complete, continuous, transitive and weakly monotonic. We can represent any preference
ordering that satisfy these requirements by a utility function which we denote with Ui. Formally
this relation can be written as
∀θi, θ′i ∈ Rm+ , θi  θ′i ⇐⇒ Ui(θi) ≥ Ui(θ′i) (2.1)
where Ui : Rm+ → R. Since we will be interested in ordinal ranking of bundles of job charac-
teristics, we can use the indifference curves obtained from the utility function as a description
of preference rankings for these bundles. Nevertheless, in order to be able to make the inter-
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personal comparison of utilities we must have individuals with exactly the same preferences
which does not seem as a plausible assumption since different individuals may have different
preferences. Once we introduce the heterogeneity of preferences we may not longer use the same
indifference curves for comparing bundles of goods between individuals.
θi
θj
θ1
θ2
Figure 2.1: Preferences
A situation where the heterogeneity of preferences does not allow us to use the indifference
curves for utility comparison is depicted in figure 2.1. Suppose there are two individuals i and
j and both of these two individuals are having preferences over two job characteristics, θ1 and
θ2. The slope of indifference curves reveal that an individual i relatively prefers θ1 while on
the opposite an individual j relatively prefers θ2. Since their indifference curves cross we are
not able to tell whether individual i in point θi is better or worse off that individual j in point
θj . A solution to this problem is found by cardinalizing the utility function such that to each
indifference curve we ascribe a number according to which we can precisely rank the well being
of individuals by looking at their indifference curves.
An approach that we will follow in order to achieve the cardinalization of utility function
is to use the information on the subjective satisfaction of individuals Si as a way of assigning a
number to indifference curves of individuals. As long as the satisfaction function of individuals
Si complies with individual preferences Ri one can achieve a cardinalization of utility function
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which is consistent with preferences. The following requirement can be written as
∀θi, θ′i ∈ Rm+ , θiRiθ′i ⇐⇒ Si(θi) ≥ Si(θ′i) (2.2)
Nevertheless, we could be suspicious about whether this requirement that tells us that a
cardinal representation of Si could be achieved from the preference ranking Ri will be satisfied.
For instance, individuals may report the level of subjective satisfaction which is affected with
their mental states or feelings that they are endure and therefore their level of satisfaction will
not be consistent with the preference ordering (see Adler (2013)).
Another reason why the consistency between the subjective satisfaction and preference
ordering may fail concerns the evidence which has found that individuals change their aspirations
and expectations in life when they compare their current life situations with a life situation at
the particular reference point (see Loewenstein and Ubel (2008)). That is to say, if we want
to have a proper cardinal representation of Si which is consistent with the representation of
preference ranking Ri, we have to take into account the influence of aspirations, expectations
and other scaling factors. It is important to note that these scaling factors affect the labels
(position) of indifference curves but they do not have an effect on the slope of indifference
curves.
Finally, we arrive at the condition that guarantees that the cardinal representation of the
satisfaction function Si is consistent with the representation of the preference ordering Ri. This
is called the Consistency assumption and it can be written as
θiRiθ′i ⇐⇒ Si(θi,Ri,Σi) ≥ Si(θ′i,Ri,Σi) (2.3)
where Σi represents the scaling factors such as aspiration and expectation of individuals. We can
immediately see that after we control for the scaling factors, the preference orderings over vectors
of job characteristics is logically equivalent to a situation where we compare the subjective
satisfaction of individuals holding the vector of job characteristics and preferences constant.
2.2.2 The Principles of Job Quality Measures
We now turn to present a set of propositions which a sound measure of job quality should
satisfy. A measure of job quality represents the well-being on the job that an individual holds.
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The job situation of the individual i is completely characterized by a triplet (θi,Ri,Σi). The
well-being on the job is denoted with WB. Putting this notation into use we can compare the
well-being of an individual i across different job situations. Let us suppose that we have to
evaluate the well-being of individual i at two job situations, (θi,Ri,Σi) and (θ′i,R′i,Σ′i). If we
have that (θi,Ri,Σi)  (θ′i,R′i,Σ′i) (or equivalently (θi,Ri,Σi) Ri (θ′i,R′i,Σ′i)) then we conclude
that WB(θi,Ri,Σi) ≥WB(θ′i,R′i,Σ′i).
As we are predominantly interested in comparing well-being between individuals we have
to come up with a reasonable and acceptable properties that these measures of well-being satisfy.
For that matter, showing respect for individual preferences play a decisive role. If we assume
that individuals have identical preferences then we do not have to worry that the principle of
sovereignty of individual preferences would be violated in the process of well-being comparison.
Nevertheless, we are confronted with a non-trivial question on how to compare the well-being
between individuals when we assume that individuals do not have the identical preferences. In
order to find the solution to the following dilemma we could start with the so-called Dominance
principle.
Principle 4 (Dominance principle). Let us assume that there are two individuals i and j
which differ in their preference rankings such that Ri 6= Rj. Then this principle imply that
WB(θi,Ri,Σi) ≥ WB(θj ,Rj ,Σj) if θi ≥ θj and similarly for the strict preference relations P
and indifference preference relations I.
In line with this principle we can say that if the bundle of job characteristics of the individ-
ual i is not smaller than the bundle of job characteristics of the individual j then the well-being
on job of individual i is at least as good as the well-being on job of individual j. It is obvious
that a weakness of this principle is that it does not imply a complete preference ordering but it
implies only a partial preference ordering.
The Dominance principle completely disregards individual preferences (and the scaling
factors) when it compares the job quality of individuals. Nevertheless, the preferences of in-
dividuals can be quite distinctive and since we believe that the idea of respecting individual
preferences is important, we would look for a principle which would require that a measure
of well-being on the job takes into account the preferences of individuals over a vector of job
characteristics. In order to do this we introduce the principle which is called the Conditional
respect for individual preferences.
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Principle 5 (Conditional respect for individual preferences).
Let us assume that there are two individuals i and j which have identical preference rank-
ings, Ri = Rj = R and they have identical scaling factors, Σi = Σj = Σ. The following
principle implies that (i) WB(θi,Ri,Σi) ≥ WB(θ′i,Ri,Σi) ⇐⇒ θiRiθ′i, (ii) WB(θi,R,Σ) ≥
WB(θj ,R,Σ) ⇐⇒ θiRθj, and similarly for the strict preference relations P and indifference
preference relations I.
We can use the following principle to compare the individual well-being on the job over
two different bundles of job characteristics. Moreover, this principle asserts that if we have two
individuals with the same preference ordering and the same scaling factors, we can compare
their well-being by using the preference orderings that these two individuals have over the bun-
dles of job characteristics. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that it is not possible
to find a measure of job quality which satisfies at the same time the Dominance principle and
Conditional respect for individual preferences because these two principles are mutually not
consistent. Fleurbaey (2007) and Decancq et al. (2015) show that if we consider both of these
principles then the axiom of transitivity of preferences will be violated.
θbi
θdj
θai
θcj
θ1
θ2
Figure 2.2: Contradiction between dominance and conditional respect for preferences
This can be easily shown in the figure 2.2. Suppose there are four jobs available which we
denote with a, b, c and d. Each of these four jobs are characterized with a different vector of
job characteristics, θ. If we apply the Dominance principle we would obtain WBb(θbi ,Ri,Σi) ≥
WBc(θcj ,Rj ,Σj) and WBd(θdj ,Rj ,Σj) ≥ WBa(θai ,Ri,Σi) while if apply the Conditional re-
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spect for individual preferences we would obtain WBc(θcj ,Rj ,Σj) ≥ WBd(θdj ,Rj ,Σj) and
WBa(θai ,Ri,Σi) ≥ WBb(θbi ,Ri,Σi). Obviously, it is not possible to satisfy both of these two
results.
Although the previous principle gave rise to the important notion for respecting individual
preferences, yet the underlining assumption was that the scaling factors are assumed to be con-
stant across individuals. Nevertheless, as we have argued the scaling factors such as the level
of aspirations and expectations can vary across individuals or they can vary across time for a
given individual. Therefore, we have to consider the principle which takes into account individ-
ual preferences in the setting where the scaling factors might not be constant. This principle
can be formally stated as
Principle 6 (Unconditional respect for individual preferences). Let us assume that there are
two individuals i and j which have identical preference rankings, Ri = Rj = R but their
scaling factors differ, Σi 6= Σj. Then the following principle imply that (i) WB(θi,Ri,Σi) ≥
WB(θ′i,Ri,Σ′i) ⇐⇒ θiRiθ′i, (ii) WB(θi,R,Σi) ≥ WB(θj ,R,Σj) ⇐⇒ θiRθj, and similarly for
the strict preference relations P and indifference preference relations I.
Nevertheless, since the Conditional respect for individual preferences is not consistent with
the Dominance principle and since the Unconditional respect for individual preferences implies
the Conditional respect for individual preferences, this means that the Unconditional respect for
individual preferences will not be consistent with the Dominance principle. In order to solve
the following problem one can either weaken the Conditional respect for individual preferences
or one can weaken the Dominance principle. Fleurbaey (2007) and Decancq et al. (2015) argue
that we should weaken the Dominance principle if we want to respect individual preferences
over important dimensions in life. A weaker form of the Dominance principle is given in the
following principle.
Principle 7 (Subset dominance principle). Let us assume that there are two individuals i and
j which might have different preference rankings, Ri 6= Rj and they might have different scaling
factors, Σi 6= Σj. In addition, let us assume that there exists a subset Γ ∈ Rm+ , such that
θi, θj ∈ Γ. Then we have WB(θi,Ri,Σi) ≥WB(θj ,Rj ,Σj) if θi ≥ θj.
It is important to note that the Subset dominance principle still applies the same rationale
as the Dominance principle but the former principle is constrained at the specific subset of the
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space of job characteristics which we denote with Γ. Fleurbaey (2009) has shown that the Con-
ditional respect for individual preferences and Unconditional respect for individual preferences
are both satisfying the Subset dominance principle and this proves the existence of a well-being
measure which respect individual preferences. This is known as the Equivalent income (wage)
measure (see Fleurbaey (2009) and Decancq et al. (2015)). In the next section, we provide the
description of this measure in detail.
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2.3 Measures of Job Quality
We present five measures of well-being on the job. Each of these measures are conceptually
different and they use different part of information to evaluate job quality. We will differentiate
between the well-being measures according to the arguments contained in these measures. These
arguments are a vector of job characteristics θi, preference orderings Ri and the scaling factors
Σi. In other words, a measure of well-being on the job uses the information which is included
in a triple (θi,Ri,Σi). However, it is not necessary that all measures of well-being on the job
use the entire information included in a triple but rather they may use only some part of it.
2.3.1 Subjective Measures of Well-being on the Job
The subjective measure of well-being on the job is based on the job satisfaction question where
individuals self report their level of satisfaction on the job. The convenience of this approach
is that we can use the answers on the job satisfaction question as a measure of job quality.
The subjective measure of well-being on the job of individual i is represented with the job
satisfaction function S as follows
WBs(θi,Ri,Σi) = S(θi,Ri,Σi) (2.4)
Yet, one has to be cautious when using the subjective job satisfaction as an instrument
to compare job quality. As we have already mentioned in the previous section, the numbers
assigned to subjective job satisfaction (that is, the calibration of the job satisfaction function)
will be under the influence of the scaling factors like the aspirations, adaptation, and expecta-
tions.
Moreover, one can reasonably be sceptical about whether the subjective measure of well-
being on the job appreciate the preferences of individuals. As long as the Consistency assump-
tion is satisfied, this measure will comply with the ordinal preference rankings of individuals Ri
such that we could legitimately be involved in making intrapersonal comparisons of well-being
on the job. In other words, if the Consistency assumption holds, we can argue that this measure
satisfies the Conditional respect for preferences. Of course, one can easily imagine the situation
where for instance the individual i prefers θi over θ
′
i, θiRiθ′i, while due to altering scaling factors,
the individual i would still be better off with θ′i than with θi, so that S(θi,Ri,Σi) < S(θ′i,Ri,Σ′i).
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Nevertheless, even if the Conditional respect for preferences is satisfied still this does not
allow us to make the interpersonal comparisons of well-being on the job. For instance, it is
easy to imagine the situation where two individuals i and j, both have the same preferences,
Ri = Rj = R, where they both prefer job b over job a but nevertheless the satisfaction of
individual i that holds job b may be lower than the satisfaction of individual j that holds job a.
Since these two individuals assign a different number to their satisfaction functions and since
the later depend on the scaling factors (i.e. adaptations, norms and expectations) which may
be different for different individuals, it is indeed possible that this situation occurs.
Since the scaling factors play a role, the subjective job satisfaction will not satisfy the
Unconditional respect for preferences. In the work by Sen (1985) the influence of aspiration and
adaptations on the subjective satisfaction is well described in his notion of physical condition
neglect according to which a person i can adapt to her poor situation such that she is more
satisfied than the other person j who might be in the better situation but due to a higher
expectations of person j, still person i will be more satisfied than person j. Thus, if we want to
satisfy the stronger condition for respecting individual preferences, then obviously our choice
for the subjective job satisfaction measure would be wrong.
2.3.2 Wage
A vector of job characteristics θ includes the monetary asset of the individual which is repre-
sented with wage. Using wage as a measure of well-being on the job of individual i we arrive
at the following expression
WBw(θi,Ri,Σi) = wi (2.5)
One can immediately notice that the multi-dimensionality of the job quality measure falls
apart with the wage measure. This is obviously a noticeable weakness of the following measure
since we could find two individuals with the same wage but with quite different non-wage job
characteristics, yet the well-being on the job of these two individuals would be identical.
2.3.3 Objective Measures of Well-being on the Job
Those who are interested in the multi-dimensional concept of well-being would not find the wage
measure useful since it only takes into consideration one aspect of the job. The weakness of a
97 Chapter 2
one-dimensional measure can be resolved by taking into account additional aspects of the job
which we would include in the well-being measure. Unfortunately, even when these additional
aspects of the job are included in a measure of well-being, still the remaining challenge is how to
make the interpersonal comparisons of well-being based on a vector of job characteristics. Using
the Dominance principle we would require that all elements of a vector of job characteristics
are larger for the individual i than the individual j (that is, we would require θi  θj). It seems
that the later requirement would be rather difficult to satisfy.
A solution to this problem consists of finding the importance weights for each aspect of
the job which we will use to aggregate aspects of the job in one composite measure. Such
measure will be used for making interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The weights ascribed
to each aspect of the job would reflect the relative importance of a particular aspect of the
job in respect to other aspects of the job. The selection of weights for the objective well-being
measures on the job is based either on the statistical-data driven procedure (i.e. factor or
principal component analysis) or on the normative decision. Neither of these two approaches
allow that the constructed weights use the information on individual preferences. Particularly,
the weights for the objective measure of well-being would reflect the notion that the comparison
of well-being should be based on some reference individual whose preferences and scaling factors
we take for granted. We will denote the reference value for preferences by R˜ while the reference
value for a vector of scaling factors is denoted by Σ˜. The objective measure of well-being on
the job for the individual i can be defined as follows
WBo(θi,Ri,Σi) = S(θi, R˜, Σ˜) (2.6)
Notice that the objective well-being measure uses the subjective job satisfaction score
evaluated at the vector of job aspects θi, the reference value for preferences R˜ and the reference
value for scaling factors Σ˜. Since the preferences and scaling factors differ across individuals,
the objective measures of well-being do not satisfy the Conditional respect for preferences and
thus they do not satisfy the Unconditional respect for preferences. Yet, the objective well-being
measures would satisfy the Dominance principle if we select a positive weight to each aspect of
the job.
We will compute two different objective well-being measures which are based on a specific
reference value for the indifference curves and a specific reference value for the scaling factors.
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The first measure is called an equal weights objective measure (WBo,ew) which is computed as
the arithmetic mean of the normalized values of wage and non-wage job characteristics. The
normalization of the wage and non-wage job characteristics is done by the min-max method
at the country level. In other words, within each country we have computed the minimum
and maximum values for all job characteristics and then the minimum value for a given job
characteristic is subtracted from the actual value of that job characteristic and this difference
is divided by the difference between maximum and minimum value of that job characteristic.
The second measure is called the average preferences objective measure (WBo,ap) which
is computed from the job satisfaction equation where the reference values of indifference curves
and scaling factors set at the average values in the sample. Although WBo,ap will not respect
individual preferences, still this measure will take into account the relative importance of wage
and non-wage job characteristics for the average individual in the sample. Both objective
measures will be presented more formally in an upcoming section.
2.3.4 Equivalent Wage
The well-being on the job measures we have yet presented suffer from some serious weaknesses.
Although the subjective measure of well-being may respect individual preferences in the intrap-
ersonal well-being comparisons if the consistency assumption holds, still the following measure
cannot be used in the interpersonal well-being comparisons since the Unconditional respect for
preferences would be violated as a result of the presence of scaling factors. On the other hand,
the objective well-being measures are paternalistic in ascribing the weights to job dimensions
and thus these measures do not show respect for individual preferences over job dimensions
that individuals find important. Yet, there exists an approach which appreciates individual
preferences and which can be used in inter-personal comparisons of well-being. It is called
the equivalent income (wage) (see Fleurbaey et al. (2009) and Decancq et al. (2015)). We can
describe the well-being on the job of individual i using the equivalent wage measure as follows
WBw
∗
(θi,Ri,Σi) = w∗i such that (wi, Xi) Ii (w∗i , X˜i) (2.7)
The following measure represents the hypothetical level of wage w∗i of an individual i when
all of her non-wage dimensions xi are set on the reference value X˜ such that she is indifferent
between this position and her original position. A graphical illustration of the equivalent wage
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is presented in figure 2.3. Let us assume that there are two individuals i and j and there are
only two job characteristics which are wage w and job security s. The solid horizontal line
represents the reference value for job security which we denote with s˜. The vectors of job
characteristics are represented by θi and θj for individual i and j, respectively. One can notice
that individual i has a lower wage than individual j though individual j has more security on
the job than individual j.
In addition, we can see that these two individuals have different ideas on what makes
a good job. For instance, individual j has a steeper individual curve which tells us that she
prefers less job security. On the other hand, the indifference curve of individual i is sloped less
which means that he attaches a higher weight on job security. The intersection point between
the reference value for security s˜ and indifference curve represents the equivalent wage. These
two points are denoted with θ′i and θ
′
j . Notice that in order to reach the equivalent wage we
are moving along the indifference curves of individuals i and j so that these two individuals
are equally well-off in their initial positions (θi, θj) and when they reach the reference value for
job security (θ′i, θ
′
j).
w∗i w
∗
j
wi wj
si
sj
s˜
θ′i
θi
θ′j
θj
Wage (w)
Security (s)
Figure 2.3: Equivalent wage
It is obvious that the equivalent wage is equal to wage when all non-wage job characteris-
tics of individuals are taking the reference values. In addition, we can see that the equivalent
wage of individuals does not depend on their preferences over job attributes. Even though the
individual i has a higher job security, yet the equivalent income of individual i is lower than
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the equivalent wage of individual j because individual j has a higher wage and he cares less
for job security. Nevertheless, even if the individual i would have higher wage and job security
then individual j, wi > wj and si > sj , still the individual i could have a lower equivalent
wage then individual j, w′i < w
′
j . For that matter, the equivalent wage measure would not
satisfy the Dominance principle but the equivalent wage measure would satisfy the preferences
of individuals (Conditional and Unconditional respect for individual preferences) and the Subset
dominance principle.
Additional information that we obtain before computing the equivalent wage is the indi-
vidual willingness-to-pay (WTPi) for having the non-wage job characteristics at the reference
values. Taking the difference between the equivalent wage and wage of the individual i we arrive
at the following expression
WTPi(xi → X˜; θi) = wi − w∗i (2.8)
where WTPi(Xi → X˜; θi) represents the of willingness to pay of individual i for a change from
Xi to X˜. We can see in our example that although the individual i has higher job security than
individual j (si > sj) yet, individual i has a higher WTP than individual j. The reason for this
lies in the fact that individual i cares more about job security than individual j does and thus
individual i is ready to pay more of his wage to reach the reference value for job security.
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2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Estimating Equivalent Wage
In this section we present the methodological framework for estimating the equivalent wage
from the individual data on job satisfaction (see Fleurbaey et al. (2009), Schokkaert et al.
(2011) and Decancq et al. (2015)). The estimation of the equivalent wage requires that we have
available information on subjective job satisfaction Si, information about job characteristics θi
and information on preferences of individuals Ri. Normally, one can find the information on
Si and θi in surveys which are immediately ready to use in the estimation of the equivalent
wage. However, the information on Ri is usually not directly accessible from the data so we
will follow the procedure which infer information on individual preferences from the data on
job satisfaction.
Typically, one can find in the surveys the job satisfaction question such as What is your
overall satisfaction with your job? The respondents are normally offered a categorical or discrete
(or combination of both) scale on which they can choose their answer. The scale of answers
ranges from the lowest level of job satisfaction (“very dissatisfied”) to the highest level of job
satisfaction (“very satisfied”). The relationship between the job satisfaction and the explanatory
variables can be represented with the following equation
Si = α+ (β + ΩZi) lnwi + (γ + ΛZi)
′Xi + Ziσ + i (2.9)
where lnwi is the logarithm of wage, Xi is a vector of other (non-wage) job characteristics, Zi is
a vector of personal characteristics, i is the error term while α, β, γ,Ω,Λ and σ are parameters
to be estimated. The logarithmic transformation of wage is applied in order to capture the
non-linear effect of wage on job satisfaction. That is to say, we are assuming that the effect of
wage on job satisfaction is marginally decreasing.
The important point that has to be emphasized from the outset concerns the impact of
personal characteristics on job satisfaction. We distinguish between two different effects. The
direct effects of personal characteristics on the subjective job satisfaction, which we denote with
σ, capture the effect of aspirations, adaptations and norms. These effects scale the indifference
curves of individuals but do not change the slope of indifference curves. The indirect effects
of personal characteristics on the subjective job satisfaction are captured with the interaction
Chapter 2 102
terms. In other words, a matrix of coefficients Ω and Λ change the slope of indifference curves of
individuals since they affect the marginal rate of substitution between wage and non-wage job
characteristics. These interaction terms between job characteristics and personal characteristics
are of great importance for us in obtaining the information on individual preferences.
The heterogeneity of individual preferences is certainly an important issue and we take the
view that individual preferences over job characteristics should definitely be respected. In that
respect, we model the heterogeneity of individual preferences by assuming that workers with
different socio-demographic and other work related characteristics have a distinctive view over
the job characteristics which they find important. We represent the marginal rate of substitution
between wage and non-wage job characteristic k for an individual i as follows
MRSw,Xiki ≡
∂Si/∂Xik
∂Si/∂wi
=
(γ + ΛZi)wi
β + ΩZi
(2.10)
One should note that we are not precisely able to obtain the information on individual
preferences but rather we can estimate the preferences of certain groups defined by personal
characteristics, Z. Thus, we assume that individuals with the same values for Z have the same
preferences. In addition, we will assume that the marginal rates of substitution between wage
and non-wage job characteristics are constant, although we are certainly aware this may be an
oversimplification.
After we have specified the job satisfaction regression we can proceed further with the
estimation of equivalent wage. In the next step we define the reference values for all non-wage
job characteristics which we denote with Xi. Plugging these reference values and the level of
wage w∗i into the job satisfaction regression we obtain the following expression
Si = α+ (β + ΩZi) lnw
∗
i + (γ + ΛZi)
′X + Ziσ + i (2.11)
whereX = (X1, · · · , Xk). We calculate the equivalent wage w∗i such that a worker i is indifferent
between the hypothetical job situation (w∗i , X) and her actual job situation (wi, Xi). In other
worlds, we equate the equations 2.9 and 2.11 which gives us the following expression
α+(β+ΩZi) lnwi+(γ+ΛZi)
′Xi+Ziσ+i = α+(β+ΩZi) lnw∗i +(γ+ΛZi)
′X+Ziσ+i (2.12)
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The previous expression can be simplified further to
(β + ΩZi) lnwi + (γ + ΛZi)
′Xi = (β + ΩZi) lnw∗i + (γ + ΛZi)
′X (2.13)
Solving this equation for w∗i we obtain the equivalent wage equation
w∗i = wi exp
[(
γ + ΛZi
β + ΩZi
)′ (
Xi −X
)]
(2.14)
We can notice that a vector σ has vanished from the equivalent wage equation since the
coefficients capturing aspirations, adaptations and norms do not play a role any more. The error
term i has been dropped since any stochastic dissimilarities over workers are not important for
computing the equivalent wage. Nevertheless, the interaction terms between personal charac-
teristics and job characteristics are included in the equation since the equivalent wage measure
respect preferences over job characteristics. The term in the second (round) bracket shows by
how much a worker is deprived in each of his non-wage job dimension from the reference value
of that non-wage job dimension. This immediately implies that if a worker has no deprivation
in non-wage job characteristics then his equivalent wage equates to his wage.
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2.4.2 Estimating the Job Satisfaction Equation
This section illustrates our empirical strategy that for estimating the job satisfaction regres-
sion. We have worked with five different specifications for the job satisfaction regression. We
start with the simplest specification while each consecutive specification is enriched with the
additional control variables. The dependent variable which we denote with Si represents the
job satisfaction of the individual i. The main independent variables are wage and non-wage job
characteristics. Obviously one important job characteristic represents the monetary remunera-
tion of workers for the effort they have exerted. In our work, this characteristic is represented
with wage3.
The remaining job characteristics refer to non-wage job characteristics which we denote
with a vector Xi. In order to construct these non-wage job characteristics we have used the
question in which individuals were asked to assess eight job characteristics. The question was for-
mulated as follows Please indicate to what extent the following job characteristics actually apply
to your current work situation? A vector of non-wage job characteristics includes the auton-
omy at work (Autonomy), job security (Security), opportunity to learn new things (Learn), new
challenges (Challenges), good career prospects (Career), social status (Social Status), chance
of doing something useful for society (Valuable) and good chance to combine work with family
task (Family Work). The individuals were offered a discrete-categorical scale where the possible
answers from which they could choose ranged from 1 which means “not at all” to 5 which means
“to a very high extent”.
It is important to note that this set of job characteristics we have chosen, is not to be
considered as the exhaustive set of job characteristics that workers find important at their jobs.
Yet, our choice of job characteristics matches the choice of job characteristics we have found
in other studies. A vector of personal characteristics which we denote with Zi, consists of a
set of socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, dummy variable if an individual has at
least one child, a dummy variable if an individual is living with a partner, a dummy variable
if an individual is living with his parents, relatives or friends, level of education measured as
3We have used the gross monthly wage of the individuals in their full-time working equivalent. A full-time
working equivalent is calculated on the basis of the average working hours in the country where the individual
works. The gross monthly wage includes the gross monthly earnings in the main employment per contractual
hours and overtime hours. Wages for all countries are measured in euros and they have been corrected for the
purchasing power parity (PPP) between countries. In addition, we have used a Consumer Price Index (CPI) in
order to have a comparable measures of inflation since the data for five countries (Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovenia and Turkey) is collected in 2002/2003 while for the remaining countries the data is collected in 1999/2000.
The reference period for a CPI is 2005.
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the number of years of education currently attained (i.e. the number of years which is required
to earn the highest degree which individual has attained at present), a dummy variable if an
individual works in the medium company (50-249 employees), a dummy variable if an individual
works in a large company (250 employees and more), a dummy variable if an individual followed
any work related course or training in the past 12 months, a dummy variable if an individual
work in public sector, a dummy variable if an individual works part time (i.e. less than 30 hours
per week) and a five points scale variable for work risk which measures the degree of damage
that could happen if a worker made major mistakes or omissions in the performance of his work
(i.e. the scale ranged from 1 which means “hardly damaging” to 5 which means “extremely
damaging”).
The richness of the data allowed us to include a self-assessment of the workers on a set of 14
competencies required at their job. We denote these competencies with a vector Fi. The indi-
viduals were asked to provide the information on the their own level of competence by answering
at the following question How do you rate your own level of competence?. This list of competen-
cies includes the mastery of their own field or discipline (Masterfield), knowledge of other field
or discipline (Knowfield), analytical thinking (Think), ability to perform well under pressure
(Pressure), alertness to new opportunities (Alert), ability to use time efficiently (Use Time),
ability to work productively with others (Work Productivity), ability to mobilize the capacities
of others (Mobilize Others), ability to make their meaning clear to others (Make Clear), abil-
ity to use computers and the internet (Use Computers), willingness to question their own and
others ideas (Quest), ability to present products, ideas and reports to an audience (Present),
ability to write reports, memos and documents (Write) and ability to write and speak in a
foreign language (Foreign Language). These variables are measured on a categorical-discrete
scale which ranges from 1 which means “very low” to 7 which means “very high”.
Normally, the information on competencies of workers is not available to researches so
having these variables at our disposal enable us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity.
Since we do not have a panel data set we were prevented from using the fixed effects which
control for the unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we are interested to
obtain estimates on some time-invariant variables which would not be the available strategy to
follow with the fixed effects and it can also bias the estimates (see Boyce (2010)). In addition,
we have included in the regression a dummy variables for the type of occupation and industry
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and country dummies. These variables are contained in a vector Gi. The full specification of
the job satisfaction regression can be written as
Si = α+ β lnwi +Xiγ + Fipi +Giκ+ Ziσ + i (2.15)
where α, β, γ, σ, pi and κ are parameters of interest to be estimated while i is the error term.
Since our objective is to obtain information on individual preferences we will calculate the
marginal rate of substitution between wage and each non-wage job characteristics. Thus, we
will use coefficients β and γ for obtaining the slopes of indifference curves for individuals. We are
still left with coefficients α, σ and κ which we do not use for estimation of individual preferences
but they rather represent the scaling factors or shifters for labelling the indifference curves. We
have assumed that our job satisfaction regression is linear in the parameters of non-wage job
characteristics which then implies that the indifference curves for non-wage job characteristics
are linear and parallel lines. In other words, the marginal rates of substitution between wage
and other (non-wage) job characteristics are held constant.
Another important issue concerns the issue of heterogeneity of individual preferences. One
way to achieve a more flexible functional specification of the job satisfaction regression is to
permit the coefficients on wage and non-wage job characteristics to vary between those indi-
viduals who are having different socio-demographic characteristics and personal characteristics
related to the job. We denote a vector of these socio-demographic characteristics and personal
characteristics related to the job with Θi.
We permit the coefficients on job characteristics to vary for different socio-demographic
characteristics which are defined with a vector of dummy variables where a variable contained
in a vector equals 1 if an individual is male (malei), if an individual is the age range 25-34
(youngi), if an individual has at least one child (childi), if an individual lives with a partner
(partneri) and if an individual lives with his family or relatives (familyi). The coefficients on
job characteristics are also allowed to vary for different personal characteristics related to the
job, which are defined with a vector of dummy variables where a variable contained in a vector
equals 1 if an individual works in a medium sized company (compmedi), if an individual works
in the large company (complargei), if an individual has followed any work-related course or
training in the past 12 months (trainingi), if an individual works in a public sector (sectori)
and if an individual works part time (parti).
107 Chapter 2
After we have interacted wage (wi) and non-wage job characteristics (Xi) with the vari-
ables that we believe will change the slope of individual preferences (Θi), we are left to include
these terms into our model given in equation 2.15. Therefore, the final specification of the
satisfaction regression which includes an interaction terms can be written as
Si = α+ (β + ΩΘi) lnwi + (γ + ΛΘi)
′Xi + Fipi +Giκ+ Ziσ + i (2.16)
where α, β, γ, σ, pi and κ represents direct effects while Ω and Λ are matrices of interaction terms
to be estimated. As a result of natural ordering of our dependent variable, we have estimated
the equation 2.16 with the ordered logit model (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Train
(2009)). All parameters are estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
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2.5 Data
We have employed the Reflex (Research into Employment and professional flexibility) and
Hegesco (Higher Education as a Generator of Strategic Competencies) data, which are two
large-scale surveys among higher education graduates (i.e. including bachelor, master and doc-
toral graduates). While the Reflex data relates to the study programme which individuals have
finished in 1999/2000, the Hegesco data relates to the study programme which individuals have
finished in 2002/2003. Since the objective for collecting these data sets was among others to
analyse the transitional process of individuals with higher education on the labour market, we
could exploit the information about the labour market status of individuals once they have left
their education. More precisely, the information on the labour market status of individuals
contained both the information about the first job after graduation and the current job of an
individual.
In our analysis we will use only the information on the current job of individuals although it
may happen that the current job for some individuals is actually their first job after graduation.
Both of these two surveys are compatible in their methodology and they contain information on
a various topics such as socio-demographic conditions, a type of study programme individuals
have finished, attained level of education, other educational and related experiences, job satis-
faction, own level of competencies and the required level of competencies at work, job outcomes
and job characteristics. Concerning the geographical coverage of the data, the Reflex data con-
tains 14 countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
the UK, Belgium (Flanders), Czech Republic, Portugal, Estonia and Japan) while the Hegesco
data contains 5 countries (Slovenia, Turkey, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland).
The distribution of overall job satisfaction over countries is illustrated in figure 2.4. The
question on the overall job satisfaction that we have used was formulated as follows How satis-
fied are you with your current work? The individuals were offered a discrete-categorical scale
of possible answers which ranged from 1 denoting those who are “very dissatisfied” to 5 de-
noting those who are “very satisfied”. Each sub-figure in figure 2.4 represents the estimated
proportions and confidence intervals of the overall job satisfaction for a given country. Vertical
bars represent the categories of job satisfaction while the capped spike lines at each vertical bar
represent 95 percent confidence intervals. We have shaded vertical bars in darker color for men
while the bars in lighter color denote women. One can immediately notice that the distribution
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of job satisfaction within countries does not differ much between men and women. Within each
country, the highest proportion of individuals is to be found in the category “satisfied” while the
smallest proportion of individuals is to be found in the category “very dissatisfied”. Moreover,
the distribution of job satisfaction is gently skewed to the left for every country.
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables (tabulated in rows). On
average the job satisfaction level is highest in Norway and Austria while it is lowest in Turkey
and Japan. The oldest graduates are found in Slovenia while youngest in Belgium. On average
the highest share of couples are found in Norway and Finland while the lowest share is found
in Japan. On the other side, we find the largest share of individuals living with their families
in Japan while the lowest in Norway and Finland. The perception of risk at work is on average
the lowest in Czech Republic and highest in Slovenia. The average wage is lowest in Turkey and
highest in Germany. Moreover, on average the graduates in Turkey earn around 11% of their
counterparts in Germany.
The highest level of work autonomy is found in Austria and lowest in Turkey. Job secu-
rity and opportunity to learn new things is highest in Estonia. Workers in Norway are mostly
confronted with new challenges while workers in France are the least confronted with new chal-
lenges. Good career prospects are highest in the UK and lowest in Germany. Chance of doing
something useful for society is highest in Norway and lowest in Hungary. Good chance to
combine work with family task is the worst in the UK and the best in Lithuania.
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2.6 Results
In this section we first present the results obtained from the job satisfaction regression. Then
we present the results that illustrate the average quality of jobs across countries using five
different measures of job quality and accordingly we rank countries. We show the rank correla-
tions between all pairs of measures which provides us with the information about the strength
and direction of relationship between the pairwise rank of measures. We illustrate the average
overlap across countries for the worst off and the best off individuals according to different
combinations of measures. We also illustrate the gender differential in job quality across coun-
tries using the equivalent wage and wage measure. We present the results obtained from the
Shapley value decomposition which enabled us to decompose the total willingness-to-pay to its
contributions to non-wage job characteristics. Finally, we show the gender differences in the
total willingness-to-pay along the distribution.
2.6.1 Job Satisfaction Regression
We illustrate the estimation results for the job satisfaction regression in table 2.2. Our results
represent five different specifications we have used for the job satisfaction model. We start
from the most parsimonious specification (model I) and then we enrich each succeeding model
with the additional control variables until we have reached the full specification (model V). We
have estimated each model on a pooled sample of 19 countries. As our dependent variable is
categorical and ordered we have decided to use the ordered logistic regression in order to fit the
model.
We have applied the backward-selection estimation for each five models we have estimated.
The logic of the backward-selection estimation is to fit the full specification of the model on all
regressors where the least significant regressors will be removed from the estimation and then
the model is re-estimated. Using this stepwise selection procedure, the model is re-estimated
until all insignificant regressors are dropped from the specification of the model. The significance
level for removal from the model was set at 5%. The only regressors which were not subjected
to the stepwise-selection procedure were the job characteristics, socio-demographic and other
personal characteristics and county dummies. We have used the robust standard errors in order
to weaken the assumption that explanatory variables and error term are identically distributed
although we have still assumed these terms to be independent.
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The results in the first column refer to the specification where we have controlled for the
logarithm of wage (lnwi), a vector of non-wage job characteristics (Xi) and a vector of personal
characteristics (Zi). In addition, we have included the interaction terms between the job char-
acteristics and personal characteristics which allow us to obtain the information on preferences.
One can see that all job characteristics have highly significant effect on the job satisfaction (ex-
cept the social status). The gross monthly wage increases the likelihood of being more satisfied
on the job. We have found that jobs with more autonomy (Autonomy), security (Security),
opportunity to learn new things (Learn), new challenges (Challenge), good career prospects
(Career), chance of doing something useful to society (Valuable) and a chance to combine work
with family tasks (Family Work) have a positive effect on job satisfaction. The direct effects
of personal characteristics on job satisfaction are operating through out the scaling factors (i.e.
aspiration and expectations of individuals). These effects are picked up by variables measuring
age, gender, number of children, whether living with the partner, whether living in a family,
attained level of education, dummy variable for the company size, the degree of risk at work,
dummy variable if an individual has followed any training in the past 12 months, dummy vari-
able for the public sector, dummy variable for a part-time working hours, industry, occupational
and country dummies and a vector of abilities and competencies.
The results from the model I show that the effect of age on job satisfaction is found to be
convex with the minimum level of job satisfaction at age 40. Having a child increases the job
satisfaction. Individuals who are living with their partners have a higher level of job satisfaction.
The interaction terms between the personal characteristics and job characteristics allowing us
to obtain the information on preferences. In other words, these indirect effects are representing
the preference shifters for a certain socio-demographic and work characteristic an individual
belongs to. We interpret the statistical significance on the interaction terms as the evidence of
preference heterogeneity that certain groups of individuals have over certain jobs. Notice that
a job that has a higher social status is more preferred by young people. Higher autonomy on
the job generates less job satisfaction for the young people. A job with good career prospects
is more preferred by men while on the other hand men prefer less jobs which offer a chance of
doing something useful for the society. Having a child reduces the preferences for a job where
there is a possibility to learn new things. The positive effect of a job that brings new challenges
is reduced for the individuals living with their parents, relatives or friends.
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In the second column we illustrate the results obtained from the model II where in addition
to the previous model we controlled for a set of variables capturing abilities and competencies
of individuals. This set of variables represents the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals since
they are not observed normally (see Di Tella et al. (2010)). Since the abilities and competencies
may be correlated with the job characteristics and the job satisfaction, it is important to control
for the variables that capture abilities and competencies. In fact, a great number of studies in
the economics have been devoted to the problem of dealing with the unobserved heterogeneity
(see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), Frijters et al. (2004), Boyce (2010)). Our results
indicate that the variables capturing abilities and competencies have a significant effect on job
satisfaction. We have found that a higher mastery of their own field or discipline (Masterfield),
higher ability to perform well under pressure (Pressure) and higher ability to use time effi-
ciently (Use Time) increase the job satisfaction. On the other hand we have found that higher
knowledge of other fields or disciplines (Knowfield), analytical thinking (Think), willingness to
question your own ideas and ideas of others (Quest), ability to write reports (Write) and ability
to write and speak in a foreign language (Foreign Language) reduce job satisfaction.
Comparing the results between model I and model II, we can see that once we have intro-
duced the abilities and competencies of individuals, the coefficients on wage and non-wage job
characteristics have slightly changed. The direction of this change went in both ways so that
some of the variables capturing abilities and competencies were positively correlated with the
job characteristics and others were negatively correlated with the job characteristics. In other
words, the following evidence points out that individuals would have a higher or lower level of
job satisfaction which is only due to the positive or negative effects of abilities and competencies
but not due to the effects coming from the job characteristics.
In model III we have included a set of country dummies where Italy represents the base
category. The country dummies are needed to capture the possible heterogeneity between coun-
tries. Although, due to lack of space, we do not report in the table the coefficients on country
dummies, the significant coefficients on country dummies would indicate that the job satisfac-
tion in these countries is different from the job satisfaction in Italy. While the coefficients on
the job characteristics have not changed much once we have introduced the country dummies,
we can observe that the coefficient on log wage has increased notably relative to the previous
specifications.
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In model IV, we have included a set of personal characteristics related to the job. The
following set contains a dummy variable if an individual works in a medium company, dummy
variable if an individual works in a large company, dummy variable if an individual followed any
work related course or training in the past 12 months, dummy variable if an individual work
in public sector, dummy variable if an individual works part time and a categorical variable
that measures risk at work. We treat all these variables (except a variable that measures risk
at work) as the preference shifters and therefore we interact them with wage and non-wage job
characteristics. The variable that measures the risk at work is treated as a scaling factor which
means that it only has a direct effect on the job satisfaction through a change in aspiration and
expectations of individuals. While workers in the medium companies are less satisfied at their
job than workers in the small companies, the opposite is true for those working in the large
companies (although the later effect is not significant). Individuals who are working in a public
sector have a higher job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is lower for a part-time workers which
seems reasonable to expect from highly educated young people who do not want to waste their
human capital investment (see De Witte and Na¨swall (2003), Booth and Van Ours (2008) and
Booth and van Ours (2013)). Increasing the degree of risk that could occur if an individual
makes a serious mistake at their work has a positive effect on job satisfaction. The later evidence
would indicate that the recent graduates prefer to take the risk.
Model V contains the additional control variables for the type of industry and occupa-
tion that a worker belongs to. We have included a list of 17 dummy variables for the type of
industry and 9 dummy variables for the type of occupation4. However, we have kept only a
few of industry and occupational dummies in our regression since many of them failed to be
significant after the backward selection estimation. The industry and occupational dummies
are assumed to have only a direct effect on the job satisfaction or in other words we treat them
as the scaling factors affecting aspirations and expectations. Clerks, craft and related trade
workers and workers in elementary occupations have a lower level of job satisfaction than the
legislators, officials and managers (i.e. the base category). Workers employed in the industries
4The dummies for the type of industry include the agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply, construction, wholesale and retailtrade, accommo-
dation, transport, storage and communication, financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business, public
administration and defence, education, health and social work, other services, activities of private households
and extraterritorial organizations. The dummies for the type of occupation include the legislators, officials and
managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, clerks, service workers and salesman, agricultural
and fishery worker, craft and related trades workers, plant, machine operators and assemblance and elementary
occupations.
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of accommodation, education, health and social work and other service activities are more sat-
isfied at their job than the workers in the real estate, renting and business industry (i.e. the
base category). Notice that after we have introduced the industry and occupational dummies in
the regression, the coefficient on the log wage becomes larger. The non-wage job characteristics
have positive and significant effect on the job satisfaction (except for the variable measuring
social status which is not significant). One can notice that workers attach more weight in order
to have new challenges on the job than to earn a higher wage.
We have not found any significant gender differences in the job satisfaction. Obtaining
the additional year of higher education decreases the job satisfaction. Although this result may
seem surprising, it confirms the interpretation made by Verhofstadt et al. (2007) that the direct
effect of education brings the expectations of more educated individuals upward and thus they
feel less satisfied5. While, young people prefer less those jobs that offer a higher salary, they
would prefer jobs with higher social status. Men have greater preferences for jobs which provide
better career prospects but they less prefer jobs which offer a chance to combine work with fam-
ily tasks. While those workers who have a child favour less jobs where there is a chance of doing
something useful for society, on the other hand they favour more jobs where there is a good
chance to combine work with family tasks. A job that provides new challenges is less preferred
by those workers who are living with a partner or family. Workers in the large companies prefer
less jobs that are secure and better paid. On the other hand, those working in large companies
have higher preferences for jobs that offer opportunities to learn new things and jobs that offer
a chance to combine work with family tasks. Workers in the public sector prefer less jobs that
give a chance to learn new things.
2.6.2 Comparing Measures of Job Quality
The first well-being measure that we use is the gross monthly wage in full time equivalent
(WBw), which is calculated on the basis of the mean contractual and overtime working hours
in each country. Since we knew the earnings per contractual hours and overtime hours and we
knew the contractual and overtime hours individuals spent in main employment, we have derived
the wage variable on the basis of both of these information. In addition, we made corrections
for the purchasing power parity and differences in CPI between 1999/2000 and 2002/2003.
5The effect of education on job satisfaction has been found to be both positive (see Clark and Oswald (1996)
and Grund and Sliwka (2005)) and negative (see Hall and Buttram (1994)).
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The equivalent wage measure (WBw
∗
) is computed from the equivalent wage equation
(equation 2.14). The reference value for all non-wage job characteristics is set at the value of
4. Although the choice for setting the reference values for the non-wage job characteristics may
not seem to be obvious, still this choice is not arbitrary since we want to choose these reference
values at the level that is aspired by all individuals. Yet someone may wonder why we have not
set the reference values at 5 which is the highest value for all non-wage job characteristics. We
believe that the individuals who have reported their values of non-wage job characteristics at
the level of 4 are already in an excellent position and therefore by setting the reference value at
5 would be excessively harsh in evaluating the situations of individuals on their jobs. In order
to obtain the coefficients in the equivalent wage equation we have opted to use our results from
the model V since in that specification we have controlled for the largest set of regressors and
the following model had the best fit by the pseudo-R2 score.
The job satisfaction measure (WBs) is represented with the subjective job satisfaction
score. An equal weights objective measure (WBo,ew) is computed as the arithmetic mean of the
normalized values of the same job characteristics that we used when we calculated the equivalent
wage6. The average preferences objective measure (WBo,ap) uses the job satisfaction equation
(equation 2.9) but the values of variables in Zi are replaced with their arithmetic means
7.
In table 2.3 we present the average values of each well-being measure and the country
rankings according to these averages. Ranking countries according to average wages indicates
that the highest wages (i.e. lowest ranking) for recent graduates are in Germany, Norway and
Belgium while the lowest wages (i.e. highest ranking) are in Poland, Hungary and Turkey.
Obviously the wage measure does not respect individual preferences, it does not take into ac-
count non-wage job characteristics and it is not affected by scaling factors of expectations and
adaptations.
6We have computed the equal weights objective measure for each country c as follows
WBo,ewc =
1
Nc
1
M
Nc∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
θji,c −min(θjc)
max(θjc)−min(θjc)
where Nc denotes the total number of individuals in country c, while min(θ
j
c) and max(θ
j
c) denote the lowest and
highest value of job characteristic j in country c, respectively.
7In other words, we have computed the following equation
WBo,api = α+ (β + ΩZ) lnwi + (γ + ΛZ)
′Xi + Zσ + 
where Z is a vector of arithmetic means of personal characteristics, while  denotes the arithmetic mean of the
error term.
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We can notice that a significant re-ranking occurs when we move from wage to the equiva-
lent income measure, although the re-ranking is less pronounced for those countries which were
at the bottom or top of the ranking according to wage. The equivalent wage measure respects
individual preferences and it is not sensitive to scaling factors. We have found that the highest
equivalent wage is in Norway, Belgium and Germany while lowest in Hungary and Turkey. A
considerable increase in ranking occurred when we moved from the wage measure to the equiv-
alent wage measure for France (an increase from [5 ] to [16 ]) and Japan (an increase from [6 ]
to [15 ]). On the other hand, there has been a considerable drop in ranking as we moved from
the wage to the equivalent wage measure for Spain (a drop from [12 ] to [6 ]), Czech Republic (a
drop from [13 ] to [8 ]), Poland (a drop from [17 ] to [12 ]) and Estonia (a drop from [14 ] to [10 ]).
To make it easier to visualize the changes in country rankings for each pair of measures, we have
plotted these changes in figure B.1. As one can notice, the absolute values for the equivalent
wages are substantially lower compared to wages. This is a consequence of the equivalent wage
measure which respect individual preferences over job characteristics and it corrects the wage
level for deprivations in non-wage job characteristics.
The subjective job satisfaction measure, given in the third column, satisfies the Conditional
respect for individual preferences and in addition this measure takes into account the difference
in aspirations and expectations. One can notice that the subjective job satisfaction measure
shows little variations across countries. The highest job satisfaction is found in Austria and
Norway while the lowest job satisfaction is found in Japan and Turkey.
In the last two columns we illustrate two objective measures of job quality. The property of
the equal weights objective measure and the average preference objective measure is that both of
these measures satisfy the Dominance principle but they do not pay attention on the individual
preferences. In case of the equal weights measure, the marginal rates of substitution between
job dimensions are equal for all individuals. The objective equal weights measure shows that
the job quality is highest in Norway, Belgium and Czech Republic, while the lowest job quality
is in Hungary, Italy and Turkey. Measuring job quality with the average preference objective
measure reveals that Germany, Norway and Belgium are having the highest well-being on the
job, while the lowest well-being on job is in Italy, Japan and Turkey. The evidence shows that
the rankings given by the two objective measures are giving us a quite distinctive picture on
the well-being on the job across countries. Since the average preference objective measure uses
117 Chapter 2
the information on preferences of the average individual, this measure then produces a ranking
which is closer to other two measures who are using information on individual preferences (i.e.
the subjective job satisfaction and equivalent wage measures). This is also a reason why the
two objective measures produce a quite distinctive ranking over countries.
In table 2.4 and table 2.5 we illustrate the average values of job quality measures and
accordingly their ranks for men and women, respectively. The results for the wage measure
show that the average job quality for both men and women is highest in Germany and Norway,
while the lowest job quality is in Hungary, Poland and Turkey. We can see that women are
having higher average wages in Norway and Belgium, while the opposite holds true for all other
countries, except Turkey where the average wage is the same for both men and women. Turning
to the preference sensitive measure of equivalent wage we obtain a quite different picture of job
quality over countries. The best job quality according to the equivalent wage measure is found
in Germany, Norway and Austria for men and in Belgium, Norway and United Kingdom for
women. On the other hand, the worst job quality for both men and women is found in Hungary
and Turkey. Again we can see that for both men and women the absolute value of the equivalent
wage has substantially decreased compared to the wage measure since the former measure is
sensitive to preferences and it is also a multi-dimensional measure which takes into account
deprivations in other non-wage job characteristics. This evidence points out that individuals
across countries suffer to a large extent from not achieving the reference values of non-wage job
characteristics.
Comparing the job quality between men and women reveals that the average equivalent
wage is higher for men in all countries except the United Kingdom, Norway, Czech Republic,
Belgium Slovenia and Hungary. An interesting evidence comes from Norway where the average
value of equivalent wage for women is higher by around 100 euros per month although the
average wage between men and women are almost the same. Thus, men in Norway are willing-
to-pay more to achieve the reference values of non-wage job characteristics although both men
and women are earning the same wage on average.
Another interesting evidence concerns the changes in rankings for men and women as we
move from the wage measure to the equivalent wage measure. We can notice that in some
countries there is a substantial increase in ranking (i.e. worsening of the relative position) when
we moved from the wage measure to the equivalent wage measure. For instance, in case of men
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we see an increase in ranking in France (from [3 ] to [17 ]), Japan (from [5 ] to [15 ]) and Belgium
(from [6 ] to [13 ]) while in case of women we see an increase in ranking in Italy (from [10 ] to
[17 ]), France (from [6 ] to [14 ]) and Japan (from [7 ] to [16 ]). On the other hand, for some
countries we have seen a substantial decrease in ranking (i.e. improving of the relative position)
once we switched from the wage measure to the equivalent wage measure. For instance, in
case of men we have observed a drop in Spain (from [12 ] to [6 ]), Czech Republic (from [15 ] to
[10 ]), Poland (from [18 ] to [14 ]), Estonia (from [13 ] to [9 ]) and the Netherlands (from [9 ] to
[5 ]). In case of women we have observed a drop in Spain (from [12 ] to [7 ]), Czech Republic
(from [13 ] to [6 ]), Estonia (from [14 ] to [10 ]) and Poland (from [17 ] to [13 ]). The average job
quality according to the subjective job satisfaction measure is highest for both men and women
in Austria and Norway while it is lowest in Italy, Turkey and Japan.
Finally, we will consider the two objective measures. The equal weight objective measure
indicates that for both men and women the average job quality is highest in Norway, Estonia
and Czech Republic while the lowest job quality is in Hungary, Turkey and Italy. However,
these findings raise doubts about the validity of the equal weights objective measure since the
country rankings obtained with this measure differ noticeably from the rankings obtained with
other measures. The average preferences objective measure indicates that for both men and
women, the highest job quality is in Norway and Austria while the worst job quality is in Japan
and Turkey.
2.6.3 Rank Correlation between Job Quality Measures
In the previous section we have seen that the ranking of countries changes according to the job
quality measure we use. Thus, for some countries we have observed a considerable re-ranking
between different measures. Yet, we are also interested in finding the strength and direction
of the relationship between the ranking for each pair of measures. In order to do so, we have
used the Spearman rank correlation which is a non-parametric measure of rank correlation.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient r determines if there exist a monotonic relationship
between two variables, such that when r equals 1 there is a perfect monotone increasing rela-
tionship while when r equals -1 there is a perfect monotone decreasing relationship.
The rank correlations between all pairs of job quality measures are illustrated in table 2.6.
Since we work with an individual data for a relatively large number of countries, the presentation
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of our results have to be simplified and therefore, we illustrate the rank correlation coefficients
which are computed between the averages of all job quality measures computed at the country
level. In other words, we are computing rank correlations using 19 observations which is the
number of countries contained in our sample. We can see that the correlation is positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level for each pair of measures (except for a pair of WBw and
WBo,ew). We have found that the lowest correlation is between pairs WBw and WBo,ew and
pairs WBw and WBs. The low correlation between WBw and WBs is intuitively appealing
result since there is no overlap of variables that have been used to construct either of these
two measures. A high correlation between WBo,ew and WBs is somehow surprising since by
construction WBo,ew does not contain the subjective satisfaction score.
We have found a moderate correlation between WBw
∗
and WBo,ew which seems appealing
since only the first measure is sensitive to preferences over job characteristics. One can notice
that WBw
∗
is more strongly correlated with WBw, WBo,ap and WBs. These results seem
quite reasonable since the second to last measure involves respecting preferences in a weaker
form while the last measure respects the average preferences of individuals. Finally, our results
indicate almost a perfect positive relationship between WBs and WBo,ap which conveys a use-
ful information to policymakers who are deciding between the well-being measure on the job
which respects individual preferences in a weaker form and the objective well-being measure
that respects the average preferences of individuals.
2.6.4 Identifying the Worst off and the Best off Individuals
In this section we focus on the identification of the worst off and the best off individuals accord-
ing to different combinations of measures of job quality. This aspect is of great importance for
creating a reasonable public policy which has the aim to target those individuals at the bottom
end of the distribution or to identify those individuals at the top end of the distribution. Since
we have computed five different measures of job quality we could analyse what percentage of
individuals is identified as the worst off or the best off according to each measure. In other
words, for each measure of job quality we can label individuals either as the worst (best) off or
not. We analyse all possible combinations of five different measures according to which an indi-
vidual is identified as the worst (best) off or not. This leaves us with 32 possible combinations
to work with.
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An important decision we have to make at the beginning concerns the choice of the thresh-
old level according to which we will identify the worst off and the best off individuals. Although
the choice for the threshold level is not obvious, we believe that an acceptable solution in order
to define the worst off is to focus on the percentage of individuals whose level of job satisfaction
is not larger than 2 while for the best off we focus on the percentage of individuals whose level
of job satisfaction is at least 4. This gives us different percentages of the worst off and the
best off individuals across countries. For instance, in the case of the worst off, we focus on
the bottom 6.4% of the population in Czech Republic while in Turkey we focus on the bottom
22.4% of population. On the other hand, in the case of the best off we focus on the top 74.6%
of population in Austria while in Turkey we focus on the top 48.2% of population.
After we compute the percentage of the worst (best) off individuals for all countries and for
all possible combinations of measures, we normalize these percentages with the amount of the
worst (best) off individuals according to the job satisfaction threshold. This step is necessary
since the number of individuals identified as the worst (best) off varies across countries. The
results are presented in table 2.7 for the worst off and in table 2.8 for the best off. Each table
shows different well-being measure in each column while each row represents a combination
of measures according to which an individual is identified as the worst (best) off. In the last
column we show the average percentage of individuals who are identified as the worst (best) off
according to each combination.
We first interpret the results for the worst off. In the first five rows (panel a) we present the
percentage of individuals who are designated as the worst off according to only one well-being
measure. Since the percentage of the worst off individuals is approximately the same across all
measures, this gives us approximately the perfect overlap with respect to the percentage of the
worst off according to the subjective job satisfaction measure. Panel b shows the percentage of
individuals identified as the worst off according to all combinations of pairs of measures. As we
would expect, the overlap of worst off individuals is reduced when we switch from one measure
to a pair of measures. A substantial reduction in the overlap of the worst off occurs between
wage and equivalent wage and between wage and subjective job satisfaction measure. These
two pairs identify only around 20% of individuals among the worst off. The highest overlap of
the worst off is between two objective measures (80.2%), between equivalent wage and average
preferences measure (73.6%) and between equivalent wage and equal weights measure (67.7%).
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Panel c shows that the overlap of the worst off is further reduced when we consider a triplet
of measures. The lowest overlap is between a triplet of wage, equivalent wage and subjective
job satisfaction (10.3%) while the largest overlap is between a triplet of equivalent wage, equal
weights measure and average preferences measure (62.3%). When we use a combination of four
measures the overlap of the worst off ranges from 9.2% in case of quadruplet of wage, equivalent
wage, subjective job satisfaction and equal weights measures to 32.9% in case of quadruplet of
equivalent wage, subjective job satisfaction, equal weights and average preferences measures.
From the last panel we can see that the overlap of the worst off according to all measures is
9.2%.
We are turning to the results for the best off. In panel a we can see the percentage of
individuals who are identified as the best off according to only one measure. We observe that
the overlap of the best off individuals decreases when we move from one measure (panel a) to a
pair of measures (panel b). The largest overlap of the best off at 93% occurs for a pair of objec-
tive measures and between equivalent wage and average preferences measure. A combination
of wage and subjective job satisfaction gives us the lowest overlap of the best off for a pair of
measures which equals 69%. The following evidence makes perfect sense since the information
requirement for computing the equivalent wage and average preference measure is closer than
the informational requirement between wage and subjective job satisfaction. We observe that
the highest overlap of best off individuals equals 88% when we consider a triplet of equivalent
wage, equal weights and average preferences measures. The degree of overlap for a combination
of four measures ranges from 52.1% for quadruplet of wage, equivalent wage, subjective job
satisfaction and equal weights measures to 71.2% for quadruplet of equivalent wage, subjective
job satisfaction, equal weights and average preferences measures. Finally, we observe that the
overlap off the best off according to all five measures is 51.2%.
2.6.5 Wage and Equivalent Wage Gender Gaps
Although in the recent decades the participation of women in the labour market has increased
and they have caught up with the level of education of men, we still observe inequality in labour
market outcomes for women (see Ponthieux and Meurns (2015)). The evidence has pointed out
that over recent decades the gender wage gap has initially started to decrease across many
countries but then the catching up trend slowed down (Blau and Kahn (2006a,b)). Thus,
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the gender wage inequality is still persistent across many countries8 and the literature on the
gender wage gap tells us that this evidence occurs as a result of inequality in the national wage
structure, differences in employment rates of men and women, due to predominantly part-time
work of women and due to gender differences in occupations (i.e. occupational segregation).
In order to analyse the gender differences in job quality we compare the gender ratios
of wage and equivalent wage across and within countries. We will first compare the wage and
equivalent wage gender ratios at the mean and then we show a more detailed picture about these
differences by computing the gender ratios of wage and equivalent wage across the distribution.
In order to keep the analysis of distributional inequality simple we illustrate the ratios computed
at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles and then we show the ratios computed over the entire
distribution (i.e. from 5th till 95th percentile).
We first illustrate the gender ratios of mean wage and mean equivalent wage computed at
the country level (see table 2.9). We can see that in Norway and Turkey there are no differences
in the mean wages between women and men. The most unequal country is Lithuania where on
average women are paid 68% of what men are paid. On the other hand in Belgium women are
on average paid 16% percent more then men. We can see that the lowest equivalent wage gap
at the mean value is present in Hungary and France with a 3 and 4% higher equivalent wage for
women, respectively. The largest lagging behind is found in Germany and Italy where women
have around 40% lower equivalent wage. We have found that on average women have higher
equivalent wage in France, Finland, Norway, Czech Republic, Belgium, Slovenia and Hungary.
Turning to the results that illustrate the percentile ratios, we can immediately notice that
the equivalent wage ratio show evidently larger distributional variation than the wage ratio.
That is to say, this evidence points out to the fat that wage shows a greater distributional
equality than the equivalent wage. While in the United Kingdom both men and women earn
almost the same wage at 10th percent (or more precisely women earn 2% more than men), in
Lithuania women are paid only 71% of what men are paid. The opposite evidence applies to
Turkey where women earn 34% higher wage at the 10th percent of distribution. At the median
women earn less than men in all countries except in Turkey where the gap is not present. We
can see that at the top 10th percent of distribution, women earn less than men in all countries
apart from Turkey where women are paid 4% more.
8The average gender wage gap in most industrialized countries by the end of 2010 stands between 10% and
20%.
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The percentile ratios of the equivalent wage show different picture which reflects primarily
from larger distributional inequality of equivalent wage both between and within countries. At
the bottom 10% of distribution women have higher equivalent wage in the Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Norway, Japan, Estonia and Poland while in all other countries women are lacking
behind men with respect to the equivalent wage. The magnitude of the differences in ratios
at the bottom 10% percent of distribution between countries is striking. While in Lithuania
women have the equivalent wage which is only 13% that of men, on the other hand in Norway
women have a three-fold higher equivalent wage than men.
As we move from the 10% to the 50% of distribution, the ratios of equivalent wage between
men and women increases for most of the countries (with the exception of the Netherlands,
United Kingdom, Norway, Japan and Estonia). We see that the difference in ratios of equivalent
wage at the median decreases between countries. The lowest ratio of the equivalent wage at the
median is found in Lithuania where women have the equivalent wage which is 46% of equivalent
wage for men while the highest ratio of the equivalent wage is found in Poland where women
have the equivalent wage which is 39% higher than the equivalent wage for men. At the top 10%
of distribution women have lower equivalent wages in all countries except the United Kingdom,
Slovenia, Belgium, Lithuania, Hungary, Spain and Czech Republic. The results show that at
top 10% of distribution, the lowest ratio of equivalent wage is found in Austria where women
have 40% lower equivalent wage, while the highest ratio is found in the United Kingdom where
women have the equivalent wage which is 15% higher.
A more detailed understanding of the gender gaps across the distribution is provided in
figure 2.5 which illustrates women to men ratios for wage and equivalent wage from the 5th
till 95th percentile. We can notice that for almost all countries the wage ratio stays below
one almost over the entire distribution which means that women earn less than men across
the distribution. The only exception is Turkey where women earn more than men both at the
bottom and top of the distribution. The wage ratio is close to one across the distribution in
Italy, Finland, Czech Republic and Belgium. In Germany, Estonia and Hungary the wage ratio
is decreasing as we move from the bottom to the top of distribution while in the Netherlands
the wage ratio is increasing as we move from the bottom to the top of distribution.
The ratio of equivalent wage shows a more complex pattern. We observe that the ratio is
either decreasing over the distribution or increasing over the distribution, of for some countries
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the ratio has an inverted U-shaped pattern. In Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Turkey,
Lithuania, Austria and Slovenia the equivalent wage ratio is increasing which means that women
are catching up with men as we move from the bottom to the top of distribution. The opposite
pattern is present in the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Japan, Estonia and Poland where
at the bottom of distribution women are having higher equivalent wages but then as we move
towards the top of distribution the ratio becomes smaller. An interesting pattern occurs in the
Netherlands, Germany, Czech Republic and Hungary where the ratio is increasing up until the
median but then it starts to decrease.
Further, we can notice that within countries the ratio of equivalent wage and ratio of wage
differ to a large extent. We observe that the ratio of equivalent wage is higher than the ratio
of wage in the United Kingdom, Spain, Finland, Czech Republic; Norway, Japan, Poland and
Estonia. In other words, this evidence points out that in the following countries women are
faring relatively better on the job than men as soon as we switch from wage to equivalent wage
measure. On the contrary, if we use the equivalent wage measure, women are lacking behind
men in job quality for the remaining countries.
2.6.6 Shapley decomposition of willingness-to-pay
In this section we discuss the results obtained from the Shapley value decomposition (see Shapley
(1988) and Shorrocks (2013)) of the total willingness-to-pay (WTP ). The Shapley decompo-
sition enabled us to compute the individual contributions of each non-wage job characteristics
to the total WTP . Since the Shapley value decomposition has a property to be exact, the
summation of all non-wage contributions add up to the total WTP without any residual term
that is left.
Figure 2.6 presents the shares of WTP contributions for the entire sample (top panel),
a sample of men (middle panel) and sample of women (bottom panel). The results in the
top panel show that on average the most important non-wage job characteristic is to have a
good career prospect. The following evidence is observed across all countries. Since we are
considering relatively younger and more educated individuals who are usually having stronger
preferences for making a career, this evidence makes perfect sense. We can notice that the
relative importance of a career across countries is the most important in Austria and Germany,
while in the UK and Spain this job characteristic is the least important. These differences can
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be explained by the fact that workers in Austria and Germany are having lower average value
of career characteristic than the workers in the UK and Spain. Therefore, workers in Austria
and Germany are suffering more for not having better career prospects. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that we are measuring the relative importance of the WTP contributions
which are attributed to a certain non-wage characteristic and hence the size of these terms will
depend on the size of all other WTP contributions.
We have found that the second most important job characteristic in most of the coun-
tries is to have a valuable job. The exceptions are France, Japan, Czech Republic, Slovenia
and Turkey were the second most important characteristic is to have a challenging job, while
in Noway, Portugal and Hungary the second most important characteristic is to have a social
status. Workers in France and Czech Republic are on average ready to give up around 20% of
their total WTP for a job that is challenging. We can see that the social status and a good
chance to combine work with family tasks are somehow of the same importance for most of
the countries. The opportunity to learn new things is of highest importance in Japan while in
Finland is the most unimportant job characteristic. Job autonomy is for most of the countries
on the second to last place of importance. The relative importance of job autonomy is highest
in Turkey while it is lowest in Germany. Impressive as it may sound but the job security is
the least important job characteristics. Although, one will find this evidence a bit surprising
at first, however it should be noted that we are concerned with the preferences of young and
educated individuals who have recently entered the labour market. Since their worries about
job security may come later in life or since it can turn out that more educated people are less
concerned with the issue of job quality, the following evidence might not be surprising after all.
The relative importance of having a good career prospect is the most important priority
for both men and women in almost every country. On the other hand, both men and women
are willing to give up relatively the smallest amount of their WTP to achieve a perfect job se-
curity. The following evidence that says that men and women are having similar relative WTP
contributions for non-wage job characteristics comes from the fact that the preferences between
these two groups are not considerably different (although women prefer more challenging jobs
and jobs with a good chance to combine work with family tasks, while men prefer more to
have a good career prospects) but also due to the fact that on average both men and women
experience similar deprivation in these non-wage job characteristics.
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2.6.7 Gender differences in willingness-to-pay
In previous section we have shown the results from the Shapley value decomposition of the
total willingness-to-pay on its contribution to each non-wage characteristic. The following re-
sults have provided us with the information about the relative importance of various non-wage
characteristics. In this section we illustrate the (total) willingness-to-pay for men and women
across the distribution and we compare the gender differences in willingness-to-pay.
We observe from figure 2.7 that men are having higher willingness-to-pay over the entire
distribution in each country except Turkey where women are having higher willingness-to-pay in
the first half of the distribution. This evidence points out to the fact that in absolute terms men
suffer more than women for not being at the reference levels of non-wage job characteristics and
thus they are willing to give up more of his wages to reach the reference points. Nevertheless,
the following evidence is not surprising since we know that the willingness-to-pay is a function
of wage and since we have seen that men are having higher wages across the distribution in all
countries except in Turkey where the opposite is true. Thus, we clearly see that men more able
to afford a job of higher quality. However, once we normalize the (total) willingness-to-pay with
the wage level the evidence points out that the differences in willingness-to-pay between gender
almost disappear (see figure B.2).
We can notice that the willingness-to-pay for both men and women is monotonically in-
creasing over percentiles with the sharp increase on the top of distribution. The following
pattern is observed across all countries. While the differences in willingness-to-pay between
men and women are less pronounced at the bottom of distribution across countries, these differ-
ences start to widen at the top of distribution. A few countries like Italy, Netherlands, Japan,
Belgium and Turkey are having a quite equal distributions of willingness-to-pay for men and
women while on the other hand in Germany, Hungary and Lithuania the gender difference in
the willingness-to-pay increases substantially at the top of the distribution although the differ-
ences are less pronounced at the bottom of the distribution. It is important to note that the
gender differences in willingness-to-pay are resulting from the gender differences in wages but
also due to differences in preferences and differences in non-wage job characteristics. Since we
have shown that differences in preferences between men and women are not greatly pronounced,
the gender differences in willingness-to-pay are to be explained mostly by differences in wage
and non-wage job characteristics between men and women.
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2.7 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to analyse the well-being on the job as one important sphere
of life of many individuals. We have limited our analysis to a specific sub-population of recent
graduates in a large sample of countries. Since the literature on well-being on the job have
been predominantly concerned with understanding job quantity, we have decided to broaden
the literature by analysing the important topic of job quality. In doing so, we first have to select
a reasonable well-being measure which evaluates the well-being of individuals on their jobs. We
have distinguished between five different well-being measures which include wage, equivalent
wage, subjective job satisfaction score, average preferences objective measure and equal weights
objective measure. It is important to bear in mind that the choice for each of these measures
is based on the normative assumptions that these measures materialise.
In recent years, a lot of interest for measuring the well-being on the job has received by
the subjective job satisfaction measure. Although the implementation of the following measure
does not require a lot of effort, yet it does not allow us to introduce one important normative
assumption for measuring well-being, that of respecting individual preferences. The underlying
reason why this conflict occurs lies in fact that the subjective satisfaction measure is contingent
on the scaling factors (i.e. adaptations, expectations and aspirations) which may differ across
different individuals in a given point of time or it may differ across time for a given individual.
In order to be able to make a proper interpersonal well-being comparisons, we have decided to
use the equivalent wage measure which respect individual preferences but on the other hand it
is not dependent on scaling factors.
We have also illustrated two objective well-being measures (i.e. equal weights and average
preferences) which do not respect individual preferences over job characteristics but instead they
are based on the aggregation procedure that ascribes objective weights to all job characteristics
contained in such a measure. The reason why some of researchers favour these objective well-
being measures comes from the fact that they are in line with the Dominance principle, which
neither the subjective satisfaction measure nor the equivalent wage measure satisfy. Neverthe-
less, as we have argued, the objective well-being measures may be deceptive since they rely on
a paternalistic nature of ascribing weights to job characteristics.
We have shown that the choice of well-being measure is quite important since different mea-
sures will lead to different job quality rankings of countries. Thus, have to take the well-being
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measurement seriously. In this chapter we have raised the important critique of the prevailing
measures which seem to neglect the multi-dimensional concept of individual well-being. It is
reasonable to argue that individual well-being on the job does not only depend on wage but
also on other non-wage job characteristics. Taking into account both wage and non-wage job
characteristics we are able to construct a genuine measure of well-being which reflects more
closely the job quality of individuals.
We have seen that recent graduates care about wage but also about non-wage job charac-
teristics. Among the non-wage job characteristics, having a good career prospect is relatively
the most important characteristic for both men and women. On the other hand, relatively the
least important non-wage characteristic for both men and women is job security. Accepting
the idea that the well-being is a multidimensional concept introduces additional challenge of
dealing with the correlation between job characteristics and finding a proper way to aggregate
various dimensions into a single well-being measure. Accomplishing these tasks do not seem to
be a trivial thing to do for the creators of public and social policies and ultimately it is up to
them to consider whether these additional steps are worthwhile doing. As we have argued we
find these additional steps for constructing a well-being measure indeed fundamental if one is
interested in making appropriate interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
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Table 2.2: Satisfaction Equation
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Coef. s.e Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Job Dimensions
Log Wage 0.211*** (0.017) 0.196*** (0.018) 0.260*** (0.024) 0.306*** (0.039) 0.375*** (0.037)
Autonomy 0.364*** (0.029) 0.353*** (0.031) 0.349*** (0.032) 0.285*** (0.016) 0.275*** (0.017)
Security 0.072*** (0.011) 0.065*** (0.012) 0.062*** (0.012) 0.095*** (0.016) 0.102*** (0.017)
Learn 0.341*** (0.018) 0.348*** (0.018) 0.350*** (0.018) 0.329*** (0.024) 0.315*** (0.023)
Challenge 0.287*** (0.017) 0.301*** (0.018) 0.303*** (0.018) 0.336*** (0.022) 0.384*** (0.034)
Career 0.240*** (0.016) 0.251*** (0.017) 0.260*** (0.017) 0.257*** (0.018) 0.268*** (0.019)
Social Status 0.028 (0.033) 0.016 (0.036) 0.014 (0.036) 0.068 (0.041) 0.068 (0.042)
Valuable 0.253*** (0.014) 0.251*** (0.015) 0.251*** (0.015) 0.205*** (0.016) 0.176*** (0.015)
Family Work 0.084*** (0.011) 0.093*** (0.011) 0.093*** (0.011) 0.066*** (0.016) 0.075*** (0.019)
Personal
Characteristics
Age -0.051* (0.022) -0.068** (0.023) -0.076** (0.026) -0.079** (0.027) -0.081** (0.028)
Age squared/1000 0.629* (0.283) 0.855** (0.302) 0.975** (0.332) 0.970** (0.338) 0.997** (0.349)
Male -0.047 (0.092) -0.038 (0.095) -0.029 (0.096) 0.100 (0.110) 0.151 (0.122)
Child 0.392*** (0.112) 0.393*** (0.117) 0.371** (0.117) 0.291* (0.119) 0.007 (0.114)
Partner 0.067* (0.032) 0.044 (0.033) 0.045 (0.033) 0.044 (0.033) 0.283* (0.121)
Family 0.140 (0.105) 0.153 (0.110) 0.168 (0.110) 0.195 (0.111) 0.413** (0.142)
Education -0.013 (0.011) 0.004 (0.012) -0.020 (0.013) -0.022 (0.013) -0.036** (0.013)
Company Medium -0.111** (0.035) -0.096** (0.036)
Company Large 0.355 (0.306) 0.403 (0.325)
Training -0.190 (0.283) 0.379*** (0.090)
Sector 0.540*** (0.104) 0.505*** (0.107)
Part-time Work -0.407** (0.142) -0.178*** (0.050)
Work Risk 0.069*** (0.013) 0.073*** (0.014)
Abilities
Masterfield 0.166*** (0.014) 0.156*** (0.014) 0.147*** (0.015) 0.138*** (0.015)
Knowfield -0.060*** (0.012) -0.059*** (0.012) -0.065*** (0.012) -0.066*** (0.013)
Think -0.027* (0.013) -0.030* (0.013)
Pressure 0.064*** (0.012) 0.063*** (0.013) 0.064*** (0.013) 0.069*** (0.013)
Use Time 0.036** (0.013) 0.036** (0.013) 0.030* (0.013) 0.029* (0.014)
Work Productivity 0.046** (0.014) 0.043** (0.015) 0.050*** (0.015) 0.050** (0.015)
Use Computers 0.031* (0.014)
Quest -0.050*** (0.013) -0.041** (0.013) -0.044*** (0.013) -0.053*** (0.014)
Present -0.022* (0.011) -0.034** (0.011)
Write -0.064*** (0.012) -0.061*** (0.012) -0.062*** (0.012) -0.057*** (0.013)
Foreign Language -0.019* (0.008) -0.028*** (0.008) -0.020* (0.008) -0.024** (0.008)
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Table 2.2: Satisfaction Equation (Continued)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Coef. s.e Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Occupation and
Industry
Clerks Occ. -0.236*** (0.057)
Craft/Trade Occ. -0.488* (0.220)
Elementary Occ. -0.876*** (0.233)
Accommodation Ind. 0.452** (0.163)
Education Ind. 0.356*** (0.042)
Health/Social Ind. 0.177*** (0.044)
Other Services Ind. 0.288*** (0.064)
Interactions
Log Wage*Young -0.040* (0.018) -0.043* (0.018)
Social Status*Young 0.106** (0.034) 0.114** (0.037) 0.116** (0.037) 0.107** (0.039) 0.112** (0.039)
Autonomy*Young -0.076** (0.028) -0.076* (0.030) -0.078* (0.030)
Challenge*Male -0.070* (0.029) -0.070* (0.030)
Career*Male 0.065** (0.022) 0.064** (0.023) 0.061** (0.023) 0.086** (0.027) 0.083** (0.028)
Valuable*Male -0.068** (0.021) -0.060** (0.021) -0.060** (0.022) -0.044* (0.022)
Fam. Work*Male -0.051* (0.023)
Valuable*Child -0.052* (0.026)
Learn*Child -0.085** (0.028) -0.091** (0.030) -0.091** (0.029) -0.068* (0.030)
Fam. Work*Child 0.057* (0.026)
Challenge*Partner -0.065* (0.032)
Challenge*Family -0.076** (0.029) -0.080** (0.030) -0.081** (0.030) -0.086** (0.031) -0.143*** (0.039)
Log Wage*Co. Large -0.086* (0.038) -0.091* (0.041)
Security*Co. Large -0.093*** (0.023) -0.090*** (0.024)
Learn*Co. Large 0.081** (0.026) 0.078** (0.026)
Fam. Work*Co. Large 0.044* (0.022) 0.056* (0.023)
Log Wage*Training 0.082* (0.037)
Social Status*Training -0.069* (0.027) -0.058* (0.028)
Learn*Sector -0.085** (0.027) -0.101*** (0.027)
Fam. Work*Part Time 0.081* (0.038)
Occupation No No No No Yes
Industry No No No No Yes
Country No No Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.1201 0.1266 0.1283 0.1322 0.1353
Log-likelihood -36975.2 -33916.0 -33850.6 -33073.0 -31295.7
Observations 30714 28439 28439 27927 26540
Notes: Results obtained from the ordinal logistic regression. The estimation procedure includes weighting.
Robust standard errors in parentheses where *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% level,
1% level, and 0.1% level, respectively
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Table 2.6: Spearman rank correlations between the well-being measures
WBw WBw
∗
WBs WBo,ew WBo,ap
WBw 1
WBw
∗
0.6719* 1
( 0.0016)
WBs 0.4825* 0.6368* 1
(0.0364) (0.0034)
WBo,ew 0.1614 0.5737* 0.7667* 1
(0.5092) (0.0102) (0.0001)
WBo,ap 0.5018* 0.6456* 0.9807* 0.7070* 1
(0.0286) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0007)
Notes: Numbers denote Spearman rank correlation coefficients for all pairs
of measures. Numbers in brackets denote a two sided p-value. * indicates
statistical significance at the 5%.
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Table 2.7: Overlap of the Worst off over different measures
WBw WBw
∗
WBs WBo,ew WBo,ap Overlap (%)
Panel a
× 101.7
× 100.0
× 100.0
× 100.1
× 100.1
Panel b
× × 20.6
× × 20.0
× × 22.1
× × 22.4
× × 43.0
× × 67.7
× × 73.6
× × 43.7
× × 45.4
× × 80.2
Panel c
× × × 10.3
× × × 16.2
× × × 17.9
× × × 10.7
× × × 11.1
× × × 18.6
× × × 34.5
× × × 37.1
× × × 62.3
× × × 38.9
Panel d
× × × × 9.2
× × × × 9.7
× × × × 15.7
× × × × 10.0
× × × × 32.9
Panel e
× × × × × 9.1
Notes: Numbers denote the degree of overlap of the worst off according to different measures.
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Table 2.8: Overlap of the Best off over different measures
WBw WBw
∗
WBs WBo,ew WBo,ap Overlap (%)
Panel a
× 100.0
× 100.0
× 100.0
× 100.0
× 100.0
Panel b
× × 69.9
× × 68.8
× × 69.5
× × 70.1
× × 78.4
× × 90.5
× × 92.8
× × 78.6
× × 78.6
× × 93.0
Panel c
× × × 55.9
× × × 63.4
× × × 65.5
× × × 55.9
× × × 56.2
× × × 65.5
× × × 72.8
× × × 74.4
× × × 88.0
× × × 74.4
Panel d
× × × × 52.1
× × × × 53.2
× × × × 62.1
× × × × 53.4
× × × × 71.2
Panel e
× × × × × 51.2
Notes: Numbers denote the degree of overlap of the best off according to different measures.
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Figure 2.4: The overall job satisfaction across countries: Proportions by gender
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Figure 2.4: The overall job satisfaction across countries: Proportions by gender (continued)
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Figure 2.5: Wage and Equivalent Wage Gender Gaps
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Figure 2.5: Wage and Equivalent Wage Gender Gaps (continued)
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Japan
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Portugal
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
1.
2
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Belgium
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Estonia
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
1.
2
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Slovenia
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
1.
2
1.
4
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Turkey
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Lithuania
.
8
1
1.
2
1.
4
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Poland
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
R
at
io
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentiles
Hungary
142
Figure 2.6: Shapley Decomposition of WTP
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Figure 2.7: Total WTP for Men and Women
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Figure 2.7: Total WTP for Men and Women (continued)
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Chapter 3
Performance Pay Jobs and Job
Satisfaction
3.1 Introduction
In recent years we have seen a growing interest of researches for finding the factors that affect
the job satisfaction. Yet, the empirical question on what are the perspective effects of differ-
ent payment schemes on the job satisfaction has received surprisingly insufficient attraction
in the literature. The literature has shown that workers in the performance paying schemes
exert higher effort in return for a higher earnings (see Parent (1999), Lazear (2000), Paarsch
and Shearer (2000)). As a result, the productivity of workers in performance paying jobs is
increased but it stays ambiguous on how this process reflects to the job satisfaction of workers.
On the one hand, it is assumed that higher salaries would increase the job satisfaction but on
the other hand, workers in performance pay jobs will be exposed to a higher level of effort and
to a higher income variation which can lower their job satisfaction.
Brown and Sessions (2005) argue that workers choose firms that enhance productivity
which as a consequence have a positive impact on workers satisfaction. Workers also report a
higher level of satisfaction when they think that the payment they receive for their labour is
equitable (see Brown (2001)). The literature on job satisfaction has been dealing with the effects
of gender (Clark (1997a)), age (Groot and Maassen van den Brink (1999)), and occupations
(Ward and Sloane (2000)). The connection between the job satisfaction and social psychology
has been found as well (see Blanchflower and Oswald (2004)).
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The literature on the gender differentials has shown that among equally qualified men and
women, women are paid less (Blau and Kahn (1992)), women have less attractive jobs in terms
of promotion opportunities, conditions of hiring, job content (see Johnson et al. (1992)) and
women also report a higher level of stress (see Clark and Oswald (1994)). However, despite
of the later evidence, it is found that women tend to report higher level of job satisfaction
(see Blanchflower and Oswald (1992)). This is quite of a paradox1. Clark (1997b) proposed
an answer to this paradox by arguing that women have lower expectations regarding the job
opportunities they will receive in the future and that is why they are unconditionally more
satisfied on their current jobs. In other words, higher job satisfaction among women reflects
their lower expectation from the job opportunities which are influenced by the previous job
positions they have acquired.
The literature on job satisfaction has shown that payment schemes do matter. Lazear
(2000) and Oettinger (2001) have demonstrated that workers who are paid on the piece rates
exert more effort and earn more than those workers paid an hourly salary. Thus, the payment
schemes can influence the job satisfaction through higher earnings and by providing better
working conditions (see Godard (2001)). Nevertheless, it is ambiguous what effect will differ-
ent payment schemes have on the job satisfaction. Meyersson-Milgrom et al. (2002) showed
that workers in the performance paying jobs may not be entirely compensated for having a
higher earnings risk so that they will be experiencing a lower level of job satisfaction. Another
approach that shows how the performance pay jobs can lower the job satisfaction is taken by
Kennedy (1995) who has assumed that the performance pay jobs may erode the morale of the
least productive workers and consequently they would exert lower effort levels. Thus, those
firms who are using the performance paying schemes might end up with workers who are having
a lower level of productivity than the firms who are using an hourly wage payment scheme.
Since the predictions of the microeconomic theory on the effects of performance paying
jobs on the well-being on the job are mutually contrasting we have decided to tackle this issue
in order to provide the empirical evidence behind these effects. It is important to bear in mind
that we will use the subjective job satisfaction as our measure for the well-being on the job. In
1There are several reasons for observing the significant gender differences in job satisfaction. The first reason
is due to different personal characteristics (age, education, health, union membership) and job characteristics
(hours of work, type of performance pay scheme) between men and women. The second reason for existing gender
difference in subjective well-being may be due to individual’s beliefs and work values. The third reason has to
do with different understanding of well-being in the sense of absolute and relative comparison levels.
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addition, we break down the performance paying schemes into individual, group and company
performance paying scheme and we illustrate the effects that each of these schemes have on the
job satisfaction. According to the standard microeconomic theory, once we control for the level
of earnings, workers in the performance pay jobs should have a lower level of job satisfaction
due to the fact that they acquire a greater risk. In this chapter we examine this prediction
by testing whether the workers in performance paying jobs will have a higher level of job sat-
isfaction than the workers in non-performance paying jobs and whether this evidence will be
true even after controlling for the level of earnings. We also test for the effect of risk attitudes
on the job satisfaction in order to disentangle between the possible effects that the higher risk
tolerance can induce a higher level of job satisfaction.
In this chapter we estimate the effects of performance pay job schemes on job satisfaction
for both men and women and we consider the implications of our results for the gender job
satisfaction. Although, the widespread evidence points out that women are holding less at-
tractive jobs which is reflected in the important job characteristics like hiring, job content and
earnings, we have found that despite of that women report higher level of job satisfaction in
performance pay jobs. Nevertheless, after controlling for the personal and job characteristics we
should expect that the identical men and women would be on the same level of job satisfaction.
A solution to this puzzle can be explained with the fact that women have lower expectations
from their jobs since they have formed their beliefs on the basis of their previous employment
based on the jobs of lower quality.
The results we have found have confirmed the prediction that workers in the performance
pay job schemes are more satisfied on their jobs than workers in the non-performance pay job
schemes, even after we have controlled for the level of earnings, personal and job related char-
acteristics. Both men and women, conditionally or unconditionally on their earnings are more
satisfied in the performance paying jobs. Among all explanatory variables, we have found that
health has the strongest effect on job satisfaction. After we have disaggregated the performance
pay job schemes into individual, group or company performance pay job schemes, we have found
that workers employed under each of these three types of schemes are more satisfied on their
job than workers paid by the fixed amount. While the individual performance pay job scheme
has the strongest effect on job satisfaction, the company performance pay job scheme has the
smallest effect on job satisfaction.
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The standard approach in modelling job satisfaction is to use the information on the sub-
jective job satisfaction obtained on a Likert scale, which approximates the continuous latent
variable of the true level of satisfaction. Unfortunately, the latent variable on the job satisfaction
is unobserved to econometricians. Yet, the literature points out that the subjective well-being
measure of job satisfaction can be represented as a function of income, hours of work, individual
characteristics and job characteristics. It is important to emphasise that the job satisfaction is
considered as the approximation of the utility on the job. We will consider the job satisfaction
as the ordinal variable which implies that for instance the job satisfaction level of 4 is not as
twice as high as the job satisfaction level of 2 but we know that the former level of job satisfac-
tion is higher than the later level of job satisfaction.
Another important issue in modelling job satisfaction concerns the right specification of
the econometric model. One should bear in mind that the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
caused by personality traits and other factors (i.e. genetics) can bias the effects of regressors on
the subjective job satisfaction. Thus, we need to cautiously consider which estimation strategy
to follow. The literature on the human capital has illustrated the importance of accounting
for the unobserved effects of ability that can bias the returns to education (see Card (1994)).
Gottfredson (2004) showed that a large fraction of variation in education and earnings is due to
genetic differences in ability. Thus, for analysing the effects of performance pay schemes on job
satisfaction, we have to bear in mind that the variation in choosing the performance pay jobs
may be correlated with socio-economic and personality factors. For that matter, the model we
will choose should properly account for the possibility that the unobserved heterogeneity might
correlate with other explanatory factors2.
Unfortunately, the econometric panel model for the categorical ordered dependent vari-
able that allows for the unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the regressors is not
computationally feasible due to the incidental parameter problem. To some extent a possi-
ble workaround to this problem is to use conditional maximum likelihood estimation (CML)
proposed by Chamberlain (1980). However, a considerable weakness of the CML estimation is
reflected in the notion that this estimation greatly reduces the sample size because the dependent
2The presence of unobserved ability might correlate with the performance paying scheme but also the unob-
served ability can be correlated with greater job satisfaction. Our estimation strategy accounts for the unobserved
ability in estimating the effect of performance paying jobs on job satisfaction by assuming that the performance
paying scheme is correlated with any level of unobserved ability. This is in contrast with assuming that only
workers with higher ability levels are obtaining the performance pay premium.
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variable has to be collapsed into a binary variable and only those individuals whose dependent
variable exceeds the threshold level will be accounted in the estimation. Another weakness of
the CML estimation is that there is no meaningful procedure to calculate the marginal effects
due to lack of information on the distribution of the unobserved factors. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Frijters (2004) proposed a method that collapses the categorical ordered dependent variable
into a binary variable without losing a substantial amount of observations. However, the later
method suffers from the computational difficulties and the fact that the threshold value is ar-
bitrary defined which can lead to a bias in estimation3.
An alternative strategy for modelling the non-linear categorical ordered dependent vari-
able model with the fixed effects (FE) is found by Baetschmann et al. (2011). The following
approach uses all information contained in the ordinal dependent variable by “blowing up” the
data to estimate all possible combinations of the ordered dependent variable. The authors also
correct the standard errors for clustering and therefore they call their estimation procedure
“Blow-Up and Custer” (BUC). Using the advantages that this estimation procedure offers for
estimating the ordered non-linear dependent variable model with fixed effects, we have decided
to use the BUC estimator in our work.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an outline of
the econometric model for estimating the job satisfaction in the presence of non-random unob-
served heterogeneity. Section 3.3 illustrates the data and presents the distribution of the job
satisfaction for the performance and non-performance paying jobs and the distribution of the
job satisfaction for both men and women. In section 3.4 we illustrate our empirical strategy
for estimating the job satisfaction model. In section 3.5 we present the results. Section 3.6
concludes.
3In order to escape this estimation problems, some researches did not tackle the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity but instead they used the pooled ordered maximum likelihood estimation, generalized ordered
probit models or random effects ordered models.
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3.2 The Econometric Model
An important advantage from using a panel data is the possibility to purge out for the time
invariant unobserved individual effects which may cause the problem of endogeneity. Neverthe-
less, researches are faced some serious constraints in estimating a non-linear ordered dependent
variable model with fixed effects. An ordered categorical dependent variable models are applied
in many econometrics settings like the estimation of the subjective job satisfaction, health, etc.
A popular technique for modelling ordered dependent variable is to use the ordered probit or
logit models which are estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The standard
approach in estimating the ordered dependent panel data model is to collapse an ordered de-
pendent variable into a binary variable and then the model is estimated by using MLE.
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) and Kassenbo¨hmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) col-
lapse the ordinal dependent variable into a binary variable and run the conditional maximum
likelihood (CML) estimator suggested by Chamberlain (1980). While this approach has an ad-
vantage of exploring more information that is available, on the other hand this approach has a
serious weakness which is reflected in the notion that a threshold value for recoding the ordered
dependent variable is chosen arbitrarily. The conditional logit fixed effects panel data estimator
is conditioning on the sum of the outcomes over time. The role of this estimator is to dismiss
the unobserved heterogeneity that confounds the effects of independent variables. Nevertheless,
in the literature there are other approaches for estimating fixed effects logit models, which have
the advantage of using more information in the process of estimation (see Das and van Soest
(1999) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)).
In the following section we provide an overview of one particular estimation procedure for
the fixed effects ordered logit model that has been suggested by Baetschmann et al. (2011). The
reason why we have decided to use the estimator proposed by Baetschmann et al. (2011) lies in
the fact that the following estimator outperforms other estimators that are currently available
(see Riedl and Geishecker (2014)). The general framework for estimating a latent variable model
with ordered dependent variable and unobservable characteristics can be formulated as
y∗it = x
′
itβ + αi + εit (3.1)
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where y∗it is a latent dependent variable of individual i (i = 1, ..., N) in period t (t = 1, ..., T ),
xit is a vector of independent explanatory variables (i.e. observable characteristics related to
job satisfaction), αi represents a time invariant unobserved component (i.e. cognitive ability)
that is assumed to be correlated with the vector of the observed explanatory variables and εit
is the error term that follows logistic distribution. Since we do not observe the latent variable
y∗it, we relate it to the observed ordered categorical variable, yit, it the following way
yit = k ⇔ θk < y∗it 6 θk+1, k = 1, ...,K (3.2)
where the threshold parameter θ is assumed to be strictly increasing in k, θk < θk+1 ∀k. Note
that the threshold parameters can be represented as individual-specific as well, θik, ∀k. Assum-
ing that the error term, εit, is independent and identically distributed standard logistic, we can
express the conditional distribution function F (·) of εit as
F (εit|xit, αi) = exp(εit)
/
(exp(εit) + 1) = Λ(εit) (3.3)
The probability of observing outcome k for individual i at time t is given by
Pr(yit = k|xit, αi) = Λ(θk+1 − x′itβ − αi)− Λ(θk − x′itβ − αi) (3.4)
where Λ(·) represents the link function (the logistic cdf). Baetschmann et al. (2011) point out
that there are two basic problems with estimating the equation 3.4 with the MLE. First, we
cannot identify αi and θik but only the difference between the parameters, αik = θik − αi. The
second weakness is attributed to the incidental parameter problem, which means that under
fixed-T asymptotics, the parameter θik cannot be consistently estimated and moreover the
estimates of β will be biased as well. In the literature there are several alternative strategies
in order to overcome these two problems but in general, these strategies boil down to the same
approach of collapsing ordered dependent variable yit into a binary variable and then proceed
in the estimation with a CML estimation suggested by Chamberlain (1980). Following the
approach by Baetschmann et al. (2011) we define the binary variable dkit that is transformed
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from the ordered variable using the threshold level at k as
dkit =

1 if yit > k
0 if yit ≤ k
(3.5)
The conditional logit statistic for αi is then defined as the joint probability of observing
a sequence of outcomes dki = (d
k
i1, ..., d
k
iT ), conditional on the number of times the dependent
variable per group exceeds the threshold k, ci is
Pki (β) ≡ Pr
(
dki
∣∣∣ T∑
t=1
dkit = ci
)
=
exp(
∑T
t=1 d
k
i x
′
itβ)∑
ji∈Bi exp(
∑T
t=1 jitx
′
itβ)
(3.6)
where ji = (ji1, ..., jiT ) with jit ∈ {0, 1} and Bi denotes a set of all possible combinations of
yi1, ..., yiT that sum up to ci =
∑T
t=1 jit
4. Chamberlain (1980) illustrates that maximizing the
conditional log-likelihood gives a consistent estimate of β which can be represented as follows
logLk(b) =
N∑
i=1
logPki (b) (3.7)
The underling weakness of the following estimation technique is that it discards all ob-
servations in yit that are above or below the threshold level k. In other words, although it is
possible to use any value for the threshold k = (2, ...,K), the estimation will crucially depend
on the fact that those individuals with unchanged dkit will not be taken into account when max-
imizing the conditional log-likelihood. An alternative estimator called “Blow-up and Cluster”
(BUC) suggested by Baetschmann et al. (2011) avoids the following problem of discarding the
observations. The BUC estimator transforms the dependent variable with k categories into
k − 1 dichotomizations and then it estimates the model using k − 1 thresholds simultaneously.
The procedure involves duplicating the original data k − 1 times so that every time different
threshold level is used to breakdown the dependent variable. In the next step the model is
estimated on the newly created sample using a conditional logit estimator while the standard
errors are adjusted for clustering since some individuals could be accounted several times in the
log-likelihood function.
4The set Bi can be more formally represented as: Bi =
{
ji ∈ {0, 1}
∣∣ ∑T
t=1 jit = ci
}
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3.3 Data
The analysis is based on the Korean Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). KLIPS is the lon-
gitudinal dataset conducted annually on a sample of 5,000 urban households. We have worked
with the data that spans from 2003 till 2010, which are the only available years. The dataset
includes a wide array of categories such as the information on the economic activity, incomes,
earnings and consumption, education and vocational training, employment, working hours, life
satisfaction, job-seeking activities, and labour market mobility. We constrain our analysis on
employees who work at least 20 hours per week. We limit our analysis to individuals who are
aged between 15 and 65 years in order to avoid any considerations that individuals have about
their retirement.
The job satisfaction variable represents a categorical measure of job satisfaction measured
on a five point Likert Scale. The original question on the job satisfaction asked in the question-
naire was Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your main job? A scale of possible
answers consists of 1 for “very dissatisfied”, 2 for “dissatisfied”, 3 for “neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied”, 4 for “satisfied” and 5 for “very satisfied”. Identification of workers in the perfor-
mance pay jobs comes from the following question What kind of performance-based pay scheme
does your employer apply to you? The individuals could choose i) the individual level (wage is
decided based on an individual’s output), ii) the group level (wage is decided based on a team
or division’s output), iii) the company level (wage is decided based on the company’s overall
performance and iv) no performance based pay. A real hourly net wage rate is constructed
using the reported weekly earnings and working hours5.
The risk variable is constructed from the question on the willingness to participate in the
lotteries. The original question on the risk attitude was formulated as follows Suppose, for a
minute, that you took over shop-keeping for a friend who had to go away for one day. As a
token of thanks, she is offering you either 100,000 Won in cash or an instant lottery ticket. In
this situation, how would you react to the following types of offers? Given the winnings and
probabilities of the instant lottery the individuals are offered the following choices: 1) 100,000
Won won in cash, 2) a lottery that gives 200,000 Won with the probability 0.6 and 0 Won with
the probability of 0.4 and 3) whichever is fine. Based on the answers on the following question
5In order to construct the real wage variable a Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been applied with 2010 chosen
as a base year.
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we have approximated the risk attitude of individuals. This variable takes the value 0 if an
individual is risk averse, 1 if an individual is risk neutral and 2 if an individual is risk lower.
In figure 3.1 we illustrate the distributions of job satisfaction over performance pay jobs
(left-hand side panel) and the distribution of job satisfaction for both men and women (right-
hand side panel). The vertical bars represent the estimated proportions of each job satisfaction
category while capped spike lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The highest pro-
portion of workers in the performance pay jobs is neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their
job (41.7 percent) while the highest proportion of workers in the non-performance pay jobs is
satisfied with their jobs (59.1 percent). The gender difference in the job satisfaction is almost
negligible across the distribution. The highest proportion of both men and women are found to
be neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their jobs.
The distribution of job satisfaction for both men and women in the performance pay jobs is
illustrated on the left hand side panel of figure 3.2. The distribution for both men and women is
skewed to the left. The highest proportion of both men and women in the performance pay jobs
are satisfied with their jobs. The right hand side of figure 3.2 displays the distribution of job
satisfaction form men and women in the non-performance pay jobs. The highest proportion of
both men and women in the non-performance pay jobs are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with
their jobs. Figure 3.3 displays the distributions of the performance pay schemes (individual,
group and company schemes) and non-performance pay scheme for men (left hand side panel)
and women (right hand side panel). We have found that across different performance paying
schemes, the highest proportion of satisfied men and women are found in the group scheme with
56.6 percent and 59.3 percent, respectively.
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3.4 Estimating the Job Satisfaction Regression
In this section we illustrate our empirical strategy for estimating the job satisfaction model. We
first consider the empirical strategy for estimating the effects of performance paying jobs on job
satisfaction. The second empirical strategy is designed for estimating the effects of individual,
group and company performance paying schemes on the job satisfaction. We have specified
three different models for each empirical strategy. The first empirical strategy that estimates
the effect of performance paying jobs on the job satisfaction is specified as follows
Sit = α0 + α1Pit + α2lnWit + α3Rit + α
′
4Zit + α
′
5Cit + α
′
6Dit + α
′
7Tt + α
′
8Gi + εit (3.8)
where Sit is the overall job satisfaction, Pit is a dummy variable that equals one if a worker
belongs to performance pay job and zero otherwise, lnWit denotes the natural logarithm of the
real hourly wage, Rit denotes the risk attitude, Zit is a vector of socio-demographic variables
which includes age squared over 1000, marital status and number of kids, Cit is a vector of job
characteristics which includes a dummy variable if an individual works in the medium company,
a dummy variable if an individual works in a large company, a dummy variable if an individual
works in shifts, dummy variable if an individual has fixed working hours and a set of dummy
variables for occupation and industry, Dit is a vector of other controls which includes a dummy
variable if an individual has finished elementary school, college, university, master studies or
doctoral studies, a dummy variable for the years of experience and a dummy variable for the
years of tenure an individual has, Tt is a vector of time dummies, Gi is a vector of regional
dummies, εit is the error term, and α’s are parameters to be estimated.
Our second empirical strategy that estimates the effects of different performance paying
schemes on the job satisfaction is specified as follows
Sit = β0 + β
′
1Xit + β2lnWit + β3Rit + β
′
4Zit + β
′
5Cit + β
′
6Dit + β
′
7Tt + β
′
8Gi + εit (3.9)
where Xit = [X
i
it, X
g
it, X
c
it] is a vector of dummy variables for individual performance pay scheme
(Xiit), group performance pay scheme (X
g
it) and company performance pay scheme (X
c
it) , β’s
are parameters of interested to be estimated while the remaining variables are the same as in the
equation 3.8. In case of both strategies, the point estimates and standard errors are transformed
from the log odds ratio to odds ratio in order to easy the interpretation of the results.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 The Effect of Performance Pay Scheme on Job Satisfaction
The first set of results illustrate the difference in job satisfaction between workers in the perfor-
mance and non-performance pay jobs. Table 3.1 reports the estimation results from a pooled
sample of men and women. First, we concentrate on the results of model I where we estimate
the odds ratio of the performance pay jobs on job satisfaction but without controlling for the log
wage and risk. Beside the regressors presented in model I we also control for a vector of socio-
demographic variables, vector of job characteristics, vector of other controls which consists of
education, experience and tenure, vector of time dummies and vector of regional dummies. The
results confirm that the job satisfaction is significantly higher for workers in the performance
pay jobs than for the workers who are paid by the fixed amount (i.e. non-performance paying
jobs). For instance, if a worker switches from the fixed paid job to the performance pay job his
odds ratio of being in very high job satisfaction relative to all other remaining lower categories
of job satisfaction combined together is increased by 1.23. In other words the odds of being
very satisfied with the job relative to all other lower categories are higher for workers in the
performance paying jobs by 23 percent.
An interesting evidence is coming from the effects on the demographic variables. If an
unmarried worker becomes married, then his odds ratios of being in the highest job satisfac-
tion category will decrease. The evidence that marriage increases the likelihood of being more
satisfied with life in general is found with a cross-section data (see Blanchflower and Oswald
(2004)) and in the panel data that used fixed effects (Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998)).
One reason for finding the positive effect of marriage on job satisfaction comes from the fact
that married individuals suffer less from a mental illness (see Cochrane (1996)). Notice that
the odds ratio greater than one relates to workers in the medium and large companies, which
implies that the odds of being very satisfied with job is increasing for those workers. An in-
crease in the subjective health status6 by one category increases the odds ratio of being very
satisfied with the job relative to other job satisfaction categories taken together. For instance,
if the health of individuals improve from good to excellent, then the odds ratio of being very
satisfied with the job increases by 1.53. We can notice that the magnitude of this effect is
6The subjective health status variable takes on value 1 for poor health, 2 for fair health, 3 for good health
and 4 for excellent health.
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quite strong. Working in the fixed hours regime increases the odds ratio of being in the highest
job satisfaction category. It should not be unreasonable to expect this since an unanticipated
working hours could lead to a lower level of job satisfaction.
We turn to the model II where in addition to the previously introduced variables we control
for the log hourly real wage. In other words, in model II we test whether the job satisfaction
of workers in the performance pay jobs would be higher than the job satisfaction of workers in
the fixed paid jobs, once we control for the earnings. It should be emphasised that our previous
findings about a significantly positive effect of performance pay jobs on the job satisfaction may
be confounded with the notion that we have not controlled for the wage compensation that
the workers in performance pay jobs receive for undertaking higher risks. According to the
standard microeconomic theory, once we control for the level of earnings, the positive effect of
performance pay jobs on workers’ utility should disappear (see Gazioglu and Tansel (2006)).
We have found that a unit increase in the log wage increases the log odds ratio of being
very satisfied with the job relative to other lower job satisfaction categories by 1.137. The odds
of being very satisfied with the job relative to combined set of other lower categories are higher
for workers in performance pay jobs by 15 percent. This effect is by 8 percentage points lower
than in model I where we did not control for wage. The following evidence goes clearly in con-
trast with the standard principal-agent model which predicts that the job satisfaction should be
lower for workers in the performance paying jobs once we control for their earnings due to the
fact that these workers face a greater risk. The results we have found are also in line with the
evidence found by Clark (1997a) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) who argued that various
job characteristics have a significant effect on the job satisfaction. Working in the medium and
large companies increases the odds of being very satisfied with job. An increase in the health
status by one category increases the odds ratio of being very satisfied with the job. Working in
shifts and working in the fixed hours regimes increase the odds ratio of being in the highest job
satisfaction category by 1.18 and 1.23, respectively.
In model III we have add the variable risk in order to test whether the job satisfaction
would be lower among workers in the performance pay jobs after we control for the risk attitude.
Although, we have found that workers who are ready to accept higher risks tend to report a
higher odds ratio of being more satisfied with the job, still the odds ratio on risk attitude is not
7This effect is calculated as follows ln(exp(αˆ2)) = ln(3.107).
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significant. We can also notice that once we have controlled for the risk attitude of individuals,
the odds ratios for all other variables remain almost unchanged relative to the specification in
model II. Thus, even after controlling for the log wage and risk attitudes the odds of being very
satisfied with the job are higher for workers in the performance pay jobs.
3.5.1.1 Sub-samples of Men and Women
Since the effects of performance pay jobs on job satisfaction could possibly differ between gender,
we have estimated the job satisfaction regression separately for men and women. These results
are presented in table 3.2 and table 3.3 for men and women, respectively. For easier comparison
of the results across gender we have plotted the odds ratios and confidence intervals for model
I (figure 3.4), model II (figure 3.5) and model III (figure 3.6).
Let us first take a look at the model I which illustrates the odds ratios of the performance
pay jobs on job satisfaction after controlling for a vector of socio-demographic and job related
characteristics, time and regional dummies. We have found that for both men and women the
odds ratio of being very satisfied with the job relative to all lower categories taken together is
higher among workers in the performance pay jobs. The odds of being very satisfied with job
are higher by 22 percent for men in the performance pay jobs and by 28 percent for women in
performance pay jobs. This evidence indicates that the effect of performance pay jobs on job
satisfaction is stronger for women than for men.
It is important to note that it is not possible to evaluate the effect of gender on job
satisfaction by including an indicator variable for gender in the job satisfaction regression since
we cannot separately identify the effects on time-invariant variables. Yet, we can compare the
estimates from the job satisfaction regression across gender. Clark (1997a) has found that the
job satisfaction greatly differ across gender since men and women are having quite different
expectations form the job. Women are having lower expectation from their jobs than men do
and therefore the job satisfaction for women will be higher. Crosby (1982) and Ross and Reskin
(1992) argue that individuals construct their expectations in the early phase of life during
nurturing and education, so one way of testing whether the gender difference in expectations
have an effect on job satisfaction would be to estimate the effects of age and education on
the job satisfaction across gender and then to see whether these effects differ between gender.
Unfortunately, the later approach is not feasible in our setting since it is not possible to identify
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the linear effect of age and time trend independently and therefore we are not keeping the former
variable in our model (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)).
We have found no significant effect of being married or having an additional child in the
household on job satisfaction for both men and women. We can notice that the odds ratio
greater than one applies only for male workers in a medium and large companies while the odds
ratio for women is not significant. For instance, males employed in a medium (large) companies,
compared with males employed in small companies are 15 (22) percent more likely to be in the
highest job satisfaction category. The odds ratio on subjective health status is greater than
one for both men and women, which implies that an increase in the subjective health by one
category will increase the odds of being in the highest category of job satisfaction by more than
one. The odds ratios on health variable is almost the same between men and women which
means that both men and women evaluate the health with the same importance. Working fixed
hours contribute to the odds of being very satisfied with the job, although this effect is only
significant for men. In other words, an unanticipated working hours will not affect the level of
satisfaction for women but it brings men more dissatisfied.
We are now turning to the model II where in addition to all variables in the previous
model we control for the log hourly wage. Again we test the prediction from the classical
principal-agent model that workers in the performance pay jobs should be on the lower level
of indifference curve once we control for the level of earnings. We can see that after we have
controlled for the log wage, the odds ratio on the performance pay jobs remained higher than
one for both men and women which implies that workers in the performance pay jobs have
a greater odds ratios of being on the higher level of job satisfaction than the workers in the
non-performance pay jobs. The following evidence clearly contrasts the predictions from the
standard principal- agent model. The odds of being very satisfied with the job are higher for
male (female) workers in performance pay jobs by 13 (20) percent which leads to a 7 percentage
points gender difference in favour of women.
Comparing the odds ratios for the performance pay jobs between models I and II, we
can notice that the odds ratios for being the most satisfied with the job have decreased after
we have controlled for wage by 9 and 8 percentage points for men and women, respectively.
However, even after we have controlled for wage, for both men and women there is a positive
and significant difference in the level of satisfaction between workers in performance pay jobs
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and workers paid by fixed amount. For a one unit increase in the log hourly wage, the log odds
of being very satisfied with the job increase by 1.16 for men and by 1.10 for women8. Both men
and women that work in the medium or large companies are having a higher odds ratio of being
very satisfied with job than men and women employed in small companies (although the effect
is not significant for women). Working in shifts has the positive effect on job satisfaction for
men but not for women. A higher self reported health status increases job satisfaction for both
men and women while working in shifts contributes to higher job satisfaction only for men.
In model III we have introduced a variable that measures the attitude towards risk in
order to test whether the differences in preferences for undertaking risks have an effect on job
satisfaction for men and women (see figure 3.6). We have fount that the odds ratios on the risk
attitude are almost equal to one for both men and women which implies that the risk attitude
does not increase the likelihood of becoming very satisfied with the job and moreover these
effects are not significant for both men and women.
3.5.2 The Effects of Individual, Group and Company Performance Pay
Schemes on Job Satisfaction
In order to analyse whether a different performance pay schemes have different effects on job
satisfaction, we have used the information on the particular type of performance paying scheme
that applies to a worker. We could determine for each worker who has been using the perfor-
mance pay scheme, whether she or he is using an individual, group or company performance
pay scheme at their job. In the individual scheme wage is decided according to individual’s
output, in group scheme wage is decided according to team or division’s output and in company
scheme wage is decided according to the company’s overall performance.
The results are illustrated in table 3.4. We first illustrate the results for model I. We
observe that an odds ratio greater than one applies to every type of performance paying scheme
which indicates that workers employed in such schemes are having a higher odds of being in the
highest job satisfaction category compared to the workers who are paid by the fixed amount.
Workers in the individual performance pay jobs are having the highest likelihood to be very sat-
isfied with their jobs in contrast to workers in fixed paid jobs. For instance, if a worker switches
from a non-performance pay job to the individual performance pay jobs, group performance
8Alternatively, the effect of wage on job satisfaction can be interpreted as a one percent increase in wage (or
0.001 increase in log wage) increases the log odds by 0.0116 for men and by 0.0111 for women.
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pay jobs or company performance pay jobs, then her odds of being very satisfied with the job is
by 25, 24 or 19 percent higher, respectively. The latter effects indicate that the cooperation re-
duces the odds ratios relative to those workers who are using the individual performance paying
schemes. In fact, this evidence goes in line with the findings of Drago and Garvey (1998) who
argue that the performance paying schemes increase the competition among co-workers which
directly leads to a lower job satisfaction for these workers.
In model II we control for the log wage so that the effect of the performance paying scheme
on job satisfaction is independent of earnings. Again, it is important to note that the effects
of performance paying schemes on job satisfaction that we have found in model I could be
confounded since workers in the performance paying jobs could receive a wage premium for
undertaking a higher risks and thus we expect the job satisfaction of these workers to increase.
We can see that after controlling for wages, all performance paying schemes have the odds ra-
tios that are higher than one, with a slight drop in the odds ratios for performance paying jobs
relative to the odds ratios in model I. The odds ratio of being very satisfied with the job is by
19 (16) percent higher for workers in the individual (group) performance paying jobs than for
workers in non-performance paying jobs. Again, this evidence goes clearly in contrast with the
assumption of the standard principal-agent model which says that on-the-job utility or job sat-
isfaction is lower for workers in the performance paying jobs once we control for their earnings
since these workers will be exposed to a greater risk.
Comparing the results between models I and II, we can see that the odds ratios on all
types of performance paying jobs decreased for the later model. The odds ratio for the individ-
ual performance pay jobs decreased by 6 percentage points while for the group performance it
has decreased by 8 percentage points. These reductions in odds ratios approximate the wage
premium that workers in individual and group performance pay jobs receive. It is important to
note that the wage premiums that the firms are paying to workers in the performance pay jobs
are lower than the optimal wage premiums predicted by the microeconomic theory since workers
employed in the performance pay job still enjoy a higher level of job satisfaction than work-
ers in non-performance paid jobs. According to the microeconomic theory, the wage premium
would need to be set at the point where the job satisfaction between workers in performance
and non-performance pay jobs equates. Interestingly, after we have controlled for the log wage
the effect of the company performance pay scheme on job satisfaction disappeared. One reason
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that can explain the following evidence comes from the fact that the determination of wage
for the company performance pay scheme depends on the level of performance exerted from all
employees together and thus the wage premium paid for the company performance job scheme
may not be high enough to compensate workers for their higher risks.
Although we have found a positive effect of wage on job satisfaction, nevertheless the mag-
nitude of the odds ratio does not indicate that money buys job satisfaction as it was found
for the overall life satisfaction by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004). We have found that a one
unit increase in the log hourly wage increases the log odds ratio of being very satisfied with the
job by 1.149 or alternatively a one percent increase in wage10 increases the log odds by 0.0114.
Working in a medium or large company increases the odds of being very satisfied with the job
relative to those working in a small companies. We can notice that if the subjective health
increases by one category then the odds of being very satisfied with the job increases by 1.53
(or 53 percent). The results show that working in shifts or having a fixed working hour contract
significantly increases the odds of being very satisfied with the job.
3.5.2.1 Sub-samples of Men and Women
Since are we are interested to see how different performance paying schemes effect job satisfaction
between gender, we have estimated the job satisfaction regression separately for men and women.
Let us first discuss the results obtained in model I (see table 3.5 for men and table 3.6 for women).
In case of men, the job satisfaction is higher for all types of the performance paying jobs, while
women are more satisfied only in the individual performance paying jobs. This evidence goes
in line with the findings that women feel a higher peer pressure when operating in the groups
(i.e. group and company performance pay schemes) and as a consequence they acquire a lower
level of job satisfaction while working in such environments (see Heywood et al. (2005)).
If a male worker switches from a non-performance pay jobs into the individual performance
pay jobs, group performance pay jobs or company performance pay jobs then her odds of being
very satisfied with the job are higher by 21, 23 or 21 percent, respectively. Women in the
individual performance paying job have a 35 percent higher odds ratio of being very satisfied
with the job relative to the same women being employed in a fixed pay job. This indicates
that for workers in the individual performance pay jobs, the odds of being in the highest job
9This effect is calculated as follows ln(exp(βˆ2)) = ln(3.115).
10Which is equivalent to an increase in log wage of 0.01.
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satisfaction category is by 14 percentage points higher for women than for men. There are
no significant effects of being married or having an additional child on the job satisfaction
either for men or women. Both men and women are more satisfied in the medium and large
companies than in the small companies, although the odds ratio is not significant for women
(see figure 3.7).
Let us now illustrate the results obtained from the model II where in addition to the
variables in the previous model, we have controlled for the level of earnings. The odds ratios
on all types of performance paying schemes are greater than one for both men and women
which implies that all performance paying schemes increase the job satisfaction more than the
non-performance paying schemes, although the only significant effect applies to women in the
individual performance paying jobs. Wage has a positive and significant effect on job satisfaction
for both men and women. A one unit increase in the log hourly wage increases the log odds of
being very satisfied with the job by 1.16 for men and by 1.11 for women11. Whether someone find
it surprising or not, both men and women care the most about their health. An improvement
in health by one category will increase the odds ratio of being very satisfied with the job by 53
(55) percent for men (women). Based on these findings we can conclude that it is not money
that buys job satisfaction but health.
11The effect for men is calculated as ln(exp(βˆm2 )) = ln(3.193) while the effect for women is calculated as
ln(exp(βˆw2 )) = ln(3.020).
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have estimated the effects of the performance pay job schemes on job sat-
isfaction. According to the microeconomic theory, the performance pay job schemes take into
account the additional productivity, effort and risk that workers would exert in such schemes
and as a way of compensation, the employers allow these workers to make the best effective use
of such schemes. On the other hand, this possibility would not be allowed to workers which are
not in the performance pay job schemes but instead they are paid by the the fixed amount (i.e.
an hourly salary). Thus, we would expect that workers in the performance pay job schemes
have a higher job satisfaction than workers in the non-performance pay job schemes, even after
we control for the level of earnings.
Since we have confirmed the later prediction in our analysis, this evidence goes clearly in
contrast with the standard principal-agent model which implies that once we control for the
level of earnings, the well-being on the job should be lower for the workers who are employed
under the non-performance pay schemes since the workers in the performance pay jobs need
to be compensated for being exposed to the higher risk. Nevertheless, it turns out that the
prediction from the standard principal-agent model is not well grounded.
An important and challenging issue in estimating the effects of performance pay job
schemes on job satisfaction concerns the choice of the econometric model. Due to the fact that
unobserved factors could have an important role in affecting the choice of payment schemes, we
cannot rely on the orthogonality of independent variables. For that matter, we have applied a
conditional fixed effects ordered logit model which allowed us to purge out the time-invariant
heterogeneity from the regressors.
The results have shown that whether we condition for the level of earnings or not, workers
in performance pay jobs have a higher job satisfaction. Nevertheless, once we have controlled
for the level of earnings, the odds ratio on performance pay jobs was slightly reduced in size but
still the effect was significant and large in magnitude. In addition, even after we have controlled
for the attitude toward risk, the effect of performance pay job schemes on job satisfaction re-
mained positive and statistically significant.
Estimating the job satisfaction for men and women separately, we have confirmed that
both men and women, conditionally or unconditionally on their earnings, are more satisfied on
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the job if they are working in the performance pay jobs. Despite of the evidence that women
are holding less attractive jobs and that they are paid less than men, our results indicate that
women in the performance paying jobs are more satisfied on their jobs. When it comes down to
the effect of wage on job satisfaction, we have found that the effect is not apparent as someone
might expect. We observe that among all explanatory variables, health has the strongest effect
on the job satisfaction. The later evidence goes in line with the results of Easterlin (1974) and
other studies who have found that focusing on income as the only source of individual utility is
wrong since other non-monetary variables do matter.
Finally, we have exploited the information on the individual, group and company perfor-
mance pay job schemes in order to test whether these schemes have different effects on job
satisfaction. We have found that workers who are employed in each type of performance pay
job schemes are more satisfied on their jobs than workers who are paid by the fixed amount.
Among those workers who are paid by performance, we have found that the strongest effect on
job satisfaction has the individual performance pay job scheme while the smallest effect has the
company performance pay job scheme.
Table 3.1: Job Satisfaction Regression: Performance Pay Jobs, Entire Sample
Model I Model II Model III
eβ s.e eβ s.e. eβ s.e.
Performance Pay Jobs 1.233*** (0.067) 1.149** (0.063) 1.148** (0.063)
Log Hourly Real Wage 3.107*** (0.214) 3.093*** (0.215)
Risk 1.027 (0.042)
Age squared/1000 1.553 (0.837) 5.102*** (2.811) 4.751*** (2.649)
Married 0.916 (0.083) 0.933 (0.084) 0.938 (0.086)
Number of kids 0.981 (0.057) 0.984 (0.058) 0.980 (0.058)
Medium Company 1.141** (0.071) 1.131** (0.071) 1.145** (0.072)
Large Company 1.192*** (0.076) 1.124* (0.071) 1.153** (0.074)
Working in shifts 1.096 (0.093) 1.181** (0.100) 1.177* (0.101)
Health 1.531*** (0.045) 1.525*** (0.045) 1.526*** (0.046)
Fixed hours 1.263*** (0.075) 1.229*** (0.074) 1.223*** (0.074)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0509 0.0697 0.0693
Log-likelihood -9562.5 -9461.6 -9312.4
Observations 26817 26817 26366
Notes: In all columns the omitted (base) variables are: dummy for upper secondary school,
experience 15-20, tenure 15-20, legislators (occupation), business activity (industry), Seoul,
small company and year 2003. Other controls consist of dummy variables for the acquired
level of education, dummies for the experience level in five years brackets and dummies
for the level of tenure in five years brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses with
clustering at individual level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%
level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.2: Performance Pay Jobs, Men
Model I Model II Model III
eβ s.e eβ s.e. eβ s.e.
Performance Pay Jobs 1.216*** (0.079) 1.132* (0.074) 1.128* (0.075)
Log Hourly Real Wage 3.189*** (0.265) 3.181*** (0.266)
Risk 1.007 (0.046)
Age squared/1000 1.816 (1.266) 8.044*** (5.777) 7.344*** (5.330)
Married 0.871 (0.102) 0.863 (0.100) 0.878 (0.103)
Number of kids 0.973 (0.074) 0.966 (0.074) 0.961 (0.074)
Medium Company 1.148* (0.087) 1.145* (0.087) 1.153* (0.089)
Large Company 1.217** (0.095) 1.142* (0.090) 1.171** (0.093)
Working in shifts 1.055 (0.102) 1.198* (0.117) 1.201* (0.119)
Health 1.532*** (0.056) 1.525*** (0.056) 1.521*** (0.057)
Fixed hours 1.353*** (0.096) 1.322*** (0.095) 1.310*** (0.095)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0568 0.0769 0.0761
Log-likelihood -6353.1 -6217.3 -6113.8
Observations 17648 17648 17326
Notes: In all columns the omitted (base) variables are: dummy for upper secondary school,
experience 15-20, tenure 15-20, legislators (occupation), business activity (industry), Seoul,
small company and year 2003. Other controls consist of dummy variables for the acquired
level of education, dummies for the experience level in five years brackets and dummies
for the level of tenure in five years brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses with
clustering at individual level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%
level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Performance Pay Jobs, Women
Model I Model II Model III
eβ s.e eβ s.e. eβ s.e.
Performance Pay Jobs 1.280** (0.128) 1.200* (0.121) 1.205* (0.123)
Log Hourly Real Wage 3.012*** (0.383) 3.000*** (0.384)
Risk 1.107 (0.098)
Age squared/1000 1.129 (0.982) 2.595 (2.294) 2.502 (2.239)
Married 0.993 (0.145) 1.057 (0.155) 1.045 (0.154)
Number of kids 0.995 (0.092) 1.011 (0.095) 1.010 (0.096)
Medium Company 1.164 (0.129) 1.132 (0.126) 1.156 (0.129)
Large Company 1.176 (0.129) 1.119 (0.121) 1.149 (0.126)
Working in shifts 1.212 (0.208) 1.148 (0.195) 1.131 (0.195)
Health 1.554*** (0.078) 1.550*** (0.079) 1.562*** (0.080)
Fixed hours 1.080 (0.118) 1.042 (0.116) 1.044 (0.117)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0501 0.0658 0.0671
Log-likelihood -3261.2 -3207.5 -3159.5
Observations 9164 9164 9035
Notes: In all columns the omitted (base) variables are: dummy for upper secondary school,
experience 15-20, tenure 15-20, legislators (occupation), business activity (industry), Seoul,
small company and year 2003. Other controls consist of dummy variables for the acquired
level of education, dummies for the experience level in five years brackets and dummies
for the level of tenure in five years brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses with
clustering at individual level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%
level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Individual, Group and Company Performance Pay Jobs, Entire Sample
Model I Model II Model III
eβ s.e eβ s.e. eβ s.e.
Individual Performance Pay Jobs 1.251*** (0.087) 1.185** (0.084) 1.184** (0.085)
Group Performance Pay Jobs 1.240** (0.108) 1.160* (0.103) 1.149 (0.103)
Company Performance Pay Jobs 1.190** (0.103) 1.066 (0.092) 1.079 (0.094)
Log Hourly Real Wage 3.115*** (0.215) 3.099*** (0.216)
Risk 1.027 (0.042)
Age squared/1000 1.557 (0.839) 5.142*** (2.834) 4.788*** (2.669)
Married 0.917 (0.084) 0.934 (0.084) 0.939 (0.086)
Number of kids 0.981 (0.057) 0.984 (0.058) 0.980 (0.058)
Medium Company 1.141** (0.071) 1.132** (0.071) 1.145** (0.072)
Large Company 1.193*** (0.076) 1.127* (0.071) 1.155** (0.074)
Working in shifts 1.097 (0.093) 1.183** (0.100) 1.178* (0.101)
Health 1.531*** (0.045) 1.525*** (0.045) 1.527*** (0.046)
Fixed hours 1.263*** (0.075) 1.230*** (0.074) 1.223*** (0.074)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0509 0.0698 0.0694
Log-likelihood -9652.4 -9460.9 -9311.9
Observations 26817 26817 26366
Notes: In all columns the omitted (base) variables are: dummy for upper secondary school, experience
15-20, tenure 15-20, legislators (occupation), business activity (industry), Seoul, small company and
year 2003. Other controls consist of dummy variables for the acquired level of education, dummies for
the experience level in five years brackets and dummies for the level of tenure in five years brackets.
Robust standard errors in parentheses with clustering at individual level. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Individual, Group and Company Performance Pay Jobs, Men
Model I Model II Model III
eβ s.e eβ s.e. eβ s.e.
Individual Performance Pay Jobs 1.213** (0.105) 1.152 (0.101) 1.140 (0.102)
Group Performance Pay Jobs 1.226** (0.126) 1.143 (0.120) 1.137 (0.121)
Company Performance Pay Jobs 1.213** (0.119) 1.086 (0.106) 1.100 (0.108)
Log Hourly Real Wage 3.193*** (0.265) 3.184*** (0.266)
Risk 1.007 (0.046)
Age squared/1000 1.815 (1.266) 8.074*** (5.799) 7.361*** (5.343)
Married 0.871 (0.102) 0.864 (0.100) 0.878 (0.103)
Number of kids 0.973 (0.074) 0.965 (0.074) 0.961 (0.074)
Medium Company 1.148* (0.087) 1.145* (0.087) 1.153* (0.089)
Large Company 1.217** (0.095) 1.143* (0.090) 1.172** (0.093)
Working in shifts 1.055 (0.103) 1.199* (0.117) 1.202* (0.119)
Health 1.532*** (0.056) 1.525*** (0.056) 1.521*** (0.057)
Fixed hours 1.353*** (0.096) 1.322*** (0.095) 1.310*** (0.095)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0568 0.0770 0.0761
Log-likelihood -6353.1 -6217.2 -6113.7
Observations 17646 17646 17326
Notes: In all columns the omitted (base) variables are: dummy for upper secondary school, experience
15-20, tenure 15-20, legislators (occupation), business activity (industry), Seoul, small company and
year 2003. Other controls consist of dummy variables for the acquired level of education, dummies for
the experience level in five years brackets and dummies for the level of tenure in five years brackets.
Robust standard errors in parentheses with clustering at individual level. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Individual, Group and Company Performance Pay Jobs, Women
Model I Model II Model III
eβ s.e eβ s.e. eβ s.e.
Individual Performance Pay Jobs 1.345** (0.158) 1.267** (0.150) 1.287** (0.154)
Group Performance Pay Jobs 1.285 (0.213) 1.217 (0.205) 1.181 (0.199)
Company Performance Pay Jobs 1.104 (0.213) 1.007 (0.194) 1.017 (0.199)
Log Hourly Real Wage 3.020*** (0.384) 3.008*** (0.385)
Risk 1.107 (0.098)
Age squared/1000 1.145 (0.996) 2.647 (2.339) 2.554 (2.285)
Married 0.994 (0.145) 1.058 (0.155) 1.047 (0.154)
Number of kids 0.996 (0.092) 1.012 (0.095) 1.011 (0.096)
Medium Company 1.166 (0.130) 1.133 (0.126) 1.157 (0.129)
Large Company 1.180 (0.129) 1.124 (0.122) 1.154 (0.126)
Working in shifts 1.215 (0.208) 1.151 (0.195) 1.136 (0.196)
Health 1.554*** (0.078) 1.550*** (0.079) 1.561*** (0.080)
Fixed hours 1.083 (0.119) 1.045 (0.116) 1.047 (0.117)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.0503 0.0660 0.0674
Log-likelihood -3260.7 -3206.7 -3158.7
Observations
Notes: In all columns the omitted (base) variables are: dummy for upper secondary school, experience
15-20, tenure 15-20, legislators (occupation), business activity (industry), Seoul, small company and
year 2003. Other controls consist of dummy variables for the acquired level of education, dummies for
the experience level in five years brackets and dummies for the level of tenure in five years brackets.
Robust standard errors in parentheses with clustering at individual level. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of Job Satisfaction over Performance Pay Jobs and Gender
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of Job Satisfaction over Gender within Performance Pay Jobs
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Figure 3.3: Proportion of Job Satisfaction within Gender over various Payment Schemes
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Figure 3.4: Effects of Performance Pay Jobs: Model I
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Figure 3.5: Effects of Performance Pay Jobs: Model II
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Figure 3.6: Effects of Performance Pay Jobs: Model III
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Figure 3.7: Effects of Various Performance Pay Jobs: Model I
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Figure 3.8: Effects of Various Performance Pay Jobs: Model II
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Figure 3.9: Effects of Various Performance Pay Jobs: Model III
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A.1 Rescaling and uprating procedures
Since our analysis is dealing with the population means and inequality measures, it is important
that these statistics, calculated from the EQLS income data, match as closely as possible those
calculated from other sources, such as national accounts in the case of population mean and
Eurostat’s figures on income inequality derived from EU-SILC. To ensure that, we had to do
rescaling of the EQLS incomes for the purpose of achieving the following steps.
First, the decile shares of equivalised household disposable income from the EQLS must
be equal to the decile shares from the EU-SILC. Under the assumption that most inequality in
income distribution is due to differences between the mean incomes of decile groups, by getting
the decile income shares in line with those based on the EU-SILC income data we try to get
Gini indices of income inequality computed from the EQLS incomes to be as close as possible, if
not equal to, the Ginis computed from the EU-SILC incomes (available from Eurostat). Second,
the mean disposable income per household member must be equal to the closest concept from
the national accounts in per capita terms. Following Decancq and Schokkaert (2016), we take
that national accounts income concept to be the net national income per capita in Purchasing
Poverty Standards (PPS) (available from Eurostat).
The rescaling procedure proceeds in four steps. In the first step, using the EU-SILC data
on the shares of decile groups in total equivalised disposable household income, we calculate,
for each country-year, what the mean for each decile group must be for the decile shares in the
EQLS data be equal to those from the EU-SILC. Here we use the fact that the overall mean,
Y , and the mean of decile group d, Y d, are related as Y d = sd · Y , where sd is the decile share
of group d. In the second step, we divide the decile means calculated in the first step by the
decile means calculated from the EQLS. This gives us decile-specific rescaling factors for each
country-year. Then we multiply all incomes in each of the decile groups for each country-year
by the rescaling factor corresponding to these decile groups and country-years. This ensures
that for each country-year the decile shares from the EQLS data be equal to those from the
EU-SILC data. In the third step, from the rescaled equivalised household disposable incomes
obtained in the second step, we recover the rescaled total household disposable incomes. From
these we calculate rescaled disposable household incomes per household member (rather than
per adult equivalent). These incomes are then further rescaled by multiplying them by country-
year-specific rescaling factors obtained as the ratio of the net national income per capita PPS
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to the mean disposable household income per household member. This ensures equality, for
each country-year, between the net national income per capita PPS and the mean disposable
household income per household member. In the final, fourth step, from the disposable house-
hold incomes per household member and the number of household members we recover total
disposable household incomes and divide them by the number of adult equivalents (according
to the OECD equivalent scale) to obtain the disposable household income per adult equivalent.
And, finally, to convert nominal to real incomes, we divide them all by country-year specific
consumer price indices (with 2005 as the base year). The income variable so obtained is the
one we use in the analysis.
Upon applying the rescaling procedure, we have checked if the Ginis calculated from the
rescaled EQLS incomes do indeed match those calculated from the EU-SILC incomes and found
that almost all of the initial differences vanish. Yet there is a reasonable a priori concern that by
rescaling incomes to get the EQLS Ginis close to the EU-SILC Ginis, one distorts the original
incomes to the extent that they become unreliable. To check that, we asked whether getting the
Ginis right comes at the price of substantial re-ranking of individuals by income, in the sense
that person i’s income, which before rescaling was higher than person j’s income, after rescaling
is lower rather than higher. This can well happen, particularly for people close to the bounds of
two decile groups, but also for those farther to a group’s interior in case of substantial rescaling.
By computing the portion of the difference between Ginis computed from the original incomes
and those computed from the rescaled incomes, we found that only a very small part of this
difference can be attributed to re-ranking. We consider that result a good enough indication
that the rescaled incomes are reliable. The more so given the fact that not all respondents
report the exact net household income, but rather choose from the number of intervals that are
offered.
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Figure B.1: Rank Changes in Job Quality
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Figure B.2: Relative WTP for Men and Women
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Figure B.2: Relative WTP for Men and Women (continued)
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